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City regions are riding high on the current political and policy agenda 
across the world. Their emergence is not accidental; they are being 
built in direct response to the deep ideological thinking exposed in 
key documents such as the World Bank’s (2009) World Development 
Report: Reshaping Economic Geography. This set- in train ‘new economic 
geography’ influenced arguments closely following the work of policy 
advisors such as Krugman, Glaeser, and Katz on the ‘new municipalism’ 
and ‘new localism’, which collectively draw links between urbanism, 
city- region scales of state intervention, agglomeration economies, and 
more democratic socioeconomic development through business and 
civil society partnerships for prosperity.
In the UK, this motif is clearly evident in reports over the past 
decade, commencing with the ‘Haywood Report’ in Wales and 
the Royal Society of Arts’ ‘City Growth Commission’ in England, 
which through the mantras of the Northern Powerhouse, Midlands 
Engine, and Western Powerhouse argued for the ‘unleashing’ of 
growth through a series of city regions or ‘metros’ – defined as the 
‘larger constellation of cities and towns that constitute a functional 
economy within build up areas’ – as the main drivers of economic 
growth in an increasingly knowledge- driven, global economy. More 
recently, city regions are pivotal to the Conservative Party’s post- Brexit 
governance- fix for ‘spatially rebalancing’ or ‘levelling up’ deep- seated 
geographical inequalities. In short, city regions are a conduit for 
redistributing prosperity, power and democracy from the South East 
to Northern ‘left- behind’ places, thereby reversing the long historical 
trend of uneven development and redevelopment. Or so the policy 
rhetoric goes …
City Regions and Devolution in the UK: The Politics of Representation 
examines this and particularly tackles the missing social sphere of 
these competitive relationships, equilibrating tendencies, and the 
vacuum around the politics of city- region building on- the- ground. It 
reports evidenced- based research probing on questions of social and 
spatial agency in practice: why civil society stakeholders are involved; 
what the motives are for their engagement or a lack of engagement; 
reasons for mobilisation or marginalisation (by interest groups and by 
geographical location); and, in turn, whether city regions can sustain 
economic agglomeration, anchor socioeconomic development, and 
deliver virtuous or vicious growth. The book addresses this by offering 
a geographical political economy framework for understanding the 
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dynamics of city- region building, highlighting the contradictions of 
state intervention, the experiences of civil society actors, and the ways 
in which policy problems are geographically played out.
Funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) 
as part of WISERD Civil Society (Grant ES/ L0090991/ 1), work 
package ‘Spaces of New Localism’, ESRC Impact Accelerator funding 
for ‘Making City- Regions Work: Inclusive Governance, Skills, and 
Labour Market Disadvantage’, and WISERD Civil Society (Grant 
ES/ S012435/ 1) ‘Changing Perspectives on Civic Stratification and 
Civil Repair’, the book draws on case study research in Wales (Cardiff, 
Swansea and North Wales) and England (Sheffield and Manchester), 
to put city- region building in its place. The book does not cover 
developments in Scotland and Northern Ireland or make any claims 
about these territories. Phase one involved the analysis of economic 
development strategies, construed firstly in national level government 
documentation (Bills, Acts, White and Green Papers) and secondly 
how this is translated through the various sub- national structures and 
projects of the state. Phase two looked at experiences of economic 
development through state- making practices and civil society struggles.
Each of the case studies featured in this book were designed to explore 
how effectively the institutions and actors of economic governance have 
been able, or not, to meet the challenges of economic development 
within their various localities. Ninety- one semi- structured interviews 
were undertaken between 2014 and 2019 with a wide variety of actors 
working in, and connected to, the field of economic development, 
ranging from Director and Chief Executive levels, to civil society 
engaged in policy formulation and delivery on the ground. This 
sample size and actor cross- section was deemed appropriate for rigorous 
qualitative insight into city- region building processes within the five 
case study sites. The interviews were mostly city region in situ office- 
based, digitally recorded, and draw from the governance structures 
and various sub- groups of economic development. Stratified actor 
sampling was undertaken, complemented by snowballing sampling 
techniques to assess more vulnerable and impenetrable groups (see 
Atkinson and Flint, 2001; Hitchings and Latham, 2020). For reasons of 
confidentiality, the individuals are not named; anonymous quotations 
feature in some chapters and in others, the ‘voices’ feature in the analysis 
of policy. These interviews were supported and triangulated by the 
analysis of policy documents, and vice versa, including institutional 
minutes, policy briefings, strategy papers, and media analysis.
newgenprepdf
1
Introduction: Onward devolution and 
city regions
The Government today outlines a new approach to local 
growth, shifting power away from central government to 
local communities, citizens and independent providers. This 
means recognising that where drivers of growth are local, 
decisions should be made locally. (HM Government, 2010: 5)
The government has an ambitious programme of devolution. 
It has sought to decentralise power through structural and 
legislative changes. The introduction of directly elected 
mayors with specific powers and responsibilities has 
enhanced local control and accountability … Just as the 
UK is bringing back power over its laws, money, borders, 
and trade from the European Union, so local places are taking 
economic, social, and cultural policy away from Westminster and 
Whitehall. (HM Government, 2018: 52, emphasis added)
[T] he motivation behind much recent institution- building 
in city- regions is ultimately rooted in a powerful logic 
of subsidiarization that sits well with the mosaic- like 
geography of contemporary capitalist society. Whether or 
not this trend enlarges the sphere of democracy and the right to 
the city remains a moot point depending precisely on the specific 
forms of political community that are put in place in any particular 
instance. (Scott, 2019: 569, emphasis added)
It has now been ten years since the launch of the UK Government’s 
‘Local Growth’ White Paper (2010), which set in train a series of policy 
initiatives concerned with removing the barriers for ‘civil society’ 
actors to participate in economic and political life through empowered 
devolved structures and new institutions of governance. This in turn 
built on a previous decade of devolution and constitutional change, 
which had resulted in the Scottish Parliament, Elected Assemblies in 
Northern Ireland, Wales and London, plus (at that time) Regional 
Development Agencies (RDAs) and emerging city regions across 
England. This previous decade was the biggest shake- up to the UK 
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state apparatus in recent times; in the words of Bogdanor, ‘the most 
radical constitutional change this country has seen since the Great 
Reform Act of 1832’ (1999: 1) – an Act that set in motion our modern 
democratic state.
Building on this, as the subtitle of ‘Local Growth’ reads, ‘realising 
every place’s potential’ charted a further decade of ‘participatory 
democracy’, ending ‘top down initiatives’ that ignored the varying 
needs of different areas, instead creating active and real partnerships 
to bring together civil society, business, and civic leaders to ‘set the 
strategy and take the decisions that will allow their area to prosper’ 
(HM Government, 2010). Further, by extending the development of 
enterprise partnerships, city regions and leadership through directly- 
elected mayors, growth could be fostered and spatially agglomerated 
by giving more power to local areas. In short, making municipal 
decisions more accountable and responsive to local economic 
conditions was the driving force behind state intervention and public 
policy. Collectively, this was the dawn of a localism ‘new era for cities’ 
(Emmerich, 2017a: 101) – new in the sense of ‘looking across the 
board’ at how government could ‘hand power back to people’ through 
new forms of governance to modernise the United Kingdom (HM 
Government, 2010: 3).
The second quotation, taken from the UK Government’s Civil 
Society Strategy, represents a confident stock- take of achievements 
made against this ambitious programme. It uses the phrase ‘onward 
devolution’ to capture city- region building to foster a sense of shared 
identity across the UK – improving integration among the people of a 
particular place and also among the people of the UK as a whole (HM 
Government, 2018: 52). As we discuss below, this involved legislation 
such as Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016, as well as 
increasing powers to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, to ramp 
up localist democracy. The foreword to this intervention boldly states 
that people have indeed been ‘empowered to take responsibility for 
their neighbourhoods’, as power has been ‘decentralised so that local 
officials and professionals are properly accountable to local people, and 
trusted to do their job without bureaucratic interference’. Moreover, 
the provision of economic development and public services is seen 
as the ‘business of the community’, not solely the responsibility of 
government, as providers are invariably drawn from a broad range of 
suppliers from the public sector and beyond. All communities, then, 
‘regardless of levels of segregation and deprivation, are able to take 
advantage of these opportunities’ (HM Government, 2018: 10), with 
the caveat being that ‘places are not all starting from the same point’ 
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but state intervention has the ‘potential to benefit all communities, 
regardless of circumstance’ (HM Government, 2018: 52).
Sandwiched betwixt and between these landmark UK Government 
statements, critiques of these moments of localism over the past 
decade though have pointed to very different scenarios being played 
out in the ‘evolution of devolution’ (UK Parliament, 2016: 9). Four 
particular interventions are worth mentioning. First, the National Audit 
Office report on the ‘Funding and Structures for Local Economic 
Growth’ recognises that ‘growth policy’ has seen an accelerating 
sequence of initiatives over a number of decades, where structures 
and funding regimes are regularly replaced by devolved schemes, 
but ‘local responsibilities and freedoms’ on the ground are ‘limited’, 
tightly ‘constrained’, and ‘poorly coordinated’ (National Audit Office, 
2013: 16). Second, the Institute of Government’s All Change: Why 
Britain is So Prone to Policy Reinvention, and What Can Be Done About 
It also reveals limited devolution due to Whitehall’s ‘unwillingness to 
place trust in existing local institutions’ (Norris and Adam, 2017: 14). 
This reports a ‘policy- churn culture’ of ‘near constant upheaval’, due to 
continuous centralisation through waves of ‘decentralisation’, with no 
evidence of strategic thinking, much policy confusion, costing annually 
£15 million for the continual reorganisation of a single government 
department alone (Norris and Adam, 2017: 3). In short, devolution 
discord is rife and awakened citizenry is somewhat limited.
Third, in a report called Democracy: The Missing Link in the Devolution 
Debate (Lyall et al, 2015), the New Economics Foundation analysed 
the arguments for devolution from a range of documents published 
between 2011 and 2015 by the central government, local governments, 
think- tanks, and civil society groups. The New Economics Foundation 
found that although economic growth was the most prominent 
outcome supporting devolution, it was poorly conceptualised and 
the distributional context was unknown. In particular, there was 
minimal reference to: austerity or structural problems affecting the UK 
economy; a more equitable distribution of growth benefits as reflected 
in living standards; improved working conditions, pay and job security 
besides the promised increase in levels of employment; and the way in 
which growth affects environmental sustainability (Lyall et al, 2015: 5).
Fourth, the UK2070 Commission – an independent inquiry into 
geographical inequalities, chaired by Kerslake, who ran the civil 
service from 2011 to 2014 – issued a final ‘ultimatum’ report (Pidd, 
2020: 15): Make No Little Plans – Acting at Scale for a Fairer and Stronger 
Justice (UK2070, 2020a), which questions the localist ‘benefits for 
all’ philosophy and instead suggests ‘nobody is winning’ or being 
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empowered. Official data (IFS, 2019) reveals that deep- rooted spatial 
inequalities persist in the UK, but the report notes limited debate 
about this, it suggests the ‘economic potential of large parts of the UK 
is not being realised’ and ‘an imbalance of wealth and opportunity’ 
exists in localist Britain, with ‘increasing economic insecurity’ 
(UK2070 Commission, 2020a: foreword). Understandably, government 
statements such as ‘it is important that the public understand where 
power lies if the democratic process is to work effectively’ (UK 
Parliament, 2016:  53) raise serious questions about devolution, 
governance, and civil society in the UK.
The third quotation, from Scott, puts these important geographical 
developments into a wider conceptual context, as they signal a deep 
intellectual concern with the academic fields of socioeconomic 
development, economic growth and spatial agglomeration, the politics 
of representation and dimensions of social polarisation, and, above all, 
critical concerns with democracy, governance and public policy in 
the context of political coordination and uneven development. Scott’s 
evaluative review of city- region developments from around the world 
over the past 50 years highlights three global driving forces. These 
collectively claim that, firstly, urbanisation is a global phenomenon to 
be embraced at all costs and within this, city regions are the principal 
spatial scale at which this happens and people experience meaningful 
lived reality. Secondly, the economic basis of city regions rests on 
concentration and specialisation, which allows spatial agglomeration 
to take place and externalities to be maximised. The clearest state of 
this purpose is offered by Deas et al (2020: 6), where agglomeration 
‘envisages city- regions as dynamic nodes in the global economy, 
characterised by dense networks of firms and concentrations of skilled 
workers, underpinned by well- developed infrastructure, a business 
friendly fiscal and physical environment, and a host of cultural assets 
and residential amenities’.
Thirdly, cosmopolitan partnership policy management is required 
with a bold and confident voice, working with the grain of market 
logistics. This necessitates new ‘spatial orderings’ (such as governance 
frameworks) to lubricate agglomeration and provide efficiency by 
lowering transaction costs and promoting proximity, thereby liberating 
growth and allowing it to spread geographically for all to benefit. Last, 
as state spatial restructuring is ‘materializing at a rapid pace’ and new 
forms of regulation and governance such as ‘city- regions are always at 
the same time conditioned by idiosyncrasies related to local material, 
social, and cultural circumstances’, Scott notes the importance of these 
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(UK) policy developments for informing academic debates (Scott, 
2019: 574). We certainly live in serendipitous times.
City Regions and Devolution in the UK: The Politics of Representation is 
situated in and contributes to these academic and policy concerns. It is 
concerned with the topics of devolution, localism, governance and the 
involvement of actors in city regions. The latter being under researched 
and silent in current debates. The book particularly questions social and 
spatial agency by analysing the representation and engagement of civil 
society to provide comparative windows on devolution and economic 
governance. Civil society is interpreted integrally as a ‘shifting horizon 
of action rather than a fixed reality’ (Jessop, 2020: xi) and where
everything that goes on to link the world of government to 
the rest of society … the sphere in which social movements 
are active, and where the popular challenges that sustain 
democracy’s vibrancy are located; but it is also the space 
within which the political power of unequal wealth is 
wielded. (Crouch, 2020: 20– 21; see also Heinrich, 2005)
We refer to ‘encounters’ (Jones, 2012) of city- region building through 
the endeavours of local government, trade unions, voluntary and third 
sector organisations, plus the plethora of social movements, based 
within and between places, thus situating civil society in the context 
of ‘critical governance studies’ (Jessop, 2020: xv).
Deploying case study research in exemplar Welsh localities (Cardiff 
Capital Region (CCR), Swansea Bay City Region (SBCR) and North 
Wales) and English localities (Sheffield City Region (SCR) and Greater 
Manchester City Region (GMCR)), the remaining chapters address 
key questions such as: what policy, strategy and institutional changes 
have taken place in the landscape of economic development since 
2010 in England and Wales? How do these changes affect and involve 
civil society organisations? What are the narratives of devolution and 
community engagement and how are these being worked into policies 
and procedures for stakeholder engagement? Who is ultimately involved 
in the localism and how does this relate to forms of associational life 
and political engagement? How successful are city- region builders 
in realising the objectives of agglomeration, economic development, 
growth, and social empowerment? We answer these through empirical 
material and policy commentary undertaken between 2014 and 2020 – 
a six- year window on economic governance spanning the ascendency 
of the Conservative Party, starting first with the Tory- Liberal Coalition, 
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and progressing to a Conservative dominated ‘beyond Brexit Britain’ 
(Bogdanor, 2019).
The remainder of this chapter provides a background to debates 
on city- region governance, economic development, and the politics 
of representation. It provides a ‘geographical political economy 
framework’ for grappling with city- region governance, which requires 
a consideration of the relationships between the state, economy and 
localism to understand historical specificities, trends, and counter- 
trends of state intervention. The chapter concludes by providing an 
overview of the arguments and chapters to follow.
City regions, devolution, the state and the politics 
of representation
City Regions and Devolution in the UK is about the big- picture academic 
concerns, anchored through small stories on the nature and scale of 
UK state intervention. It addresses Scott’s (2019: 574) concerns to 
deploy city- region building to provide a window on 21st century 
capitalism and its distinctive social and economic features, as well as 
the contradictions of this model of production and growth. The book 
builds on previous ‘governance geography’ research, which argues that 
economic success within any given territory is not exclusively the result 
of a narrow set of economic factors, but instead is partially dependent 
on a whole range of social, cultural and institutional forms and supports, 
alongside concerns with social and spatial agency (Goodwin et al, 2012, 
2017; Jones, 2019a, 2019b; MacKinnon, 2020). What is clear from 
the quotations above is that lots has been happening with regards to 
devolution, awakened citizenry, and city- region policymaking. What 
is less clear, as illustrated by concerns raised above, is whether this has 
enhanced or hindered the involvement of civil society actors and the 
capacity of the new institutions to deliver their economic strategies. 
The contemporary governance geography question, then, is why city 
regions and why now?
City- region solutions
As noted above, the notion of a ‘city region’ ushers into play areal units 
wherein socioeconomic and sociocultural relations can be effectively 
contained and developed – such as ‘uniting a city and its surrounding 
suburbs and quasi- suburbs with rural areas beyond’ (Redcliffe- Maud 
and Wood, 1974:  34). In this context, the planning tradition has 





development strategies, associated in turn with debates on the structure 
of local government, as well as forms of state intervention to address 
economic distributions of growth and opportunity for employment 
(Axinte et al, 2019). Debates have focused on stabilising city regions as 
‘functional realities’ by aligning economic activity with administrative 
jurisdictions to create planning areas (compare Hall, 2009; Hall and 
Tewdwr- Jones, 2010; Harrison, 2007; Ward 1988). Healey though 
warns that the search for city regions that ‘encompasses some stable 
“coherence” and “integration” relations may  … be misguided’ 
(2009: 832, emphasis added). Historically, city regions are one of several 
territorial frameworks for anchoring economic development, with 
much geographical flux happening around the mechanisms, institutions 
and spaces of sub- national economic governance.
The UK, since industrialisation, has a long history of uneven 
development/ redevelopment and spatial disparity, which broadly 
speaking has consistently focused the majority of economic growth 
and power within the Southeast of UK, specifically London (McCann, 
2016). This relationship has been further exacerbated through processes 
of de- industrialisation, which has been coupled with an increased 
centralisation of governmental and financial power to London (Martin, 
2015). The apparent regional disparity is often phrased in one of two 
ways, either as an overheating Southeast or that the other regions are 
underperforming and thus not reaching their full potential. Following 
Massey (1979), there is a need to move away from seeing ‘regional 
problems’ as related to merely spatial distribution and to think of such 
inequalities in holistic terms, namely how regions, and more specifically 
city regions, are being constructed and mobilised to capitalise on 
and gain competitive advantages in the global economy (While et al, 
2013). The city region for urban elites developing policy in the UK, 
then, becomes an institutional agent and spatial scale on which capital 
investment (both internal and external) can be attracted to and acted on.
Since the identification of this disparity, there has been a significant 
number of attempts to address this imbalance and these have often 
shifted in their scalar focus (Jones, 2019a, 2019b). Under New Labour 
(from 1997 onwards) for example, the UK Government attempted 
to ‘modernise’ the UK state with a strong regional focus for both 
democratic delivery and economic development. This led to RDAs 
being created throughout the UK and for a number of reasons this 
modernisation process stalled under New Labour; there was the failure 
to ‘sell’ regional devolution to the English Regions, although Welsh 
and Scottish devolution were hailed as successes (compare, Rallings and 
Thrasher, 2006; Pike et al, 2015; Bogdanor, 2019). The Labour Party 
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was also criticised for being overly centralist and not really wishing to 
cede power to the regions (HM Government, 2011), despite talking 
the language of decentralism. This was reflected in a strong emphasis 
on targets and measures for RDAs. There was also a belief that over 
time RDAs became bogged down in bureaucracy due to mission creep, 
as they were consistently being expected to do more with less. Finally, 
the global economic crisis and the removal of New Labour from office 
(2010) saw the end to the UK’s experiment with a specifically regional 
growth model for development (Imrie and Raco, 2003).
With the supposed failure of RDAs and the ‘regional approach’ within 
England, as expressed by the Conservative- led coalition on coming 
to power, the focus then shifted towards a supposedly more flexible 
and localised city- regional scale for economic development (Pugalis 
and Townsend, 2012). This meant that in England, the RDAs were 
dismantled and replaced by Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs), which 
aim to be more locally strategic for doing economic development. 
They are also meant to give a more ‘naturally’ relevant scale on which 
economic activity takes place by bringing together different adjoining 
local authorities (LAs) whereby LAs negotiate which LEP they see 
themselves as being most appropriately based within. They were given 
an open remit to begin, with central government not wishing to dictate 
fully their terms of activity (HM Government, 2010), but LEPs have 
been expected to respond to the broader issues surrounding transport, 
planning, housing, local infrastructure, employment and enterprise, 
and the transition to a low carbon economy. This reflected a new form 
of institution building at the city- region level: boards largely made up 
of local business elites, alongside elected LA members – the vision 
being that such business elites can develop with elected members 
more appropriate locality- based, functional mechanisms for growth 
(BIS, 2010a). Critical here is the deep ideological belief in developing 
city- region based ‘functional economic areas’, which HM Treasury 
(2007) endorsed through the Sub- National Review.
Building on this ‘local growth agenda’, the Cities and Local 
Government Devolution Act 2016 formalised a move towards 
integrated governance with mayoral combined authorities (CAs) 
and also set in train a series of Devolution, City, and Growth Deals 
(reflecting the boundaries of some LEPs), done on a city- by- city basis 
and not uniform in their scope and reward (see National Audit Office, 
2016). In England, during the first wave, the eight largest Core Cities 
outside London all received City Deals (HM Government, 2015a). 
The largest and most broad ranging of these has been the Greater 
Manchester Devolution Deal, set within the context of claims made 
Introduction
9
for the Northern Powerhouse (Chapters 2 and 4) to direct power and 
resources into Northern Britain. There has subsequently been a Wave 
of City Deals with further deals for other city regions being progressed 
along weaker lines (Sandford, 2019, 2020).
Different processes of negotiation have been applied to the Celtic 
devolved territories, set within their different devolution settlements. 
Within Scotland, there have been six Deals, with Northern Ireland 
receiving Deals for Belfast and Mid Ulster. Following several 
amendments to devolution through Acts passed in 2006 and 2011, 
the Welsh Government Minister established a ‘task and finish’ group 
to consider the potential role of city regions in the future economic 
development of Wales. The task was to decide, on the basis of objective 
evidence, whether a spatially focused city- region approach to economic 
development, as opposed to the (national) Wales Spatial Plan (WSP), 
could deliver an increase in jobs and prosperity for Wales. The three 
reasons for adopting a city- region approach were:  improving the 
planning system; improving connectivity; and driving investment 
through a stronger and more visible offering from an agglomerated 
wider region (see Welsh Government 2011; House of Commons 
Welsh Affairs Committee, 2019). A final report argued that:  ‘City- 
region boundaries must reflect economic reality and not political 
or administrative boundaries. Genuine engagement and meaningful 
collaboration across many local authorities will be needed. This will 
certainly involve ceding power, funding and decision making to a more 
regional level’ (Welsh Government, 2012: 7).
Two city regions have been created:  SBCR (Chapter  6) and 
CCR (Chapter 4), with both awarded City Deals in 2016. A North 
Wales Growth Deal (NWGD) followed in 2019 (Chapter  5), 
with a Mid- Wales Growth Deal currently under discussion. The 
structure of the deals in Wales is different as no such LEPs exist 
and responsibility for economic development is devolved to the 
Welsh Parliament (previously the National Assembly for Wales, 
1999– 2020). Given that the Welsh Parliament holds powers over LA 
powers and funding, there is ‘therefore no devolution of financial 
levers and the deals so far agreed have been purely economic 
stimulus packages for the areas involved’ (House of Commons 
Welsh Affairs Committee, 2019: 6).
The shift to the city region, then, represents a changing scalar 
relationship for both democracy and economic development in the 
UK, especially in English cities, with some Welsh and Scottish cities 
following, but devolution of powers is less of a factor for city deals in 
Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland than it is in England. Figure 0.1 
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Islands Growth Deal Growth Deal 1
Inverness and Highlands City Region Deal City Deal 2
Moray Growth Deal Growth Deal 3
Aberdeen City Region Deal City Deal 4
Tay Cities Region Deal City Deal 5
Edinburgh & South East Scotland City Region Deal/Tay Cities Region Deal City Deal 5/11
Stirling and Clackmannanshire City Region Deal City Deal 6
Argyll and Bute Growth Deal Growth Deal 7
Ayrshire Growth Deal Growth Deal 8
Glasgow City Region City Deal City Deal 9
Falkirk Growth Deal Growth Deal 10
Edinburgh & South East Scotland City Region Deal City Deal 11
Derry and Strabane City Deal City Deal 12
Causeway Coast and Glens Growth Deal Growth Deal 13




North Eastern Growth Deal 18/B
Cumbria Growth Deal 19
Tees Valley Devolution Deal 20/C
Lancashire Growth Deal 21
Leeds City Region Growth Deal 22
Business Inspired Growth: York, North Yorkshire and East Riding Growth Deal 23
Liverpool City Region Devolution Deal 24/D
Greater Manchester Devolution Deal 25/E
West Yorkshire Devolution Deal 26/F
Humber Growth Deal 27
North Wales Growth Deal Growth Deal 28
Mid-Wales Growth Deal Growth Deal 29
Swansea Bay City Deal City Deal 29
Cardiff Capital Region City Deal City Deal 31
Cheshire and Warrington Growth Deal 32
Sheffield City Region Devolution Deal 33/G
Greater Lincolnshire Devolution Deal 34
The Marches Growth Deal 35
Stoke-on-Trent and Staffordshire Growth Deal 36
Derby, Derbyshire, Nottingham and Nottinghamshire, Growth Deal 37
Black Country Growth Deal 38
Greater Birmingham and Solihull Growth Deal 39
Leicester and Leicestershire Growth Deal 40
Greater Cambridge & Greater Peterborough Growth Deal 41
West Midlands Devolution Deal 42/H
Worcestershire Growth Deal 43
Coventry and Warwickshire Growth Deal 44
South East Midlands Growth Deal 45
Cambridgeshire and Peterborough Devolution Deal 46/I
New Anglia Growth Deal 47
Norfolk and Suffolk Devolution Deal 48
Gloucestershire Growth Deal 49
Oxfordshire LEP Growth Deal 50
Buckinghamshire Thames Valley Growth Deal 51
Hertfordshire Growth Deal 52
West of England Devolution Deal 53/J
Swindon and Wiltshire Growth Deal 54
Thames Valley Berkshire Growth Deal 55
London Growth Deal 56
Greater London Devolution Deal 57
South East Growth Deal 58
Cornwall Devolution Deal 59
Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly Growth Deal 60
Heart of the South West Growth Deal 61
Dorset Growth Deal 62
Solent Growth Deal 63
Enterprise M3 Growth Deal 64
Coast to Capital Growth Deal 65
Belfast Region City Deal City Deal 15
Borderlands Inclusive Growth Deal Growth Deal 16
North of Tyne Devolution Deal 17/A
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captures this evolving piecemeal economic and political geography. 
The approach is not without its questions concerning an effective 
deployment as an equitable and spatial rebalancing strategy. The 
following section discusses these in considering why the city region 
has become the de facto model for urban and economic development 
and why this is deemed problematic for civil society actors.
City- region growth machines, neoliberalism and civil society
Work by Scott (2001, 2019) discussed above is a prime example in 
delineating the success city regions can have. The focus on scale is 
important as a key feature on their success has been for their urban 
centre’s ability to dominate the region surrounding them. This allows 
for a suitable supply of labour, as well as the space to spread, as city 
agglomeration grows (Storper, 2013). This points towards the concept 
of agglomeration in urban theory whereby an urban centre enlarges by 
engulfing more land, labour and infrastructure into its region (Rigby 
and Brown, 2013). Agglomeration at the city- region scale, then, is the 
current ideological discourse that is dominant within the neoliberal 
growth model of urban development thinking (Haughton et al, 2013). 
Its various proponents (such as Fujita and Krugman, 1995; Harding, 
2007; Nathan and Overman, 2013; Scott and Storper, 2003; Florida, 
2014) all purport in different ways to a model, which celebrates the 
perpetually development of the urban, while running the risk of 
glossing over the structural inequality that it creates.
There has also been a strong influence on UK policymakers from 
North American accounts on urban development, where a focus on 
the ‘Metro’ areas and ‘New Municipalism’ approaches (see Glaeser, 
2012; Barber, 2014; Katz and Bradley, 2014; Katz and Nowak, 2017; 
cf. Thompson, 2020) has had a strong influence on structuring UK 
urban policy (RSA, 2014). This is done by often focusing solely 
on ‘successful’ metro/ regional case studies (Harrison, 2007), which 
are highly spatially selective, highlighting only a narrow narrative 
of economic success through agglomeration (Lovering, 2007). The 
proponents of this approach conceptualise the city region as the focus 
for generating growth (Harding, 2007) in which the city should be 
mobilised to pull in capital as best actors can. The city region is thus 
constructed as a ‘growth machine’ (Logan and Molotch, 1987; Jonas 
and Wilson, 1999), which aims to develop a critical mass of investment 
so that such growth can then lead to a trickle- down effect for the city 
region as a whole (Overman et al, 2007). At the centre of this is the 




economic performance terms, it is better to ignore economic and 
historical imbalances and to concentrate on continuing growth, rather 
than address distribution and inequality at the outset. In the words of 
an influential commentator on this perspective:
Investing in more successful cities to either enhance the 
economy or reduce cost of living clearly exacerbates uneven 
spatial development. But I have tried to argue that this may 
make for good economic policy in a world where who you 
are matters more than where you are and the government 
can’t do much to offset the market forces that make some 
places perform worse than others. Of course, adopting such 
a course, and prioritising growth over rebalancing makes 
for very difficult politics for constituency based politicians. 
(Overman, 2012: 1)
Pushing the mantra of neoliberalism, which is the ideological backdrop 
to this, ‘success’ creates success and the city region is thus seen as a tool 
for economic growth, which focuses on building an economic mass, 
the skills base and the transport links of the region (see Chapter 5). The 
political project of city regionalism is to, therefore, rescale the central 
city into a much larger territory and to bring surrounding territories 
under its purview. It pushes the dominant centre’s identity and politics 
onto its hinterland (Deas et  al, 2020; Vainikka, 2015)  through an 
economic rationalism for growth and due to this, everything else 
becomes secondary concerns and social noise (see Peck and Tickell, 
1994, 2012).
City- regional worlds, critiques and missing links
Critiques of this position have been varied and there have been a 
variety of heated debates in the academic literature, which have 
opened up discussions with regards to city- region development. This 
will be developed further below, but with regards city regions and 
agglomeration, Haughton et  al (2014) neatly point out the failure 
of agglomeration to develop even growth, in spite of its boosterish 
potential. In discussion with Overman (2014), Haughton et al (2014) 
detail how a desire to relax planning constraints in urban areas for 
‘growth’ suffers from ‘short- term’ thinking that focuses on the centres 
of successful agglomeration examples while ignoring the uneven 
growth this creates within the city and its surroundings (see Cochrane 
and Massey, 1989; Etherington and Jones, 2009; Massey, 2015). Such 
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approaches fail to counter this evidence with empirical work from 
other less successful locations, therefore, not taking into account the 
way in which such processes, although potentially good for one city 
region, could be highly constraining for another (Henderson and Ho, 
2014; Lovering, 1999). Harrison (2007) argues that this represents a 
shift in terms of the spatial scale on which economic competition takes 
place as ‘New Regionalist’ thinking (see Brenner, 2004; Keating et al, 
2013) and is then rescaled to the city region. By moving from the 
region to the city region, the system of city- regional development only 
increases the competition between urban areas, rather than breaking 
it down, or it attempts to create uneasy growth coalitions such as the 
Northern Powerhouse (Chapters 2, 3 and 4), which is as fractious as 
it is cooperative.
Accordingly, critics of city- region deal- making policy have noted 
problems of governance complexity, which reproduces regional 
inequalities by focusing only on the most profitable and high- tech 
sectors of the local and regional economy (Etherington and Jones, 
2016a). Moreover, there is little new money, ‘more a “menu of 
specials”, where: a number of items have been made available to most 
areas, but each deal also contains a few unique elements or “specials” 
(typically consisting of commitments to explore future policy options)’ 
(Sandford, 2018: 9). Behind this, broader restructuring processes are 
at work. The principal historical function of LAs was the concern 
with public services in the context of addressing uneven development 
(Duncan and Goodwin, 1988). Merging LEPs with local government 
functions through the various CAs and mayoral CAs have shifted local 
state functions towards the ideological purpose of economic growth 
‘by negotiation’ with central government (Hatcher, 2017; O’Brien and 
Pike, 2019). The need to compete in a relentless globalised economy 
and with the city region being seen as the appropriate scale to enact 
this (Scott, 2001) as Harrison (2007) suggests, then, forces city regions 
to compete for growth and territory (in some cases) in an attempt to 
secure their position of dominance. The deployment of depoliticising 
scalar processes are crucial here to limit opposition and resistance (Deas 
et al, 2020; Conclusions in this volume), alongside an ongoing process 
of joining up economic development with the welfare reform agenda 
(see Chapters 2 and 3), collectively seen as ‘clearing the ground for 
a market solution’ (Toynbee and Walker, 2017: 78). In the words of 
a Welsh councillor, giving evidence to a select committee on City 
Deals and Growth Deals, and in the process concurring with Darling 
(2016:  230) that when ‘combined with a market- oriented transfer 
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of responsibilities, depoliticization acts to constrain the possibilities 
of political debate and to predetermine the contours of those policy 
discussions that do take place’:
When I was told I would take part in negotiations on the 
growth deal, I expected there to be some kind of specific 
system or order, and I must admit that I am quite frustrated 
that the political meetings we have had with the Ministers 
have been a little – to use my son’s word – ‘random’ and not 
particularly structured. There is no particular programme or 
agenda. I asked one Minister, ‘Before we meet next time, 
what about having a programme of our meetings diarised 
so that we are clear when we are going to be discussing this 
with you? Let us have some action points from the previous 
meeting, if you like. We don’t want detailed minutes, but 
what are the action points? You can report back on that, 
and we can then see where the problems are that we need 
to resolve’. But that really did not happen. (Dyfrig Siencyn, 
Gwynedd Council Leader, quoted in House of Commons 
Welsh Affairs Committee, 2019: 40)
There is also a need to think critically about the ways in which 
such an agglomerative approach impacts on areas outside of, or 
disconnected from, a metropolitan centre (Chapters 5 and 6). Due 
to the piecemeal process by which city regions are being delivered, 
whereby only certain cities are given a city deal, this raises a series 
of questions with regards to those places outside of the deal making 
process (Pemberton and Shaw, 2012). Figure 0.1 highlights a large 
number of cities and provincial towns, but also rural areas, that do 
not fall within the hinterland of a city- region deal. This is not to say 
economic development planning is absent, as every area in England 
is placed within a LEP, but it does again highlight the unevenness 
between metropolitan and non- metropolitan areas. The ‘city- first’ 
approach to sub- regional economic governance, whereby growth is 
delivered via agglomeration, not only has the potential to exacerbate 
uneven development in cities, but also to further entrench it in places 
external to the city region (Harrison and Heley, 2015). For them and 
Ward (2006), if not addressed, this will only perpetuate an existing 
rural development problem via the reproduction of place hierarchies 
that marginalises non- urban centres.
To date, then, there have been both theoretical and empirical 
literatures, operating at a variety of scales, arguing both for and against, 
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the practices of city- regional development. What becomes apparent 
though is that there is a pressing need to contextualise, comprehend 
and place the current economic developments and growth orientated 
agendas of city regions (in the UK) within the broader processes of ‘state 
spatial restructuring’ (Brenner, 2004, 2019). This perspective has been 
offered by MacLeod (2001) and Jones (2001), who, contra Lovering 
(1999), remain sympathetic to the new regionalist project, but note 
a conceptual void around the geographical political economy of city- region 
making. As Ward and Jonas (2004: 2120) have previously highlighted, 
it ‘appears to leave a lot out in terms of what actually drives regional 
economies in any given context’ and similarly we would argue that 
city- region discourses appear to leave out far more than they actually 
contain. They call for the following to be addressed to take city- region 
debates forward:
the economic and social conditions under which the city 
regional scale is politically constructed as a particular space 
(or scale of territoriality) for class and political alliance 
formation and struggle [and] the ways in which conflicts 
around production, social reproduction, and collective 
consumption with in and around city regions are managed 
and, consequently, the variety of struggles around state 
territorial structures in city regions. (Ward and Jonas, 
2004: 2130)
This succinctly captures part of what is missing within the current 
deployment of the city- regional discourse – this form of state rescaling 
is fraught with tensions and conflicts that are often marginalised and 
this needs to be brought into the matrix of city- region building to 
expose the ‘contestation of the political and economic consensus’ 
(Deas et al, 2020: 2).
Tensions between economic, social and political governance and 
agency, labour control, service provision, welfare policies, democracy 
and citizenship, intra- metropolitanism, the politics of the urban 
environment, and sustainability are the unfinished aspects of this 
research agenda. City Regions and Devolution in the UK tackles these 
through the lens of civil society actors, in a sense providing a ‘moral 
agency’ (Normington and Hennessy, 2018: 14– 15), or experiential 
and lived- integrity take on the regional world of agglomeration. This 
begins to dig down to the ‘lived’ experience of the city region and the 
ways in which policy begins to impact on daily lives and institutions. 
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We turn to this in the next section, suggesting the state as a sociospatial 
relation is a critical missing link in the city- regions debate.
Making links: the state, civil society and the politics  
of representation
The most general feature of the state (pre- modern as well as modern and 
pre- capitalist as well as capitalist) is that it comprises a set of institutions 
concerned with the territorialisation of political power. This involves 
the intersection of politically organised, coercive and symbolic power, 
a clearly demarcated core territory, and a fixable population on which 
political decisions may be made collectively binding. Thus, the key 
feature of the state is the historically variable ensemble of technologies 
and practices that produce, naturalise and manage territorial space 
as a relatively bounded container within which political power is 
exercised to achieve various, more or less well- integrated, and changing 
policy objectives. The state, then, is distinct and different from say a 
multinational corporation, by virtue of its territorial integrity and 
its political legitimacy. The state is also different in the various roles 
that it can play. States can respond to the contradictions, dilemmas 
and problems of capitalism by creating the general conditions for the 
production and social reproduction of the capital relation, that is, the 
environment for economic growth and development. The state does 
this in part by seeking to promote growth and development and/ or by 
responding to the effects of this, that is, uneven growth, change and 
restructuring. The state though is omnipresent: due to its development 
and penetration into most spheres of life, it appears to be everywhere 
and nowhere at the same time (Jones, 2019a: 17– 18).
Following Gramsci (1971), the state is a complex and broad set of 
institutions and networks that span both political society and civil 
society in their ‘inclusive’ sense, though these divisions between the 
state and the private or non- state sphere are purely conceptual and the 
two overlap in reality. Building on this insight, states can be viewed as 
strategic terrains, with emphasis being placed on strategic considerations 
and strategic actions. Offe (1984, 1985) discusses this arrangement by 
drawing attention to the state and its circuits of power and policy 
implementation, which provides a window on the patterning of state 
intervention and the everyday nature of policymaking and agency 
under capitalism.
Building on Offe and Gramsci, Jessop’s approach to the state, has 
significantly moved forward these arguments. For Jessop (1990, 2002, 
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2008, 2016a), the state needs to be thought of as ‘medium and outcome’ 
of policy processes that constitute its many interventions. The state is 
both a social relation and a producer of strategy and, as such, it does not 
have any power of its own. State power in relation to the policy process 
relates to the forces that ‘act in and through’ its apparatus. According 
to this view, attempts to analyse the policy process need to uncover 
the strategic contexts, calculations, and practices of actors involved in 
strategically- selective, or privileged, sites. This draws attention to the 
intricate links between actors and forms of representation, institutions 
and their interventions and practices, and the range of policy outcomes 
available. The state, then, is both a strategic and relational concern, 
forged through the ongoing engagements between agents, institutions 
and concrete policy circumstances. This means the roles of civil society 
actors and their agency in city regions needs to be conceptualised in 
this strategic- relational political economy context.
Rhodes (2007: 1254, emphasis added) reminds us that ‘patterns of 
rule arise as the contingent products of diverse actions and political 
struggles informed by the beliefs of agents as they confront dilemmas that 
are understood differently in contending traditions’. Heeding this call, 
Jessop and Sum (2013) deploy the notions of ‘semiosis’ and ‘construal’ 
in their cultural political economy framework of state- making. Semiosis 
refers to sense- making and meaning- making, whereby policymakers 
can give appreciation and meaning to their actions ‘in the world’, 
which is in turn predicted on ‘construal’ – how a particular policy 
problem is perceived and the solution constructed in response to this as 
a product of ‘symptomology’. Put very simply: ‘Policy makers are not 
faced with a given problem. Instead they have to identify and formulate 
their problem’ (Lindbolm, 1968: 13) and deploy actors to resolve. The 
governance of economic development and the roles of agency are no 
exception here and the nature of the problem and the solutions to this 
have changed considerably over time and across space – perpetually in 
a state of flux and question, as noted above.
These concerns can be further rolled together through the idea of 
‘spatial fixes’ (Harvey, 2011, 2016) and ‘spatio- temporal fixes’ (see 
Jessop, 2016a, 2016b), concepts deployed to comprehend the dynamics 
of state spatiality, state spatial restructuring and the geographies of 
state intervention specifically. The state performs the role of securing 
the relative stabilisation of society by endeavouring to manage the 
various economic and political contradictions within the state system. 
This is inherently spatial, as state intervention is articulated through 
the constructions of spaces (scales, levels, horizons, and so on) of 
intervention, the fixing of borders, the stabilisation of places, and 
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attempts are being continually made to produce and reproduce a 
territorially coherent and functioning socioeconomic landscape. This 
has been referred to elsewhere as ‘state spatial selectivity’ – the processes 
of spatial and actor privileging and articulation in and through which 
state policies are differentiated across territorial space in order to target 
particular geographical zones, scales, and interest groups. In short, 
certain spatial actors and geographical locations have a greater space 
of engagement on the state arena than others (Jones, 1997, 1999).
The latter dimension forms an integral element of how legitimation 
and mobilisation occur within the state apparatus via the creation of 
territorial coalitions, or what Cox (1998) calls ‘spaces of engagement’, 
to mobilise strategically significant actors and exclude others where 
‘spaces of dependency’ (interests and attachments) rule out their 
possibility for incorporation. The tension between engagement and 
dependency, of course, creates a politics of scale and a scaling of politics, 
where some city regions are either more or less engaged in networks of 
association beyond their immediate territories than are others (see Jonas 
and Wood, 2012). As we discuss in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 with regards 
to the Northern Powerhouse in Greater Manchester and Sheffield, 
this can be explored through Jessop’s idea of ‘spatial imaginaries’: how 
semiosis, construal and symptomology are enacted through social and 
spatial agency as ‘geographies of representation’ (MacLeod and Jones, 
1999). As Jessop (2012: 7) summarises, spatial imaginaries guide present 
and future (non- )decisions and (in- )actions and play a performative 
role, when intense expectations unfold to mobilise resources, produce 
incentives, and justify certain actions in preference to other ones (see 
also Granqvist et al, 2019; MacKinnon, 2020).
City- region building as process, not an event
Devolution is, as noted by the mantra in Wales, ‘a process, not an event’ 
(Torrance, 2020; see also Davies, 1999). It is important to highlight 
the contingent ‘mechanisms’ or ‘processes’ in and through which this 
city- region project is being politically made and contested with ‘some 
forms of agency’ to avoid ‘over generalizations’ (Le Gales, 2016: 168). 
Following Offe (1984: 37), a ‘processual’ approach is favoured in City 
Regions and Devolution in the UK, which seeks out the mechanisms 
(‘cross- scalar relations’ as Brenner et al, 2012: 60 put it) that generate 
events, highlight developmental tendencies, tease out important 
counteracting tendencies and create the opportunities for progressive 
civil society localisms. Despite the potential for progressive politics 
to develop, instances of governance failure across cities and regions 
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are becoming ever more apparent. This is a symptomatic problem 
created by the near constant process of state policy(making) switching 
to maintain the neoliberal accumulation economy through periods of 
crisis. This means the state, as a perceived rational response, attempts 
to address such failure through economic governance policies. As 
noted above, state actors appear to be continually re- inventing policy 
initiatives, often in response to the problems and contradictions caused 
by previous rounds of state intervention, in a search to maintain state 
legitimation and power. As ‘statecraft is inescapably, and profoundly, 
marked by compromise, calculation and contradiction’ (Brenner et al, 
2012: 45) this raises a series of questions: how are state and civil society 
actors dealing with these challenges? How is failure being presented, 
interpreted and addressed; can civil society effectively influence 
economic development arrangements within the context of devolved 
responsibility? City Regions and Devolution in the UK tackles this.
Outline of this book
Chapter  1 is the first of two chapters considering GMCR and 
SCR in the North of England. The chapter looks further at the 
spatial delineation of the city region, which has gained considerable 
renaissance as the de facto spatial political unit of governance driven 
by economic development. It suggests that this spatial realignment has 
been central to the construction of the Northern Powerhouse (since 
2014)  and has rested alongside other agendas such as devolution, 
localism and austerity. The chapter presents empirical findings from the 
two city regions, looking at the ways in which the city region is being 
constructed differently and the different ways in which civil society 
is attempting to negotiate its way through this changing governance 
landscape. Drawing on development in Greater Manchester, we 
illustrate how this has created a number of significant tensions and 
opportunities for civil society actors, as they have sought to contest a 
shifting governance framework. We, therefore, carefully consider how 
civil society groups are grappling with devolution; both contesting 
and responding to devolution, increasingly in the context of seeking a 
more socially inclusive city- regional mode of growth, but with limits.
Within the context of spatial rebalancing and the Northern 
Powerhouse, Chapter 2 explores the implementation of the devolution 
of employment and skills within the SCR. The chapter focuses 
on metro dynamics and suggests that notions of governance and 




tensions and contradictions of city- region economic governance 
within the context of the UK Government’s devolution and localism 
agenda (in particular ‘Devolution Agreements’). Governance failure 
arises because of the primacy of a neoliberal- dominated strategy 
orientation towards the market and its failure in the delivery of 
skills. Governance and metagovernance mechanisms are unable to 
sufficiently coordinate effective responses to address a legacy of de- 
industrialisation, characterised by deep- rooted labour market and 
sociospatial inequalities. This, in turn, raises serious questions about the 
role of civil society in skills, employment and welfare, and the inclusive 
claims made by the Northern Powerhouse and ‘Devo Sheffield’.
The opportunities for and limits to civil society involvement in 
England’s city regions are continued in Chapter 3. This chapter is 
about how social and institutional actors exercise agency within cities 
in terms of contestation and negotiation in relation to welfare reform 
and the politics of labour conditionality. Attention is drawn to the role 
of trade unions and LA unions, who as actors still have a voice within 
the ‘growth’ agendas and the increasingly precarious nature of the 
economy. This is undertaken by drawing on devolution developments 
in Greater Manchester and reading these through the lens of civil 
society within ‘austerity urbanism’. We point to the need to have a 
better understanding of the processes of social and spatial agency, which 
shapes the way cities are becoming focal points not only in relation to 
austerity, but also in terms of assessing the distributional consequences 
and civil society consequences of retrenchment.
The book moves to Wales in Chapter 4. In the context of city regions 
being vaunted as the ‘spatial imaginary’ for engendering economic 
development, the chapter unpacks the role or influence civil society can 
have in shaping outcomes outside England. It follows the development 
of city- regionalism in Wales and specifically the unfolding of the ‘elite- 
led’ CCR City- Deal. We discuss the recasting of central– local social 
relations in Wales and the governance tensions between Whitehall 
and Wales. The chapter builds on notions of metagovernance and 
its failure discussed in Chapter 2 and brings inter- scalar governance 
relations to the fore. It reveals that the historical legacy of economic 
and governance failures has created new geographies of governance 
and these are playing out differently in Wales. Austerity and local 
government reorganisation have created different structures for City 
Deals, but civil society actors also remain entangled in complex elite 
power networks. Here, they are outside the CCR representational 
regime but still expected to play along in terms of engaging with the 
neoliberal growth model.
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Chapter 5 discusses the NWGD. North Wales is primarily a rural 
region within the UK, without a core city or large metropolitan centre. 
This chapter examines how this urban dynamic, fostered around a 
pushing of the agglomerative growth model out of the city region, 
is being transferred largely across rural space and place in terms of 
where growth is envisioned and how policy is implemented. It raises 
the importance of the non- metropolitan city- regional alternatives 
in the context of the city- regional debate. Chapter 6 develops this 
argument further in the context of the SBCR City Deal. We consider 
the implications of the city region concept to a medium- sized city and 
question whether such an application of spatial policy is appropriate 
when the central city in question is not necessarily economically 
dominant or connected to its wider polycentric region. We argue that 
this leads to the further privileging of an urban metropolitan Swansea 
elite and the marginalisation of civil society actors.
Chapters  5 and 6 collectively develop the notion of ‘interstitial 
spaces’ – spatial formations that sit outside the dominant city region 
discourse and how they form their own approaches to delivering 
economic development. We suggest interstitial spaces, such as 
developing dispersed urban and peripheral rural regions, still sit 
within an economic policy focus that is too heavily skewed towards 
and driven by a mega- metro city region approach. In the context of 
Brexit and rural economic development, these chapters argue that the 
challenges of delivering on this in the context of North Wales and 
Swansea are pressing.
The conclusion seeks to address the challenges raised in previous 
chapters. We juxtapose the emergence of a post- political governance 
condition, where depoliticisation is framing and constraining the 
possibility of civil society discourses and spatial agency, with the more 
progressive community- building city- region infrastructural politics 
of the foundational economy (FE) school of economic development 
thought. The city- regional challenges and consequences of these two 
growth models are discussed and a post- script research agenda is offered 
for civil society spatial agency and civic repair in the context of the 




Osborne never has an idea:  he creates narratives, then 
everyone nods. (Kate Fall, former Deputy Chief of Staff 
to Prime Minister David Cameron, 2020: 47)
George Osborne had been thinking about his legacy for 
a while, embodied by his reading of Robert Caro and his 
books on Lyndon Johnson, the (Democrat) American 
President, and Robert Moses, the “powerbroker” who 
built New York. The outcome was a speech Osborne gave 
in July 2014 during which he announced the notion of 
the Northern Powerhouse – evocative of the nineteenth- 
century cities … and invited cities to come forward with 
their proposals for devolution to help create it. (Emmerich, 
2017a: 99)
Introduction
Since 2010, the UK Government has sought to reshape the ways in 
which economic development takes place and although this shift in 
governmental delivery began under New Labour, there has been a 
continuing emphasis on developing the city- region scale to unlock 
economic growth. As noted in the previous chapter, it was much 
vaunted by the Coalition Government elected in 2010 (Deas, 2013), 
whereby they replaced the RDAs with LEPs and latterly LEPs 
morphed into CAs. These policies were subsequently continued by 
the Conservative administrations (Conservative Party, 2015) through 
a variety of locality- specific ‘devolution deals’. In this context, the 
rhetoric of the ‘Northern Powerhouse’ as a flagship policy for delivering 
economic growth for the North of England (Lee, 2017) has sat 
alongside a severe austerity programme that has seen LA budgets cut 
significantly. This, therefore, raises difficult questions with regards to 
the ability of CAs and LAs to address the current and future needs of 
their populations (Etherington and Jones, 2016a). Finally, although the 
context of ‘Brexit’ and the forever changing leadership and ministerial 
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portfolios of the Conservative Party means the future of the Northern 
Powerhouse remains uncertain, the political territorialisation and 
regionalisation (Harrison, 2014) of the city region has problematised 
the position of civil society actors working in their respective city 
regions and those working outside or on the periphery of city regions.
Concurrently to this and historically within geography as well as 
more broadly the social sciences, as noted in the previous chapter, 
there have been a series of parallel debates simmering away for the 
past decade (see Jonas and Ward, 2007 for one such example). These 
debates have revolved around a well- developed series of discussions 
that consider the ways in which such spatio- temporal fixes either foster 
economic development through agglomeration (Harding, 2007) or 
continue to exacerbate uneven development and spatial disparities 
(Etherington and Jones, 2009). This chapter seeks to connect these 
themes with the realpolitik concerns of delivering devolution. To do 
this, we follow the development of city- regionalism through these 
different discourses and unfolding city deals to allow us to ask: within 
a language of localism, devolution and austerity, how have civil 
society actors in SCR and GMCR sought to deal with city- regional 
development approaches and the new governance structures that have 
been created? These are two key city regions in the North and were 
the first areas within the Northern Powerhouse to sign devolution 
deals with the government. Thus, focusing on their cases is central to 
comprehending what kind of Northern Powerhouse growth is being 
built, and whose interests are being represented, if this is to be more 
than an empty policy husk (see Lee, 2017; MacKinnon, 2020). In 
turn, the chapter is interested in mapping out the missing elements 
from the Northern Powerhouse recipe book for economic growth 
and social democracy. By looking at Manchester and Sheffield, if the 
Northern Powerhouse is a coordinating frame for city regions in the 
north of England in terms of their interaction with each other, the 
chapter is interested in understanding how these bodies are being 
shaped by, and also shaping, devolution.
Accordingly, the chapter sheds light on the ongoing processes of 
LA restructuring in Greater Manchester and Sheffield towards CA 
(city- region) approaches. Therefore, it highlights how ‘policies are 
not, after all, merely being transferred over space; their form and 
their effects are transformed by these journeys’ (Peck and Theodore, 
2015: 29). We engage with the views of civil society actors on- the- 
ground, in terms of how they have responded to a shifting governance 
framework at the local state and city- region scale. The chapter, 
therefore, addresses the positioning of civil society within these 
Northern powerhouses
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processes by, firstly, giving greater context to the development of city 
regions as a process of regionalisation: the ways in which ‘new regions’, 
namely GMCR and SCR, are created territorially through changes in 
governance structures. In doing this, the chapter also considers how 
austerity has impacted on these processes. Second, the chapter assesses 
how, in this context, civil society is being repositioned due to the 
economic rationale of city regions, the changes in governance scale 
and the creation of new ‘citizenship regimes’ (Jenson and Saint- Martin, 
2010). By focusing on the positioning of civil society actors, the chapter 
highlights how city- regionalism and the Northern Powerhouse, more 
broadly, offers insights into developing notions of an ‘inclusive growth’ 
approach (RSA, 2016, 2017; Chapter 3). The findings suggest that the 
main issue emerging from these complex processes concerns whether 
failure to deliver inclusive growth at the city- region scale will reflect a 
failure to deliver equitable growth within the Northern Powerhouse.
Building the city regions of the Northern Powerhouse
The government sought to reshape the map of governance in England 
through a series of reforms implemented from 2014 onwards. One 
part of the solution to this has been the creation of the ‘Northern 
Powerhouse’, seen as a policy- framing device, in which a series 
of ongoing projects have been placed (see Lee, 2017; Berry and 
Giovannini, 2018). As noted in Chapter 1, the powerhouse represents 
what Jessop (2016a: 38) would call a ‘spatial imaginary’ – a discursive 
phenomenon that distinguishes, by carving out distinctiveness, specific 
places and spaces ‘from the inherently unstructured complexity of a 
spatialized world’. This is well represented rhetorically in Figure 1.1, 
whereby economic success and growth is emphasised by the role 
Northern Powerhouse cities have in providing employment in their 
metropolitan centres.
The Northern Powerhouse agenda has framed the more substantial 
restructuring of (some) LAs into CA city regions. This has been based 
on a city first approach whereby, to date, city- region devolution has 
focused around the existing metropolitan footprints of the core UK 
cities (Harrison and Heley, 2015; Jones et al, 2015). The momentum 
for this has been developed due to a number of factors, which the 
UK state has attempted to deal with. First, it was very much a post- 
financial crisis reaction in order to stimulate economic growth with the 
city region vaunted as the de facto scale for growth (Overman, 2012). 
This reflected both a dominant policy discourse in urban development 
(see Storper, 2013 for such an example) and a perceived failure of 
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RDAs (Pugalis and Townsend, 2012). Second, it has sought to address 
the longstanding issue of rebalancing the UK economy, whereby an 
overheating South is contrasted by an underperforming North (Gardiner 
et al, 2013; Clarke et al, 2016; Martin et al, 2016). Third, the UK state 
(with specific reference to England) is renowned for being the most 
centralised in Western Europe – in light of this, with the failure of regional 
devolution (beyond Wales, Scotland and London) under New Labour 
(Goodwin et al, 2005), devolution to a suitable scale within England has 
been sought (Pike et al, 2012). Fourth, via the deal- making approach, 
it has attempted to embed and deliver austerity into the reformulation 
of CAs through a process of block grant reduction and rationalisation.
Relatedly, as noted in the Introduction, the city- region scale has 
become the dominant discourse in urban development policy (see 
Storper, 2013). This is due to a number of reasons and analytical 
frames such as the rise of ‘new regionalism’ (Keating et al, 2013) and 
the influence of new economic geography in placing specific emphasis 
on the growing of regions for economic purposes (MacLeod, 2001). 
Within both these accounts of economic and regional geography, 
there is an implicit understanding given that the city region is both the 
‘natural’ and ‘functional’ scale for economic development. It is suggested 





























that where nation states have failed to deal with macroeconomic shifts 
in the global economy, city regions represent the suitable scale whereby 
they are ‘small enough’ but ‘big enough’ to deal with this challenge 
(Scott 2001, 2019; Hall, 2009).
Within this context, the Northern Powerhouse agenda – and the 
devolution deals that are associated with it – has a strong economic 
focus, which is also emphasised by the goal of soft- institutional 
organisations (Haughton et al, 2013) such as LEPs. Crucially, this led 
to a rescaling of the ‘representational regime’ of the city region (Jessop, 
2016a; see also MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999; Cox, 1998), in spatially- 
specific and strategic ways. This, in turn, is linked to the creation of 
new ‘citizenship regimes’ for the governance of city regions. The 
concept of new citizenship regimes captures that: ‘Who qualifies and 
is recognized as a model citizen is under challenge. The legitimacy of 
group action and the desire for social justice are losing ground to the 
notion that citizens and interests can compete equally in the political 
marketplace of ideas’ (Jenson and Phillips, 1996: 112). In the context 
of the GMCR and SCR (see Figure 1.2 for a broad outline), the new 
business- orientated representational regime, by design, places civil 
society at the margins of the process. This means that what could 
broadly be termed as the ‘social reproduction of the city’ is given 
secondary status to its economic drivers (Jonas and Ward, 2007). This, 
in turn, positions civil society actors as no longer directly and centrally 
relevant within the context of chasing agglomerative growth.
Many scholars have been critical to this approach for a number of 
reasons, some of which were detailed in the previous chapter. First, 
there seem to be continuing patterns of uneven regional and city- 
regional development and redevelopment (Etherington and Jones, 
2009, 2016a, 2016b, 2018), in terms of the failure for agglomerative 
approaches to trickle down to those that need it most. Second, this 
pitches city regions against each other in a competitive race to capture 
investment (Harrison, 2007), questioning the potential of the Northern 
Powerhouse as represented in Figure 1.1. Third, it is important to 
understand how such strategies empower and disempower within the 
city region. This last point is central to the aim of this chapter, as it 
highlights the implications that such an economically driven strategy 
has for those who sit outside of this rubric for growth.
The ‘representational regime’ (Jessop, 1990, 2016a; see also 
Rutherford, 2006) of the city region is central to this and to date, 
city- region devolution has only sought to strategically engage business 
communities in terms of dealing with government and market failure. 
This raises difficult questions for those that operate within what could 
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be broadly termed ‘civil society’, who are often working with those 
who benefit least from agglomerative strategies. This reflects a failure 
to properly integrate a social or inclusive dimension into devolution, 
due to their stubborn and narrow focus on economic development. 
Despite many devolution deals having been put in place, the social 
and inclusive dimension of the reform is only starting to be discussed 
as a concern, in the continuing process of implementing devolution. 
An example of this can be seen in the Royal Society of Arts Inclusive 
Figure 1.2: Outline of Greater Manchester City Region and Sheffield City Region 
devolution and local authority membership
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Growth Commission, which sought to identify practical ways to 
make local economies across the UK more economically inclusive 
and prosperous (RSA, 2016, 2017).
The aim of the next section is to build on these arguments and 
frame the role of civil society in processes of devolution in GMCR 
and SCR, and address the position of civil society more directly within 
this rescaling of governance.
Placing civil society in the city region
This section assesses the role and place of civil society within 
GMCR and SCR in the context of the unfolding devolution and 
the Northern Powerhouse agendas. Civil society is used as a catch- 
all term for a number of different types of organisation, which are 
separate from both the state and business. This includes organisations 
such as charities, those termed third sector, voluntary groups, 
community groups (of both place and identity), social enterprises, 
and housing associations. They all have very different relationships 
with both the local state and business in terms of how they operate. 
Some have contractual relationships, whereby they deliver specific 
services. Others act to give specific representation to minority 
groups, and different groups work on very different spatial scales – 
ranging from across the city region to very localised, neighbourhood 
development. What ties them together as a set of groups is their 
individual organisational remit to produce or engender some form 
of social benefit for their perceived communities. The interviews 
were not discussing the development of the Northern Powerhouse 
specifically, but more broadly the development of the city- region 
building agenda. However, as has been previously stated above, the 
development of city regions is central to development of the Northern 
Powerhouse as a ‘spatial imaginary’ and GMCR and SCR are two key 
cases in this respect. Hence the following analysis should be viewed 
in the context of what do such approaches to city regions mean for 
discourses surrounding the Northern Powerhouse.
In framing current developments in devolution from a UK state 
perspective and from within both SCR and GMCR, it is important 
to consider the ways in which civil society actors are dealing with 
this changing governance structure. Jones et al (2015) highlight how 
in Liverpool and Bristol, the changing governance landscape and the 
reduction in funding opportunities through austerity has made things 
more difficult for groups that sit within what is broadly termed civil 
society. This has been reflected in both GMCR and SCR, as austerity 
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has impacted those hardest, in the most deprived areas of each city region 
(Beatty and Fothergill, 2016), where such groups are more active and 
needed. However, civil society members have also highlighted a number 
of opportunities to mitigate this (despite being problematic) within the 
context of devolution and in face of stringent austerity measures. Below 
we analyse how civil society actors have struggled with devolution, 
but also have attempted to find new positions and strategies on which 
to see their social agendas addressed against the economic framework.
Struggling with the economic rationale
A major observation that we wish to offer in this chapter is those 
questions around what sort of growth is being promoted by devolution 
from economic agglomeration approaches to creating and growing city 
regions. Evidence from our research suggests that inequality and social 
disadvantage actually hinders growth (see Etherington and Jones 2016a, 
2016b; Jonas and Ward 2007; Lee 2019) or, at best, creates the wrong 
kind of growth due to it not being distributed evenly (see Bowman et al, 
2014). The converse is that those policies that actively promote labour 
market inclusion will contribute to sustainable growth and also assist with 
maintaining productivity. The current model of growth though restricts 
access to employment and skills initiatives and hence the city region will 
accordingly struggle to meet targets. This is because it does not engage 
with the existing problems faced by a significant proportion of the 
population, who are under- skilled to access jobs in high growth sectors. 
We discuss the SCR case in depth in Chapter 2. This is identified in the 
below quote, as it spatially impacts on the development of the GMCR:
‘I think of Greater Manchester as having a ring donut economy, 
it’s a lot like a North American city. So, you have thriving 
city centre, which it didn’t have twenty- five years ago. The 
suburbs actually doing ok and then the middle bit. If they do 
not do something about that, the powers that be will never 
achieve their economic goals of achieving a fiscal balance for 
this conurbation.’ (Interview, Social Enterprise Leader, 2016)
The extract above highlights how from the outset there is a perception 
that the growth model proposed for GMCR fails to address the broader 
problems faced by the city region. This is caused by the ongoing geo- 
history of inequality, but it also shows how this is compounded by 





‘Trickledown doesn’t work for the most vulnerable and 
disadvantaged and you have to have strategies around social 
regeneration (for want of a better word) alongside economic 
regeneration. Those two things should come together and 
I don’t think they do because the LEP is very purely focused 
on the economic policy … Feels like I’m in a rowing boat 
and my colleagues are in a rowing boat and we’re trying to 
turn round this big tanker.’ (Interview, Sheffield Community 
Development Group, 2015)
For both respondents, one a social enterprise, primarily focused on 
projects in Salford, and the other a community development organisation 
in a deprived area of Sheffield, the urban growth machine strategy (Logan 
and Molotch, 1987; Jonas and Wilson, 1999) is deeply problematic. They 
pick out how the ‘trickle- down’ approach, which implies a strategy of 
developing high level gross value added (GVA) uplift by bringing people 
to jobs within the city region (Etherington and Jones, 2016b), does little 
for the disadvantaged citizens they are attempting to support. This means 
that because they question the rhetoric of this growth model, they are 
left on the periphery of its strategic delivery. This is also reflected in the 
above quote, which highlights how such groups, operating at a local 
level, have little ability or remit in the context of devolution to act at 
the city- region level and there is an ongoing lack of accountability that 
marginalises local civil society through institutions such as the LEPs. As 
underlined by an interviewee in SCR:
‘What opportunity will there be to genuinely involve civil 
society in the process? Because I think the LEP has been and 
I know it is an economic driver, fine and it’s about inward 
investment, economic growth and the private sector is at 
the heart of that but there is very little in terms of any wider 
involvement. And maybe that’s ok but when it comes to the 
combined authority, there needs to be more direct lines of 
accountability into localities and into local areas.’ (Interview, 
Sheffield Community Development Group, 2015)
This suggests that the construction of a new ‘representational 
regime’ for the city region based on economic interests purposefully 
excludes civil society actors from the outset. This, in turn, allows for 
an uncontested agglomerative growth model to be developed. The 
following section addresses this by assessing how civil society is being 
positioned and marginalised differently at different scales.
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Dealing with scale and representation
The struggles to have a voice within such processes, due to the failure 
for civil society groups to be integrated into the representational regime 
of the city region, has left some squeezed between the ‘scale jump’ of 
the city region (Cox, 1998) and austerity occurring at the same time. 
‘Scale jumping’, in this context, is the redefining of territorial relations 
from the LA to the city- regional scale in such a way that it circumvents, 
where possible, certain locality ‘politics of turf ’ (Cox, 1989). Scale 
jumping is, therefore, a process through which new networks of 
association can be built to prioritise practices of capital accumulation 
(Smith, 1990; Brenner, 2004, 2019). According to one interviewee:
‘At one point they talk about localism but if you look at 
regionalisation, it’s huge, it’s huge and actually the local 
voluntary community sector can’t even hope to engage 
with, let  alone deliver against that agenda. Therefore, 
civil society is finding itself squeezed behind/ between a 
rhetoric that emphasises its importance but a reality, which 
mitigates against its ability to capture the resources to 
deliver against that agenda.’ (Interview, Bolsover Voluntary 
Organisation, 2016)
This quote highlights the difficulties for civil society organisations 
to deal with austerity and devolution at the same time. It also shows 
the way in which civil society groups are co- opted and recast into 
a neoliberal growth model. In short, civil society groups are both 
needed for the continuing function of the city region, but at the same 
time they are marginalised within rescaling processes too. There is 
also appreciation of how LAs are struggling to deal with this rescaling 
process too within the context of austerity:
‘To be honest, they are holding what they can, both in 
Tameside and Oldham, they are holding everything that 
they can. We are predominantly funded through the local 
authorities, Tameside get us a fair bit from their CCG 
[Clinical Commissioning Group] but actually, we don’t, 
as an organisation the make- up is a much greater split for 
local authorities. So they are doing all they can to protect 
us. I think the voluntary organisations with smaller grants 
are dwindling, the smaller amounts of funding for the 




something that we fight hard against. But strategically they 
do view us as important in terms of achieving their public 
service reform and in fact it has been said by the cabinet 
portfolio holders around in Oldham and others, that we 
are their answer to that, that’s how they see the change in 
the relationships between citizens and the wider population 
and the public services.’ (Interview, Oldham Voluntary 
Organisation, 2016)
The end of this quote touches on the important shifts within the 
positionality of civil society, as it acknowledges how the local state is 
a deeply contradictory ‘agent and obstacle’ (Duncan and Goodwin, 
1988). On the one hand, civil society is drawn into the local state as 
a necessity of funding. On the other, it is also somewhat powerless 
in the context of restructuring and cuts, as civil society groups are 
further distanced from having a strategic voice. Here, the paradox 
of austerity in the context of scale suggests that at local level, civil 
society actors are needed more than ever, stepping into the austerity 
void (DeVerteuil, 2016) and increasingly being relied on to deliver 
public services. The work of Dear and Wolch (1987) represents an 
important framing point here, as they followed a similar trajectory of 
neoliberalisation of inner- city welfare provision in the US during the 
1980s, charting the rise of what was then termed ‘the shadow state’. 
This referred to the variety of civil society groups that stepped in to 
provide provision, as the state rolled- back and increasingly absolved 
itself of its social responsibility. This led though to a disintegration in 
the third sector’s ability to deliver such services in US cities, as they 
could not cope with the demands being placed on them. This partially 
stemmed from a lack of engagement by the state with civil society 
and a similar sense of non- engagement, particularly with third sector 
groups, and is being conveyed within the GMCR. Hence for many 
respondents, successful devolution will ultimately rely on the sector 
being engaged. However, at a city- region level they are being afforded 
a marginal voice. This is especially true within the GMCR, due to 
the fact that the devolution deal for this area also includes health and 
social care. But similar issues have been noted also in SCR:
‘I think it’s probably changed enormously actually. I think – 
well there’s a number of pros and cons, I think with the 
current government policy and the austerity measures 
everything that’s going on in terms of shrinking the states, 
promoting using third sector organisations and growing civil 
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society has brought some opportunities for the third sector. 
There’s definitely, for example, funding streams that the third 
sector can access that statutory organisations can’t access so 
having said that, they are highly competitive.’ (Interview, 
Sheffield Youth Development Organisation, 2015)
As illustrated above, within the context of austerity, opportunities have 
arisen for civil society groups, even despite the highly competitive 
nature of funding. However, the ‘jumping of scale’ to the city region 
and realignment of governance alongside austerity has also created 
destabilising experiences. The following section looks at how civil 
society organisations have responded to these, drawing on developments 
in Greater Manchester.
Responding and repositioning within city regions
In this section, the responses of civil society groups to ongoing and 
overlapping processes of devolution, city- regionalism and austerity 
will be assessed primarily focusing on GMCR, as this is only area 
where, to date, a devolution deal has developed to a sufficient extent 
on- the- ground.
Indeed, within GMCR the problematic background highlighted in 
the previous section has generated a coordinated response from civil 
society groups via the Greater Manchester Voluntary, Community 
and Social Enterprise (VCSE) Devolution Reference Group (VCSE, 
2016). The participating VCSE groups are detailed in Table  1.1. 
The Reference Group was formed in response to devolution due to 
the failure of Greater Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA) 
to engage such organisations in any meaningful way in the ongoing 
debate on the future of the city region. VCSE represents an attempt 
by the various actors to find a voice and influence the direction of 
devolution (and potentially, in turn, the Northern Powerhouse) by 
means of their collective knowledge and access to different parts of 
GMCA. According to one interviewee:
‘The reference group was set up when we realised that all 
this was going on around us and nobody was going to come 
banging down our door … So from that a little coalition 
of the willing emerged, completely undemocratically but 
again I think that’s part of it. Stop waiting for permission; 
stop feeling like you have to get every detail right. Because 




advocate for what our sector wants to achieve collectively.’ 
(Interview, Manchester Voluntary Organisation, 2016)
This quote sheds light on a very important point. Although the VCSE 
group includes ‘self- selected’ groups and therefore does not give full 
democratic representation for civil society at large, its creation reflects 
a considerable attempt to ‘jump scale’ by organisations that for the 
most part do not exist on a city- regional scale. This potentially leaves 
smaller and more localised providers further away from decisions that 
may greatly impact on their organisation’s future viability, which in 
turn creates a series of questions for GMCA in terms of how policy 
can be filtered and interpreted down to the local level. The VCSE 
sector already has a variety of different organisations working at and 
delivering across different geographical scales, whether this is at the 
community, LA or city- region scales. They have been consistently 
able to find ways to engage those individuals and groups, which 
are often hardest to reach or most in need, though this ability is 
becoming continually strained in the current era of austerity. For 
a more centralised form of ‘local’ city- regional governance not to 
appreciate the local could lead to a number of valuable services, with 
its nuanced delivery to beneficiaries, being lost in the short term, 
and possibly longer.
In this way, it could be argued that the VCSE epitomises a joint 
effort on the part of local civil society actors to exert agency at the 
city- regional level, and influence the process of devolution in Greater 
Manchester. However, the same extract also highlights how, to date, 
GMCA has failed to address the needs of civil society groups within 
the context of devolution, and the desire of these actors to be included 
Table 1.1: Participating Voluntary, Community and Social Enterprise groups
Volunteer Action Oldham LGBT Foundation
Macc Unlimited Potential
Start in Salford Stroke Association
GMCVO Breakthrough UK
42nd Street Big Life Group
Bolton CVS Greater Manchester BME Network
Note: BME: black and minority ethic; CVS: Community and Voluntary Services; GMCVO: 
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in the process. This shows the shortcomings of the representational 
regime emerging in GMCR. One interviewee develops this further:
‘The pace of change of devolution has been about the public 
sector thinking about the public sector and their internal 
mechanism ways of working override that belief that we’re 
important partners. I think we as a group, I’m going to use 
your term, ‘civil society’ but voluntary sector and social 
enterprises. By having that collective group that is able to 
in some part have representative round tables, to have the 
ability to talk to some of the key individuals, as a collective 
to be able to do that, that is important.’ (Interview, Oldham 
Voluntary Organisation, 2016)
The VCSE Devolution Reference Groups, then, represents one model, 
which, within the context of devolution, can bring a broad coalition 
of diverse groups together alongside pre- existing organisations. The 
group aims to be representative of (rather than represent), and connect 
to, the broad spectrum of VCSE activity in GMCR. This takes in 
how such groups are positioned in different ways with very different 
approaches. The VCSE Devolution Reference group in its current 
form is not perfect and the group recognises that it will always need 
to evolve. Its ability to develop partnerships across a multifaceted range 
of organisations highlights a model that can be moved forward with 
devolution to create parallel forms of representation and governance. 
Such groups are at the hard end of delivering and enabling citizens to 
thrive in the very difficult circumstances of austerity. They have clear 
social purposes with regards to helping or enabling those in the most 
difficult circumstances to achieve, in order to ‘eradicate’ inequality in 
the GMCR. They also have a strong innovative spirit for delivery in 
a time of limited resources. This innovation could be harnessed more 
directly by including such organisations earlier in commissioning 
processes rather than just as respondents to funding opportunities. 
In doing this, there could be more attuned responses to inequality 
while giving the processes of commissioning more transparency. In 
the context of devolution, such activities should be folded into the 
processes of delivering devolution, rather than being a reaction to what 
is unfolding around VCSE members. This though raises questions of 
scale and representation and to the wider positioning of civil society 
as either an agent or obstacle to the development of city- region 
policy. As ‘agent’, they risk being complicit in policy that promotes 
agglomerative economic growth. Whereas an ‘obstacle’ positioning 
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could see them marginalised further from the representational regime 
of the city region which could be precarious for organisations that can 
often rely on various forms of local state funding.
Moreover, while the voice of business leaders plays a prominent role 
in the devolution debate in GMCR, as the LEP works in conjunction 
with the GMCA, civil society groups have had to find alternative ways 
to reposition themselves within the CA. The VCSE is an attempt at 
generating ‘critical mass’ able to influence the process of devolution – but 
its impact is still marginal compared with that of the LEP. In this sense, 
the case of GMCR shows how the UK Government, with its emphasis 
on economic development in the context of ‘devo deals’, has sought 
to shape devolution from the top- down creating a distorted narrative 
of ‘inclusive growth’ which affects in turn the Northern Powerhouse 
agenda. By its very structure, it has defined who is and who is not 
involved in the debate that will shape the future of devolution deals to 
CAs and city regions – empowering certain groups (in particular business 
leaders), while marginalising and disempowering others (such as civil 
society groups). Although each city region will implement devolution 
deals differently, the ‘rules of the game’ have been shaped in one direction 
in terms of creating a new ‘citizenship regime’ under devolution. This 
raises serious questions around representation and recognition in the 
pursuit of economic growth and this is something that all respondents 
from civil society backgrounds have emphasised. By recognising this 
‘representational gap’, civil society organisations have attempted to find 
new ways to place their agendas on inequality and the social production 
of the city region back into the processes of ‘city- region building’ and 
devolution. However, as these attempts at repositioning civil society are 
still unfolding, their potential impact and success will only become clear 
if and when devolution to city region CAs will be delivered in full, in 
the coming years.
Social innovation and economic growth
Devolution offers real opportunities to do things differently to the 
supposed model of growth offered by central government, but this 
opportunity has to be negotiated. The devolution of health and social 
care in Greater Manchester (unlike in other city regions) is one such 
opportunity, but this again needs radical rethinking if it is to fulfil its 
potential (see Etherington and Jones, 2017; Chapter 3). The sector has 
been one of the most dynamic in terms of thinking through how to 
deliver services to people and communities that are hardest to reach. 
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The opinion below, again from GMCR, highlights how the voluntary 
sector is already involved in taking a multifaceted thinking approach:
‘We need to look at where are the skills and knowledge and 
solutions to fix any particular problem. Some of it may lie 
with the people who apparently have the problem, so if you 
want to solve homelessness, you’ve got to involve people 
who have experienced homelessness or who are currently 
homeless because it would be stupid not to take their … so 
they would have knowledge that no- one else has. You’ve 
got to involve a whole range of other agencies who have 
touched with that problem in one way or another. And 
those who have got the overview. Collectively you might 
then start to come up with an answer to that.’ (Interview, 
Voluntary Services Leader, 2016)
This desire to socially innovate by connecting up different agents to 
tackle problems, such as homelessness, exemplifies how new approaches 
can be found and are very much in tune with public sector partner 
thinking. VCSE groups can play a key strategic role due to their on- the- 
ground knowledge and their flexibility in delivering services. Indeed, 
understanding that the current inequality present in the GMCR is 
more than just an economic concern and that it is linked to a variety 
of other multifaceted problems is key to thinking about how groups 
within VCSE can have a very strong impact in terms of addressing these 
problems. The VCSE community represents one way in which complex 
activity and thinking (from small to large, from person to community 
and from place to identity) can allow for a stronger response to social 
inequality and to build a more inclusive economy.
Conclusions
This chapter has addressed the changes being created by the unfolding 
process of devolving power to two of the Northern Powerhouse’s key 
city regions – GMCR and SCR. Within this, it has attempted to 
understand how civil society is being (re)positioned. It has emphasised 
that if and how the Northern Powerhouse is to be successful and be 
more than just a ‘spatial imaginary’ (Jessop and Sum, 2013) in which 
a ‘rag bag’ set of policies fall (Lee, 2017), there is a need to deal more 
seriously with issues surrounding inequality and uneven development 




The Northern Powerhouse is presented as a project that will bring 
prosperity to the North of England. However, evidence suggests that 
its model of agglomerative economic growth, fostered on trickle- down 
economics, will only continue to exacerbate uneven development 
and undermine the project of spatial rebalancing, especially if this 
keeps perpetuating uneven dynamics of empowerment. By analysing 
the findings of interviews with civil society actors in GMCR and 
SCR, this chapter has highlighted how, in the context of city- region 
building, the current approach to city- regional economic development 
and governance is falling short of its promises. We have suggested that 
this is due, in part, to a clear divide between those who are enabled 
to have a voice and ‘lead’ with the devolution city- region agenda, 
and those who have been marginalised in this process. Further to 
this, findings in GMCR and SCR suggest that the new citizenship 
regimes implemented within city regions place civil society outside 
the decision- making processes that underpin devolution deals, while 
simultaneously  – and somewhat paradoxically  – expecting civil 
society to deal with the fallout from continuing uneven development, 
sociospatial inequalities and austerity. Importantly, in areas such as 
GMCR, where devolution deals are unfolding at a fast pace, civil 
society groups are trying to reverse these processes of representational 
marginalisation, as emphasised by the creation of VCSE. However, it 
remains to be seen whether these attempts at repositioning civil society 
will be successful.
The chapter has argued that the VCSE Devolution Reference 
Group is very much a response to the conditions of devolution in 
Greater Manchester but in that response, there is a model alluded 
to that, with further development, could address many of the gaps 
that have developed in the economic led thinking of city regions. If 
business interests and state restructuring are left to deliver devolution 
alone, without more holistically integrating the VCSE community, for 
instance, growth is likely to continue to be exclusive and devolution 
will not filter down to places, communities and people who have 
been left outside economic development. Therefore, in the context 
of inclusive growth, there needs to be stronger acknowledgement of 
the expertise this sector can bring and it should be a voice, alongside 
business and the public sector in terms of future devolution processes.
The Northern Powerhouse faces an uncertain future since the vote to 
leave the EU, and also due to the switch towards an Industrial Strategy 
for the UK and the largely repacking of existing committed expenditure 
with little new to create regional distinctiveness (compare Berry, 2016; 
HM Treasury, 2016). The pendulum of UK economic development 
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may have turned away from the spatial imaginaries of the Northern 
Powerhouse and the city region to focus on the national level again, 
but the spatial dimensions and sub- national dynamics of this remain 
unclear. Moreover, as we have argued here, there remains a need to 
rebalance relationships between the economy, state and civil society, so 
that a more representational form of devolution can be delivered. We 
would suggest that this requires a much stronger attempt to integrate 
‘the social’ alongside the economic within devolution if a more inclusive 




Chimera:  a thing which is hoped for but is illusory or 
impossible to achieve. Synonyms: illusion, fantasy, delusion, 
dream, fancy. (Oxford English Dictionary)
Introduction
Welcome to ‘Devo Sheffield’ – a city region that comprises the South 
Yorkshire council areas of Barnsley, Rotherham, Doncaster and 
Sheffield, alongside the East Midlands authorities of Bassetlaw, Bolsover, 
Chesterfield, Derbyshire Dales and North East Derbyshire. As discussed 
in the Introduction, with the ongoing processes of constitutional 
change and devolution in the UK, city regions in England are being 
brought to the centre stage of policy and politics to address, firstly, 
paraphrasing Lindblom (1968), the ‘problem’ of economic growth 
and a rebalancing of this geographically to iron- out issues of spatial 
combined and uneven development (see Martin, 2015), and secondly, 
the ‘problem’ of securing effective and accountable governance 
arrangements, whereby effective economic growth and development 
is contingent on open and transparent engagements with civil society. 
This model is being heavily influenced by the US ‘Metropolitics’ 
agglomeration thinking of Katz and others, transferred at speed into the 
UK through discourses such as the ‘Northern Powerhouse’, ‘Metro- 
Mayors’, and promises of additional functions to civil society actors to 
create the conditions for ‘real control’ (Wharton, 2016: 9).
‘Devo Sheffield’ was accordingly coined on 12 December 2014 (HM 
Government, 2014) and builds on a City Deal and Growth Deal to 
roadmap a ‘journey that sees the people of Sheffield put in charge of their 
own economic destiny’ (Otten, 2014: 1). Launched by Nick Clegg MP, 
as Deputy Prime Minister, and following ‘Devo Manc’ developments 
in Greater Manchester, subject to a directly- elected Mayor being in 
place, ‘Devo Sheffield’ promises to shift power from Whitehall to the 
SCR, anchored through a £900 million ‘big pot of money’ agreement 
(£30m of funding for 30 years, ‘immune from any spending review’), 
and giving greater control over skills, transport, housing and business 
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support. By combining skills with employment opportunities ‘for all’, 
the SCR is becoming responsible for the ‘building a new skills system’. 
In short, ‘Devo Sheffield’ is a ‘historic moment for the great city’, 
giving responsibilities to local leaders to push forward plans that will 
seek to strengthen the economy and ‘without waiting for Whitehall to 
do something to the regions of England’, again (Beardmore, 2015: 8). 
As we argued in the Introduction, the promise of a new city- regional 
era has been made, providing the infrastructure for a ‘second industrial 
revolution’ to transform Sheffield’s blighted post- industrial city region 
from ‘slagheap to innovation district’ (Burnett, 2016: 22).
These timely policy developments in England are not anecdotal 
or insignificant; they have deep ramifications for academic debates 
in economic and political geography and for how we think about 
contemporary urban and regional political economy. Firstly, building 
on the arguments in the Introduction, they hit head- on the new 
neoclassical urban economics city- region building agendas and critiques 
of authors such Storper, Overman, Glaeser and others. Keys to the City, 
the leading account on how economics, institutions, social action, 
and politics shape development, for instance, makes the bold claim 
that ‘[c] ity- regions are the principal scale at which people experience 
lived reality’ hence understanding city- region development is ‘more 
important than ever’ and ‘managing it will pose one of the most critical 
challenges to humanity’ (Storper, 2013: 4). Focusing on the micro- 
foundations of individuals, households, firms and groups interacting 
to make city regions in successful North American cities, Storper’s 
concern is with the notions of ‘winning’ and ‘super- star’ regions and 
cities (Hadjimichalis and Hudson, 2014: 213); the ‘big game to be 
hunted’ (Storper, 2013: 4) appears to be charting growth and change to 
find success. We hear much less in these literatures about ‘ordinary’ and 
left- behind regions that have experienced extensive de- industrialisation 
and continual challenges faced by civil society.
Secondly, building on the Introduction, ‘Devo Sheffield’ talks 
loudly to the decade of debates on the spatial restructuring of the 
state (Brenner, 2004, 2019) and changes to the landscape of economic 
governance more broadly (Keating et  al, 2013). This restructuring 
has often involved a tendency towards devolving employment and 
labour market policies and functions to city regions. There is a now 
considerable body of literature that highlights the inherent tensions, 
conflicts and contradictions embodied in these governance changes – 
for example, the tensions and conflicts between central and local 
objectives, competition and cooperation, and entrepreneurial versus 
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social inclusion objectives and also issues of power and representation 
(compare Danson et al, 2012; Goodwin et al, 2012; Pike et al, 2015). 
This chapter argues that, and demonstrates how, all this is being 
intensified, and not resolved, through the processes and practices 
of devolution.
This chapter accordingly also flags the need to seriously consider 
issues of regulatory capacity, regulatory failure and ‘regulatory deficits’ 
(see Painter and Goodwin, 2000). The next section bridges these 
concerns and analyses the nature and limits to devolved city- region 
building and particularly the involvement of civil society actors within 
devolved labour market governances, given these feature strongly in the 
‘Devo Sheffield’ devolution settlement. We suggest that with limited 
regulatory powers and little direct control over additional financial 
capacity, ‘Devo Sheffield’ is deeply bound- up with the contradictions 
facing UK capitalism and the various government priorities in 
responding to them through devolution and city regions. This is a 
‘chimera’ – an apt phrase that is only occasionally used in geographical 
analysis (see Zuege, 1999; Bailey and Turok, 2001) to describe state 
projects that are imaginative, even dazzling at times, though deeply 
implausible when unpacked in reality.
To push our conceptual and theoretical understandings further, 
we suggest that notions of governance and metagovernance failure 
are important in terms of understanding both the limitations to and 
contradictions of devolution and city- region building, and the role 
of civil society actors therein. Metagovernance – the ‘government of 
governance’ through ‘overseeing, steering, and coordinating governance 
arrangements’ (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009: 11) – has received minimal 
detailed attention in urban and regional studies (except by Fawcett et al, 
2017; Whitehead, 2003), it is timely to engage with these agendas, 
show how civil society actors are involved, and we would go as far as 
to suggest that devolution through city regions in England is producing 
spatially- articulated metagovernance failures. Governance failure arises 
because of the primacy of a neoliberal dominated strategy, orientated 
towards the market and its failure in the delivery of skills. Governance 
and metagovernance mechanisms are unable to sufficiently coordinate 
effective responses to address a deep legacy of de- industrialisation, 
deep- rooted labour market and social inequalities. Depoliticised 
metagovernance coordination conflicts signal an ongoing democratic 
deficit in terms of accountabilities and transparency, which in itself 
leads to legitimation problems between the partnerships and in relation 
to wider civil society.
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‘Slagheap to innovation district’? Economic governance 
and skills in Sheffield
Sheffield is the fourth largest city in England and located in the South 
Yorkshire coalfield. Its economic base comprises steel making and 
engineering, and its politics also was formed from a strong labour 
and trade union movement tradition with the LA controlled for 
many years by the Labour Party and with an active Communist Party, 
which influenced workplace and city politics. Sheffield was the centre 
point of the 1984– 85 miners’ strike and prior to that the steel workers 
strike, which attempted to resist large scale restructuring and closures 
impacting on civil society. In the early 1980s, the city became a focal 
point of resistance to the Thatcher Government with the LA and 
civil society institutions taking a proactive role in developing local 
economic initiatives, particularly in terms of employment and training. 
It promoted a progressive redistributive strategy against the dominant 
neoliberal politics of Thatcherism (Goodwin et el, 1993).
From the mid- 1980s though, both the economy and political 
governance landscape was to change markedly. Between 1979 and 1982, 
45,000 jobs were shed in the core engineering and steel industries. 
Its employment and occupational structure have been transformed 
over the past 20 years, from a high- paid employment economy with 
a plentiful supply of skilled jobs, to an economy where many of the 
new jobs created in the service sector tend to be contingent and low- 
paid. Also, of importance is the existence of significant proportions of 
the working age population categorised as economically inactive and 
in receipt of sickness benefits and where labour market exclusion and 
poverty occurs at a significant scale. Skills polarisation and segmentation 
thus became integral features of the labour market. Sheffield faces 
some distinctive skills challenges on both the supply and demand side 
of the labour market equation. On the demand- side, the proportion 
of employers lacking any sort of strategic approach to the skills of 
their workforce is higher than the national average in Sheffield. On 
the supply- side, a smaller proportion of the northern workforce has a 
degree and a larger proportion has no qualifications. In some areas this 
results in a vicious circle of low skills and low productivity: or what has 
been terms the ‘low- skills equilibrium’ (Finegold and Soskice, 1988; 
Henderson et al, 2013).
During the 1980s, the Thatcher government’s neoliberalism had two 
major impacts – first that the politics of redistribution was replaced 
by the politics of the market where private interests were accorded 




The second impact, and related, was the shift in representational 
structures that increasingly marginalised the role of local government 
and the electoral democratic process challenging traditional models of 
accountability in public services. A raft of private sector- led initiatives 
was developed including Training and Enterprise Councils, as devolved 
bodies to cities and sub- regions charged with making the skills and 
training market. Despite there being serious, historical evidence- 
based, limits to creating an employer- led training market, New Labour 
continued with supply- side and market- driven skills policies. The 
devolution of employment and skills was a key element of New Labour’s 
skills strategy through ‘centrally controlled’ Local Skills Councils, along 
with RDAs and Sector Skills Councils charged with coordinating skills 
strategies across the regions. The City Strategy Pathfinder (CSP) pilot 
was accordingly established in 2006 with the primary aims of devolving 
welfare- to- work programmes for tackling worklessness and integrating 
employment and skills strategies. The CSP was seen as a vehicle to 
promote an element of devolved responsibility to local partnerships 
in delivering Pathways and was thus seen as a bottom- up process – 
partnerships and consortia were formed by local employment services 
along with LAs, the private, voluntary and community sectors where 
there was some discretion given to develop their own priorities and 
innovate with project development (Etherington and Jones, 2009).
The UK Government’s skills policy, 2010– 2015, was focused on 
further deregulation and on freeing colleges and training organisations 
from central and other external control in order to create a purchaser 
provider market for skills at the city level (see BIS, 2010b). Furthermore, 
the coordination of skills has been put in the hands of employer- led LEP, 
established at the city- region spatial scale with a remit to regenerate 
local economies through investment in business and infrastructure. 
The Sheffield LEP was established in 2011 bringing together local 
partnerships within the city- region partners envisaged some link up 
with both the employment (i.e. the Government’s flagship welfare- to- 
work programme for long- term unemployed the Work Programme 
(WP)) and skills agenda (i.e. apprenticeships and work based vocational 
training) (McNeil, 2010). Within this new governance and policy 
regime, the Sheffield City Council initiated its employment and skills 
strategy in 2012, which is coordinated by the Sheffield First Partnership 
established under the previous New Labour administration.
The Government subsequently established ‘City Deals’ as a means of 
first seeking to resolve the coordination problems and political conflicts 
that accompany the new (and old) governance arrangements (see 
UKCES and Centre for Cities, 2015). Through skills and employment 
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policies, City Deals are second seen as integral features of devolving 
funding to create the conditions for ‘open innovation’ – a perspective 
on innovation districts where economy shaping, place making and 
social networking come together, ‘mingle’ and are claimed to move 
places like Sheffield ‘up the value chain of global competitiveness by 
growing firms, networks and traded sectors that drive broad- based 
prosperity’ (Katz and Wagner 2014: 1). Sheffield LEP, in conjunction 
with the SCR’s Skills and Employment Partnership, obtained the ability 
to control part of the skills budget so that it can respond more effectively 
to local business needs. The brokerage model, deemed necessary to 
‘stimulate businesses to invest in skills’, outlined in the document ‘Made 
in Sheffield – a deal for growth’ (SCR Local Enterprise Partnership, 
2013, 2014), sought to match local contributions (public and private) 
with national funding (on which, see Payne and Keep, 2011).
In turn, this has led to the ‘Sheffield City Region Agreement on 
Devolution’ (HM Government, 2014) and the later ‘Sheffield City 
Region Combined Authority Devolution Deal’ (HM Government, 
2015b), which considered different options for improving local 
governance and accountability. The CA was to ‘exercise management 
functions’ in support of the LEP in implementing SCR’s skills 
and employment strategies, ‘represent’ the democratic mandate of 
local leaders and ‘provide accountability in terms of performance, 
finance and statutory obligations’. Moreover, SCR was to work with 
Government to deliver ‘integrated skills and training systems across 
the local area, driven by the needs of the economy and led by the 
private sector, giving local businesses the skilled labour they need to 
grow’. A £17 million Skills Bank, governed not by local partners but 
by PricewaterhouseCoopers, operated alongside this to improve the 
skills base of the workforce, changing the way skills system operates, 
by placing the purchasing power of skills in the hands of employers.
The SCR would in turn receive devolved responsibilities in relation 
to adult skills funding and provision, with the LEP and CA forming a 
joint venture partnership with the Skills Funding Agency, responsible 
for ensuring a forward- looking system was in place by 2017. This 
arrangement covered: the Adult Skills Budget (other than participation 
funding for apprenticeships and traineeships); the Apprenticeship Grant 
for Employers; and through an enhanced version of its existing Skills 
Bank, SCR played a central role in enabling businesses, especially 
small and medium- sized enterprises (SMEs), to take up and invest 
in apprenticeships. Working within Government’s reform agenda 
for apprenticeships, in which funding was to be routed directly to 
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employers, the Deal looked set to empower businesses to liaise with 
the SCR Skills Bank or directly with Government.
Last, joint working between the Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP) was seen as the way forward, with the possibility of 
joint commissioning for the next phase of the WP, which involves a 
‘provider led’ approach in which welfare- to- work services for longer 
term unemployed will be delivered by the private sector – usually 
large scale organisations (‘prime’ contractors) where other support 
services are sub- contracted usually to the voluntary sector. A ‘black 
box’ approach to the tendering has been adopted, essentially leaving 
the ‘prime’ contractors to put together a package of employment 
support, which meets the specific needs of the local area. Contracting 
processes – steered from the centre by the DWP and a pricing structure 
with a payment- by- results performance framework – are central to the 
governance of this. As part of this model of delivery, the long- term 
unemployed can be sign- posted to training as part of their personalised 
support. The programme for the South Yorkshire contract area 
(covering the north of the SCR – see Figure 2.1) is delivered by two 
multinational companies – People Plus (formerly A4e) and Serco. Under 
the Devolution Agreements, the SCR was to be involved in ‘local 
commissioning’. Whereby funding is combined through a single block 
allocation and implemented according to ‘local informed choices’.
The central elements of the two strategies are quite similar  – 
promoting employability skills for people of school leaving age, raising 
attainment levels and developing apprenticeships. For the LEP, a key 
element of its focus is on business growth and that strategies are linked 
to ‘flagship’ projects such as building on the ‘knowledge sectors’ and 
promoting the ‘knowledge economy’ (Sheffield City Region Local 
Enterprise Partnership, 2014). The changing governance landscape 
described above involved changes in party control of Sheffield City 
Council where the Liberal Democrats were replaced in 2010 by a 
majority Labour party. In essence, the 2000s were characterised by 
changing control of the LA between the two parties. The current 
administration has had to manage a rapidly changing governance 
landscape and negotiate new relationships such as the LEP and WP 
providers. Alongside this, the Sheffield Labour Party produced the 
Fairness Commission in 2012 in order to develop a more socially 
inclusive approach to employment, welfare and the environment (see 
Sheffield Fairness Commission, 2012). At least in terms of political 
and policy city- regional rhetoric, the SCR Devolution Agreements 
provide the basis for taking this forward. For policymakers promoting 
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Sheffield’s Manufacturing Innovation District, which stands on the 
‘Orgreave site where Arthur Scargill led his members from the 
National Union of Mineworkers as police clashed with them’ (Burnett 
2016: 22), this is the ‘dawn of a new era’, providing the basis for a 
21st Century export book beyond the volatile EU market with a high 
skilled, modern manufacturing economy, combining digital innovation; 
world class experience, academic research, and a strong global brand’ 
(HM Government 2014, 2015b). We now turn to consider some of 
the emerging on- the- ground tensions of these shifts in the governance 
and regulatory environments of the labour market and the economy 
more broadly, particularly how these are being played out in and 
through civil society.
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Restructuring of representational structures, new 
accountabilities and ongoing democratic deficits
The Government’s ‘localism’ agenda has involved a shift in 
responsibilities for labour market and skills policy to city- region actors 
through the creation of the LEPs with a central role for the private 
sector in shaping strategic economic development policy (Pike et al, 
2015). The emphasis on employer engagement and taking control of 
the skills agenda and market is a central plank of the LEP skills strategy 
(the SCR LEP Board is made up of ten ‘business leaders’ from the 
private sector and nine LA leaders). The shift towards the market in 
terms of purchaser provider relationship has created tensions within 
the LEP in terms of provider involvement in policy formation. The 
college networks have voiced concerns over their role on the LEP 
where their access to actually influencing or shaping skills policy rather 
than being seen as a ‘provider’ of skills (Davies, 2011). The LEPs role 
evolved over time, but its actual link with the existing raft of city 
partnerships remained unclear.
This is also exemplified in the way welfare- to- work programmes 
(i.e. the WP) are delivered in the city region. The WP has been 
devolved to regional/ sub- regional contract areas (see Figure 2.1). The 
two providers, Serco and People Plus (formerly A4E), which cover 
the Sheffield area, involve a proliferation of sub- contractors mainly 
from the voluntary and private sectors. The influence of the LA on 
the way welfare- to- work policy is being implemented is minimal 
and its engagement highly constrained (strategically and spatially), 
limited to providing ‘wrap around’ services (social, health and basic 
skills training) for more disadvantaged groups who are unable to 
access employment.
The LA raised cr itical questions at the early stage of the 
implementation of the WP concerning the relationships between local 
partnerships and other services that support people into employment 
(Sheffield City Council, 2011). The privatisation model of delivery has 
been identified by some voluntary sector stakeholders as limiting the 
possibility of disadvantaged groups and communities in civil society 
in engaging and influencing policy. According to one source: “The 
competitive nature of the whole employment programme reduces it 
to a cattle market, where contracts are given based on criteria where 
unemployed and disadvantaged groups have no say” (Voluntary 
Sector Submission, Sheffield Fairness Commission, 2012). This view, 
concerning a lack of voice, seems to be common within the Sheffield 
community and voluntary sector. According to another source: “In 
 
City Regions and Devolution in the UK
50
recent times, involvement in voice, influence and participation in 
services has been reduced significantly. This is counter intuitive 
in the context of the localism agenda” (Interview, Sheffield Third 
Sector Assembly, 2014). The scepticism about the contracting model 
seemed to be prevalent among stakeholders. For example, health 
service professionals considered their views regarding the needs of 
people with long- term health conditions were not incorporated into 
the welfare- to- work programmes. The WP offers opportunities for 
the larger voluntary sector organisations to deliver welfare- to- work 
interventions, but there are no guarantees that the more experienced 
voluntary sector organisations in the welfare- to- work market, which 
have acquired the expertise in terms of delivery, will sustain themselves 
in light of their radically reduced grant allocations.
As the civil society community and voluntary sectors are incorporated 
into the welfare market so their influence on policy has been reduced. 
This occurred also under the previous CSP in Sheffield implemented 
under New Labour, which promoted local commissioning and 
contracting in welfare services. According to an interview with 
one stakeholder:
‘the history of the role of the Sheffield partnerships seems 
to have given business interests a greater priority than an 
inclusive agenda. The aspirations of disadvantaged groups 
and communities has been neglected and there seems to 
be no indication that the new regime will be any different 
(the Labour Party took back control of the local authority 
from the Liberal Democrats in 2010)’. (Interview, Trade 
Union Official, 2014)
The increasing emphasis on private providers via the WPs seems to 
have led to greater disillusionment from the voluntary sector in terms 
of the ability to shape policies and decisions that affect disadvantaged 
groups. There is evidence that these tensions are prevalent within local 
government and NHS organisations. The impact of austerity and cuts 
in funding to social programmes seems to have further destabilised 
local partnerships.
Austerity, uneven development and the 
employment crisis
A crucial element of the politics of uneven development is the way 




and skills provision. The City Council has been facing a significant 
financial crisis  – the revenue budget shortfall was estimated to be 
between £53 and £57 million in 2012/ 13 and £154 million and 
£170 million in 2015/ 16. Budget cuts initially took place within the 
local educational providers such as Sheffield College – a major public 
sector training provider that involved job losses and redundancies. In 
relation to skills, as Keep observes, the reductions in the government’s 
Employment and Training spending announced in 2013 represent the 
point at which the entire edifice of traditional skills policy started to 
look unstable and probably unsustainable, particularly for provision 
beyond the compulsory phase of initial schooling. Between 2010/ 
11 and 2014/ 15, cuts totalling 24.3 per cent have been made in the 
overall Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (DBIS) budget. 
Within this overall settlement, the DBIS and Further Education budget 
was reduced by approximately 25 per cent. On current projections, 
the overall reduction in the DBIS budget between 2010 and 2018 is 
estimated to be 42.5 per cent (Keep, 2014: 5).
Although there is no exact estimate of the skills funding gap in the 
SCR, skills surveys provide some insights into employer demand for 
skill funding. Businesses have reported, for instance, that they would be 
able to commit more financial resources to training if trading conditions 
were more stable or there was more certainty over the economy, and 
they would be more likely to use external training providers if there 
was greater public subsidy (42 per cent) or lower course fees (34 per 
cent), or if training was more tailored to their business needs (38 per 
cent). Providers in SCR were less likely to report being unable to meet 
demand, and over two- thirds of the providers in the SCR would have 
liked to be able to offer new or different provision, but feel they are 
unable to do so, mainly because of uncertainties over funding and/ or 
the need for capital investment (Ekosgen, 2012). The 2014 SCR LEP 
Strategic Economic Plan sets out an ambitious funding and project 
plan in order to close the skills and employment gap within the city 
region which also entails considerable devolution of control of the 
way funding is managed and spent (Sheffield LEP, 2014). There is 
inevitably a question over whether the funding that will contribute to 
the creation of new jobs will be forthcoming from the Government 
in the context of current austerity plans.
The continued ‘underperformance’ of the city- region economy 
is a cause for concern among local politicians and stakeholders. An 
important example is the persistent jobs gap and shortfall, which 
characterises the labour market. The jobs gap is calculated by 
comparing the employment rates, i.e. the share of adults of working 
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age who have jobs between different areas. The worst districts had an 
average employment rate of 68 per cent compared with best group of 
districts comprising 79 per cent. The number of jobs required in the 
worst districts to reach the national average and the ‘best’ districts is 
then calculated, and this involves a significant need for new jobs that 
need to be created (Sheffield First Partnership, 2010: 25; Beatty and 
Fothergill, 2014). Furthermore a ‘prosperity gap’ of over £1.1 billion 
due to a combination of economic inactivity, unemployment and low 
productivity sectors characterises the local economy. It is estimated 
that an additional 70,000 jobs will need to be created within the SCR 
to ‘narrow the gap’ with other parts of the country. However, it is 
important to view this challenge in the context that other comparator 
areas will also grow. Based on the forecast growth in other parts of the 
country, the SCR would need to create around 120,000 jobs to have 
closed the gap with the national average in 2024. This would require 
GDP growth of almost 5 per cent and ‘nowhere in the UK grows at 
this rate for such a sustained period of time’ (Sheffield LEP, 2014: 22).
Sheffield experiences skills polarisation and has a larger proportion of 
higher skilled people and University graduates than the national average. 
With weak labour market conditions, and limited job opportunities, 
graduates are often taking low- paid, lower- skilled jobs and there are 
significant numbers of people who possess no or low level qualifications 
(see Henderson et al, 2013). The number of pupils gaining 5+ GCSEs at 
grade A*- C including English and maths is low (49 per cent) compared 
to a national average (58 per cent). As such, Sheffield has moved from 
being the 3rd best Core City on this indicator in 2006/ 7 to the 7th 
best (of 8) in 2010/ 11. At a time when the skills levels required for 
many occupations continues to rise, this could preclude many young 
people from well- paid work (Sheffield City Council, 2013: 73). This 
contributes to a more competitive labour market and displaces other 
people further down the skills ladder (creating further unemployment), 
but it also under utilises the skills of graduates. Currently, SMEs are not 
considered as the ‘normal’ route for graduate jobs (despite the fact they 
represent 95 per cent of the business base in Sheffield) and graduates 
do not know how to access SME jobs. Furthermore, SMEs can be 
reluctant to take on graduates, often because they feel they cannot 
offer the time or structured training programmes graduates need to 
make the transition from university into the workplace (see Sheffield 
First Partnership, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2016a).
The economic downturn, the lack of good quality jobs and 
‘sustainable’ jobs is a key issue for civil society in the SCR. In Sheffield, 
Job Seeker Allowance claimants have increased from around 8,000 
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pre- 2009 recession, to over 17,000 (2013), with young people aged 
16– 24 being particularly affected and in total there are 48,000 people 
claiming out of work benefits (Sheffield City Council, 2013:  75). 
The ratio of job vacancies to unemployed people has declined 
dramatically which, when combined with a dramatic increase in 
long- term unemployment, is an important indicator of how the 
economic downturn is impacting on Sheffield. With a mean average 
weekly wage of around £410, low- paid jobs compound these labour 
market dynamics (see Sheffield First Partnership, 2014: 17; Sheffield 
City Council, 2011). Discussions have accordingly been taking place 
in recent years on the ‘fragility’ of the economy, with an increasingly 
unstable labour market and increasing poverty being witnessed 
(Sheffield First Partnership, 2013, 2016a, 2016b).
Vulnerable civil society groups in the labour market are experiencing 
the damaging effects of the emerging employment and skills crisis. For 
example, differences in occupations undertaken by women showed 
an underrepresentation of female managers in 2012 compared to the 
average in England, and the concentration of women employed in 
services – a sector notorious for its unstable employment and training 
opportunities. For example, 32 per cent of women were employed in 
caring and customer service occupations compared with 7 per cent 
of men (Sheffield First Partnership, 2013, 2016a). Disabled people 
claiming incapacity benefit make up the largest cohort of people 
outside the labour market and experience severe barriers in terms of 
accessing employment and skills (Sheffield First Partnership, 2012: 20).
Lone parents have also been targeted for welfare- to- work 
interventions through stricter benefit conditionality. This harsher work 
first regime is not seen to be effective in progressing lone parents into 
sustainable employment. As one Lone Parent Advisor commented:
‘The new rules for lone parents make assumptions that 
people with children of school age are “ready” for the labour 
market and are able to engage with work related activity. 
The assumption is that the person has sorted problems such 
as debt and relationship breakdown and often this is not the 
case. Furthermore, one of the biggest barriers is accessing 
skills and this is currently a challenge due to the current 
funding arrangements.’ (Interview, 2014)
The WP performance for ‘signposting’ disadvantaged groups into 
employment has generally been poor: employment outcomes compared 
with targets shows underperformance by Providers in South Yorkshire 
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(CESI, 2014). In theory, the WP should also be giving priority to 
sustaining employment (in employment for at least 26 weeks), which 
would mean that providers will give some priority to clients accessing 
skills. There is a lack of data held at the SCR level to assess this, although 
national evaluations show that the WP is not providing sufficient 
opportunities for unemployed people to access training (Devin et al, 
2011:  iii). The National Institute of Adult Continuing Education 
(NIACE, 2012) in its own survey of providers found that 11 of 18 prime 
providers are committed to providing some element of skills training 
although this seems to be at a very basic level (for example, online 
employability testing and basic IT skills). This suggests that: “those who 
are disadvantaged will be provided limited opportunities to break from 
the low pay ‘no pay- low pay’ cycle. This is why we see the skills strategy 
as important as welfare- to- work as a route into viable employment” 
(Interview with Sheffield City Council Officer, 2014). Because of the 
fear that contractors will override employment strategies produced by 
local partnerships, as occurred in certain instances under the previous 
CSP, the implementation of the WP is creating further challenges for 
the strategic partnerships. As one stakeholder commented “there is 
little incentive for the contractors to engage with the partnerships”. 
Another interviewee observed: “contractors are advised to link with 
local partnerships and it is not mandatory. Nor is there likely to be 
any sanctions if they don’t” (Interview, 2014). The lack of public 
transparency in terms of the delivery model of Serco and People Plus 
was seen as a problem. People Plus would not publicly consult on 
their delivery plan because of confidential reasons (Interview, 2014).
A central element in enhancing skills of unemployed people and 
workers in Britain over the past 25 years has been promoting the role 
of employer- sponsored training. Overall the track record for the UK is 
low compared with international comparator countries and Sheffield 
reinforces this pattern (see Lindsay et al, 2013). In 2010, for instance, 
less than half of all employers surveyed in the SCR (49 per cent) had a 
skills budget and had trained at least one member of staff. Furthermore, 
only 25 per cent of employers surveyed had invested, or were likely to 
invest in, apprenticeships. This pattern shows no signs of altering in 
the current (devolving) context: evaluation data highlights a ‘reticence 
of employers to use cash to fund activity [which] suggests work is still 
required to sell the benefits of training’ (BIS, 2015: 12). The result is 
persistent weak innovation, poor receptiveness to new technologies 
and, as a consequence, low productivity and weak competitive 
advantage (Sheffield First Partnership, 2013, 2016a, 2016b).
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The political economy of governance 
and metagovernance
Despite the rhetoric of ‘localism’ and ‘milestones’ being claimed on 
a ‘devolution journey’ (HM Government, 2015b:  2), the different 
actors and coalitions of interests in the SCR are involved in a constant 
struggle to access, distribute and state a claim in resources and influence. 
Sheffield’s Fairness Commission represents a turn towards a more 
socially inclusive agenda, although this is in the context of outsourcing, 
deep cuts to the local state and implementation of austerity policies by 
the Council. There is no indication that the Labour controlled Council 
is taking an oppositional position against austerity policies: the cuts 
are being implemented, managed and internalised within the Labour 
Party and the various partnerships. There is growing civil society 
unrest within the city and protests appear to be intensifying. This is the 
context to which local policies are now being implemented – increasing 
tensions and disaffectedness are now apparent within the Town Hall 
and the partnerships (see Sheffield First Partnership, 2016b).
Given that under ‘Devo Sheffield’ policymakers within the city 
and city region have given priority to upskilling and wider access 
to training, the gap between intentions and outcomes can never be 
greater, as the economy becomes more unstable and the continuing 
deregulated labour market gives rise to more pronounced social and 
spatial segmentation. The continued almost ‘path dependent’ nature of 
policy discourses around engaging employers and greater coordination 
of different stakeholders, policy regimes, budgets and partnerships 
represents a re- working of the governance arrangements to provide 
a ‘best fit’ model to address the employment and skills crisis. So far, 
despite the Fairness Commission’s good intentions to recognise at 
least the social divisions that are endemic features of contemporary 
restructuring, policy actors, politicians and business leaders are locked 
into the market model of delivery, modes of representation, and 
subsequent failures in economic regulation. Sheffield clearly has a 
‘deficit in local regulatory capacity’ and some state forms and functions 
are clearly ‘counter- regulatory’ (Painter and Goodwin, 2000). How can 
we interpret what is happening here and put civil society representation 
and positionality in its (city- region) place?
Governance failure – the ‘failure to redefine objectives in the face 
of continuing disagreement about whether they are still valid for the 
various partners’ (Jessop, 2000: 18) – is occurring. There are a number 
of dimensions to governance failure, which are embedded in local 
economic and social development. First, and as we have demonstrated, 
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is the apparent tension between devolving responsibilities in relation 
to policy formation and implementation, and the tendency towards 
centralisation in decision making whereby local actors are charged 
with implementing nationally determined targets and programmes. 
The challenge here is the adaptation of national programmes to local 
conditions. Second is the increasing tendency towards institutional 
and policy fragmentation at the sub- regional level, with issues of 
accountability being raised. Governance becomes a new site for 
conflicts and political mobilisation as the nature and complexity of 
partnerships means that more and more ‘actors’ and ‘stakeholders’ 
are involved in design and delivery of labour market programmes. 
Outcomes at one scale may be dependent on performance at another 
scale of governance so therefore coordination dilemmas can occur. 
Furthermore, these coordination mechanisms may have different 
‘temporal horizons’ and there may be continuous tensions between 
short- term and long- term planning goals in policy planning. Third, 
and related, is the failure of current policies to address deep- rooted 
problems of labour market inequalities that are integral to market 
failure. This is exemplified in Sheffield by the employment gap and 
lack of sufficient sustainable employment growth to ‘revitalise’ the 
city- region economy. Finally, governance in the form of economic 
partnerships, dominated by private- sector interests, is continuing 
to replace elected and representative government in terms of local 
economic development, which in itself poses a number of problems 
between government and its elected representation model of democracy 
and partnerships. These partnerships tend to be elite forming with 
blurred lines of accountability, often far removed from those who 
are disadvantaged and disenfranchised. Depoliticisation is occurring, 
as opaque representational structure and lines of accountability 
close down and restrict possibilities of negotiation and contestation 
(see Conclusions).
As noted by Bakker (2010), these processes have been neither 
‘tidy in practice’ nor ‘linear in fashion’: market failures, state failures 
and governance failures coexist, ‘exhibit a range of failures’, and are 
used to justify the ‘problem’ requiring ongoing state intervention. 
Moreover, as forms of governance become more widespread, as we 
have demonstrated, ‘the question of governance failure becomes more 
acute’ (Bakker, 2010:  45). Given the timely nature of city- region 
building occurring across the globe, the answer to governance failure 
is where debates could fruitfully focus next. ‘Metagovernance’ offers 
one avenue for exploring this.
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Metagovernance involves attempts to manage the ongoing 
complexity, plurality and tangled hierarchies, characteristic of prevailing 
modes of coordination (see Jessop, 2000, 2008, 2016a). It involves, then, 
continually defining and redefining and drawing boundary- spanning 
roles and functions, creating and recreating networking and linkage 
devices, sponsoring and redesigning new institutions, identifying 
appropriate lead strategic institutions to coordinate other partners 
(in this case, the SCR CA), and continually generating discourses 
and narratives on the economy (the ‘shaping of context’, according 
to Jessop, 2011) to facilitate relative geographical coherence through 
repetition of the ‘problems’ to be addressed and the solutions to this. 
Government plays an increasing role in metagovernance: providing 
the ground rules for governance and regulatory order in and through 
which governance partners can pursue their aims and seek to ensure 
the compatibility or coherence of different governance mechanisms 
and regimes. It seeks to balance and rebalance power differentials 
by strengthening weaker forces or systems in the interest of social 
cohesion or integration, and takes political responsibility in the event 
of governance failure (Whitehead, 2003). These emerging roles mean 
that networking, negotiation, noise reduction, and negative as well as 
positive coordination occur ‘in the shadow of hierarchy’. It also means 
that, as Jessop reminds us, there is ‘the need for almost permanent 
institutional and organizational innovation to maintain the very 
possibility (however remote) of sustained economic growth’ (Jessop, 
2000: 24). This is certainly the case in the SCR, which is being produced 
through a combination of political fiat, central government diktat, and 
local state opportunism. The research agenda put down by Jessop for 
doing metagovernance, which we have sought to answer head- on with 
‘Devo Sheffield’, is the ‘extent to which the multiplying levels, arenas, 
and regimes of politics, policy- making, and policy implementation 
can be endowed with a certain apparatus and operational unity 
horizontally and vertically; and how this affects the overall operation 
of politics and legitimacy of the new political arrangements’ (Jessop, 
2008:  222). Effective governance and metagovernance, in turn, 
depends on displacing certain governance problems elsewhere and/ 
or on deferring them into a more or less remote future. Whereas the 
positively- charged devolution city- region policy discourses framing the 
Sheffield problem point to a can- do ‘steering optimism’, where there 
is deemed to be a capacity to engage fruitfully and with purpose to 
produce temporary spatio- temporal fixes, our analysis in this chapter 
points to ‘steering pessimism’ and a crisis of crisis management. The 
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chapter has highlighted the underlying long- term structural economic 
obstacles to effective governance and metagovernance, and that, ‘by 
virtue of the simplification of the conditions of action, so often lead 
to the “revenge” of problems that get ignored, marginalized, displaced, 
or deferred’ (Jessop, 2011: 117). This sort of simplification found in 
‘Devo Sheffield’ is evident in attempts to define problems as societal in 
scope and as requiring consensual governance, rather than as conflictual 
effects of exploitation, oppression or discrimination that can be only 
resolved by addressing fundamental structural and strategic patterns 
of domination. A website, with postings since the launch of ‘Devo 
Sheffield’, offers some insights into this:1
What is ‘Sheffield City Region’? Is it an organisation, some 
sort of quango, a government department? And how is it 
to be held accountable? Where’s the role for residents to 
steer changes and set the agenda?
Sounds like a glorified talking shop. There has been 
virtually no discussion of these City Deals … for me this 
is a backward step not a forward one.
The problem is  … this handout to city- regions will 
be instead of a comprehensive devolution agenda, but is 
simply yet another last minute sticking plaster to hide the 
fact that nothing of substance has been achieved by yet 
another government.
Conclusions
Within the context of the Northern Powerhouse, this chapter has 
explored the implementation of the devolution of employment and 
skills frameworks within the SCR. The UK Conservative government 
has taken a ‘localist’ approach to urban regeneration, which positions 
sub- regional economic development and city- region building as the 
primary policy tools for growth, democracy, and also tackling spatial 
inequalities. There is certainly a gap in our knowledge in terms of 
how city- region growth strategies, welfare- to- work programmes, 
and employment and skills initiatives contribute to economic and 
employment growth. The chapter has highlighted the complex issues 
around facilitating access to employment and skills by disadvantaged 
civil society groups.
On this, we have highlighted three main tensions in the devolution 
settlement, as applied to the SCR through the Devolution Agreements. 





disadvantage in the SCR, which is stubbornly embedded on several 
levels:  there is a relative low level of economic performance, with 
its GVA ranked 38 out of 39 city regions; the lack of employment 
demand and poor jobs growth compounds this with, as noted above, 
an additional 70,000 jobs needed to narrow the gap with other parts of 
the country; low pay, skills and in- work poverty mean that work is not 
an automatic route out of poverty; disability health and labour market 
disadvantage is a significant policy challenge; women and young people 
are particularly disadvantaged in terms of employment and pay, with 
a higher proportion of women paid below the living wage compared 
to men in the SCR, and some 22 per cent of those aged 16– 24 years 
old unemployed (see Etherington and Jones, 2017).
Second, employment and skills provision are compounding this 
through policy fragmentation, limited transparency and accountabilities. 
According to some stakeholders, the city region as an economic entity 
faces challenges primarily due to overlapping boundaries – three LAs 
are in two city regions, and the Derbyshire LAs are also involved with 
employment and skills initiatives developed by Derbyshire Employment 
and Skills Board. The cross- border involvement of Chesterfield and 
Bassetlaw (in Derbyshire) LAs in a South Yorkshire deal subsequently 
led Derbyshire County Council to seek a (successful) judicial review 
(on the breadth of the consultation, on its fairness, on the means used 
to consult, and on the complexity of the information surrounding 
transfer of powers) of this devolution process, effectively putting back 
the mayoral election timetable to run the city region’s development 
corporation. These ‘custody battles’ and ‘regional rows’ (Perraudin, 
2016), illustrating how ‘the power of the state is the power of the 
forces acting in and through the state’ (Jessop, 1990: 270), increased 
during 2017 through the ambitions of Barnsley and Doncaster’s LAs 
to be part of a wider Yorkshire Devolution Deal, culminating on 18 
September with their withdrawal from, and ‘derailing’ of, the SCR 
devolution process (Burn, 2017). This triggered central government 
to withhold the £900 million financial offer, with a possible mayor 
de facto powerless, while austerity romps on. This situation was not 
resolved until Dan Jarvis MP was appointed Mayor in 2018 and in 
2020 when Barnsley and Doncaster LAs finally ratified the deal (see 
Hoole and Hincks, 2020). All the time, welfare cuts had continued to 
bite deep, and austerity impacting further on Sheffield City Council’s 
budget equated to 50 per cent of funding (£475 million) over the 
period 2010 to 2020 (Dore, 2020: 1).
The lack of boundary alignment also underlines an inherent problem 
with coordinating city- region and LA employment initiatives with 
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WP providers. The growth model in itself will contribute to increased 
numbers of jobs but there is a view that these will not be accessed 
by disadvantaged groups. There is a concern that this model is weak 
in terms of social inclusion policies and that it restricts the voice 
of disadvantaged groups being heard within the city- region policy 
process. Moreover, there have been weak links between welfare- to- 
work programmes and city- region initiatives and partnerships. The 
WP seems to have been ‘parachuted’ into the regions with relatively 
little consideration in terms of how provision is coordinated with 
local services.
Third, in the context of austerity, funding cuts are adversely impacting 
on the employment and skills system and the devo ‘big pot of money’ 
(see above) is not plugging this gap. The National Audit Office (2013) 
reports that over the 5- year period 2010/ 11 to 2014/ 15 the government 
will have spent £6.2 billion on local growth programmes, including 
that spent via RDAs and their legacy and spending on new funds and 
structures. By comparison, the RDAs spent £11.2 billion over the 
preceding 5- year period 2005/ 06 to 2009/ 10. Adult Skills budget cuts 
have been ongoing for a number of years and, we would argue, are 
unsustainable. The Government is prioritising apprenticeships in terms 
of skills policies and funding and an issue raised is how disadvantaged 
groups are to access Apprenticeships, given the importance of Further 
Education colleges (which are experiencing funding cuts) in providing 
training for disadvantaged groups. A significant funding gap is emerging 
within local government as a result of this and we have underlined how 
LA cuts are undermining and hindering the effectiveness of skills and 
employment programmes. Those services that are crucial to assisting 
civil society disadvantaged groups into employment are delivered or 
coordinated by LAs and are being cut back. We would argue that these 
cuts are hindering city- region growth objectives.
City- region building frameworks clearly have a long way to go to 
address these dilemmas, and the current obsession with deal- making 
public policy, which is ‘founded upon territorial competition and 
negotiation between central and local actors unequally endowed 
with information and resources, leading to highly imbalanced and 
inequitable outcomes across the UK’ (O’Brien and Pike, 2015: 14), will 
only compound the deeply historical problem of uneven growth that 
is occupying much media attention in the UK (see Pike et al, 2016). 
Devolution deals are concerned with arrangements for individual city 
regions and beyond the aspiration for a larger collective contribution 
to national economic output; there is no focus on the relationships 
with and between city regions and hence the overall functioning of the 
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economy is bereft of strategic planning (Goodwin et al, 2017). In effect, 
there is an asymmetric distribution of powers:  the devolution deals 
encourage competition over collaboration between city regions, which 
exacerbates existing inequalities, whereas the fantasy of ‘neoliberalism 
promises that everyone will win’ (Dean, 2009: 72) prevails in policy 
and political discourses. This is heightened by the welfare and LA 
cuts, as many of the policies that previously distributed the proceeds 
of the UK’s finance- centric economic model have been ended by the 
broader austerity agenda. We maintain that public sector and public 
investment should play key roles in supporting and leading growth, 
but this stance ‘is being directly hampered by a big withdrawal of state 
funding for this purpose’ (RSA, 2016: 6).
Building on the innovative thinking of colleagues seeking to effectively 
spatial rebalance the economy in advanced capitalism (Martin, 2015), 
we would favour approaches that: offer growth based on social inclusion 
for civil society (adopt options which ensure that economic activities 
are more jobs rich, the poorest benefit the most); exercise redistribution 
and fairness (central government needs to acknowledge that the poorest 
areas, after decades of de- industrialisation and underinvestment, need a 
‘hand up’); and promote excellent public services to attract economic 
success (we need a new central– local relationship, founded on trust and a 
genuine localism, which appreciates the wider value of local government 
activity and strengthens local capacity to act in the interest of local people, 
communities and places). This in turn suggests the need for inclusive and 
accountable models of governance and commissioning; a needs- based 
approach to employment and skills; a targeted job creation programme; 
refocusing the outcomes of employment support on earnings and not 
performance indicators based on benefit off- flows; and targeting funds 
around integrated employment and skills to provide in- work support 
and progression.
Last, in terms of its analytical contribution, the key arguments put 
forward are that concepts of governance failure and metagovernance are 
important for analysing the development, tensions and contradictions 
of city- region economic governance within the context of the UK 
Government’s devolution and localism agenda (in particular ‘Devolution 
Agreements’). Using the tools of geographical political economy, it 
is time to grasp the contradictions of space and start thinking about 
‘devolved’ city- region building as spatially- articulated metagovernance 
failure, where different and multiple spatial frameworks appear to be 
operating at the same time and evoking a crisis of crisis management 
(Jessop, 2016a, 2016b).
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On this, and building on Rancière (2007), there is an urgent need 
to consider the links between, in this case, the ongoing depoliticisation 
of economic development and its governance in and through the 
existence of what have been termed ‘post- democratic’ and ‘post- 
political’ frameworks of performative and situated (apparent) consensus 
building (see Allmendinger and Haughton, 2012), and the ongoing 
‘march of neoliberalism’ (Hall, 2011: 6) as a market- making machine 
continually depoliticising civil society through its economisation. 
Behind the chimera of the SCR is an ongoing brutal logic of labour 
market segmentation, flexibilisation and shifts in power relations 
between capital and labour through the weakening of collective 
bargaining and employment rights, creating the conditions for control 
over work arrangements and the casualisation of employment (part- 
time, temporary and zero- hour jobs). We must, as Rancière (2007: 106) 
points out, ‘repoliticize [these] conflicts so that they can be addressed, 
restore names to the people and give politics back its former visibility 
in the handling of problems and resources’. The next chapter tackles 





The impact of austerity in cities has been framed around ‘austerity 
urbanism’. This is a concept initially developed by Peck (2012, 2014) 
and extended more recently by Davidson and Ward (2018) to describe 
a strategy of fiscal policies and cuts focused on cities. This is in part a 
neoliberal response to previous policy failures to generate sustainable 
economic growth, which would influence the local tax base (Kennett 
et al, 2015). This ‘austerity urbanism’ approach has received criticism 
for being primarily overly ‘US centric’ and that it underestimates the 
role of global as well as national economic processes, shaping the way 
cities are becoming focal points, for ‘managing’ the distributional 
consequences of fiscal crises and retrenchment (see Hastings et  al, 
2017; Pike et al, 2018).
This critical engagement is extended further, to include how social 
and institutional actors exercise agency within cities in terms of 
contestation and negotiation (Meegan et al, 2014; Newman, 2014). 
Much of the work to date precludes agency and the ways urban actors 
can either resist or at least mitigate the impact of austerity. This point 
has been extended by Blanco and colleagues (Blanco et al, 2014; Davies 
and Blanco, 2017) and similarly by Bristow (Bristow and Healy, 2015; 
Webber et al, 2018), where attention is drawn to the importance played 
by agency in relation to LAs as ‘regulatory intermediaries’ adapting, 
responding and reacting to austerity crisis. LAs devise various strategies 
to protect the poor and disadvantaged groups who tend to depend on 
LA services (see Donald et al, 2014; Fuller, 2017, 2018).
Building on Chapter  2, this chapter is interested in how civil 
society social actors exercise agency within city regions in terms of 
the contestation and negotiation of austerity- fuelled welfare reform 
and the emerging ‘politics of labour conditionality and discipline’. 
Attention is drawn to the role of trade unions and LA unions, who as 
actors still have a voice within the ‘growth’ agendas and in particular 
in terms of the growing precarious nature of the economy. This is 
undertaken by drawing on devolution developments in the GMCR, 
as noted in Chapter 1, considered to be one of the flagship devolution 
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initiatives in England. This comprises, through city- region devolution, 
the LAs of Manchester, Bolton, Bury, Salford, Trafford, Stockport, 
Wigan, Oldham, Rochdale and Tameside to one (political) level. 
The inception of a mayoral CA, following waves of deal- making, 
has seen GM’s ‘Devo Manc’ in the vanguard of recent devolution 
debates. This has been central to England’s state spatial reconfiguration, 
with agglomerative city- region building and various rounds of 
‘spatial imaginaries’ facilitating the decentralisation of budgets 
pertaining to economic and social development (Deas et  al, 2020; 
Hincks et al, 2017).
The next section builds on the Introduction and charts the political 
economy of austerity in city regions. This is followed by an analysis 
of the implementation of welfare reform in the context of devolution 
in Greater Manchester and how these impact on civil society by 
reinforcing social inequalities. One of the key contradictions of austerity 
is how it undermines neoliberal objectives for a free market supply 
of labour. Building on Chapter 2, a subsequent section illustrates the 
increasingly unstable nature of the labour market because of the rise 
in precarious work. The chapter then focuses on the civil society 
institutional actors and explores the way they negotiate and contest 
austerity politics.
The political economy of austerity in city regions
Austerity is generally used to mean public expenditure cuts: reducing 
government budget deficits through a combination of public spending 
cuts and regressive tax hikes. There is a view that austerity involves 
an ‘economic model’ integral to neoliberalism with the aim of 
underpinning and reinforcing the power of ruling classes – that is, 
financial interests (Callinicos, 2012: 67). This restoration of ‘class power’ 
entails reducing wages and labour protections to make the workforce 
more ‘flexible’. The ‘disciplining of labour’ is a key element of the 
austerity ‘growth project’ in terms of restricting its agency and capacities 
of mobilisation and resistance and this is facilitated by curtailing the 
bargaining power of labour via industrial relations and employment 
regulation. In addition, as we noted in Chapter 2, welfare and labour 
market policies involve the increasing use of conditionality in terms 
of reducing access to benefits and restricting the capacities of labour 
to negotiate and challenge the welfare system (see Etherington, 2020; 
Umney, 2018).
Austerity has generally led to widescale inequalities and markedly 




midlands former industrial regions (Beatty and Fothergill, 2016). 
Devolution and localisation share a joint purpose  – to ‘download’ 
austerity to the regions, while at the same time seeking to manage its 
contradictions. Precarious economies, therefore, need to be understood 
in relation to the wider political economy of state restructuring and 
geographical uneven development. City governance, which operates 
at different spatial scales, now involves an array of actors, stakeholders 
and organisations; it is neoliberal in character in terms of the changing 
relations between state and market economy involving the increasing 
influence of corporate interests and privatisation of public services 
(Jones, 2019a, 2019b). Austerity plays a key role in the restructuring 
of modes of representation and democratic accountability, which are 
integral to devolution strategies. Interventions in managing civil society 
over the past few years have become more punitive and revanchist. 
Universal Credit (UC) now involves the amalgamation of six different 
benefits into one with a tapering system linked to in- work benefits and 
wages designed to ‘make work pay’. This requires a more disciplinary 
and conditional welfare system through a tougher claimant regime in 
which sanctions are an integral feature. In turn, ‘in- work conditionality’ 
is a central feature of UC, with the requirement for claimants to 
attain ‘earning thresholds’ set at the level of effort reasonable for an 
individual to undertake. In short, the localisation of welfare performs 
societal depoliticisation by transferring aspects of social policy from 
the (collective) public to the (individualised) private sphere, articulated 
locally through the changing internal structures of the state. The 
Conservative Government’s welfare reform agenda has, therefore, 
been established around moral and ideological messages in terms of 
rights, responsibilities and benefit ‘dependency’ drawing distinctions 
between ‘strivers’ (people who work) and ‘skivers’ (those who claim 
benefits) (Shildrick, 2018). As Wiggan (2012: 391) states: ‘a hostile 
environment is slowly being constructed for all those who find they 
need to rely on social security, whilst the principle of solidarity that 
underpins support for more expansive public expenditure is eroded in 
favour of a market orientated system of punitive welfare’.
The onset of the 2008 financial crisis stimulated employer 
strategies towards labour flexibilisation and a key aspect of this is pay 
determination and the prevalence of low paid work, which is evidenced 
by this becoming a more prevalent feature of the UK labour market 
(D’Arcy et  al, 2019). As such, working life in low- paying sectors 
has become more insecure and there is evidence that the movement 
between work and welfare becomes more common (see Peck and 
Theodore, 2000; Rubery et al, 2018). In turn, businesses shift the risks 
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of the market on to workers, as the ‘exit of qualified/ skilled benefit 
claimants into low paying, precarious jobs, is uniformly considered a 
sub- optimal result of activation’ (Raffas, 2017: 356). Indeed, the role 
of activation/ welfare- to- work becomes clearly defined as a policy 
tool to ensure that precarious jobs are filled by claimants as a way of 
sustaining the new financialised business model of outsourcing and 
fragmentation. The removal and downgrading of employment rights 
and processes, which facilitate employee representation in negotiating 
workplace employment conditions, are key to facilitating this process 
(Rubery et al, 2018).
Our understanding of austerity in the context of devolution and 
civil society requires analysis of the role of social and spatial agency 
within the wider geography of insecurity. Both the attacks on civil 
society and the contradictions of neoliberalism and austerity are clearly 
expressed – and visible – on the local scale (Gough, 2014). Cumbers 
et al (2010: 53) make an important point when they state that ‘our 
approach is to bridge the separation of production and reproduction 
(by) locating individuals within both their local labour market contexts 
and the broader webs of social relations through which they negotiate 
everyday life in the city’. We propose a deeper sense of agency through 
‘unpacking’ resistance in the context of social struggles. As noted in 
Chapters 1 and 2, city regions are important sites of resistance to the 
downloading of or devolving austerity particularly in relation to local 
government and other state institutions. The labour market impacts of 
economic and state restructuring places demand and pressures on local 
institutions, trade unions and social movements in terms of resisting 
and negotiating the local impacts of austerity. However, devolved 
governance also opens a new space for civil society actors to mobilise 
their power resources and capacities, to engage in partnerships, and to 
try to shape local agreements (Gough, 2014).
The role of actors and collective action can, therefore, be extended 
to include the analysis of representational structures such as local 
government as ‘anchor institutions’ in the delivery of vital social 
investment and reproduction services and in terms of engagement 
with unemployed and disadvantaged groups (see Hastings et al, 2017). 
Referring to the role of local government, Newman coins the term 
‘landscapes of antagonism’, contextualised within a ‘contradictory field 
of political forces’ (Newman, 2014: 3298). As Johnson et al (2017: 13) 
emphasise, as ‘wider systems of welfare have retreated over the past 
30 years or so, paradoxically local government has assumed a greater 
burden of responsibility for regulating the market in various ways’. 
In this way, the local state is a site where trade union densities and 
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organisation are still relatively strong and often act as a focal point for 
negotiating and in some cases challenging the impact of welfare reform.
The GM ‘city deal’: austerity and uneven development
Chapter 1 outlined that the Northern Powerhouse was established to 
mobilise partnerships and local government to collaborate ‘strategically’ 
on key economic issues. This includes increased powers over transport 
and economic planning; electing their own mayors; some powers to 
manage health; new employment and skills power via apprenticeships; 
and in 2017, the co- commissioning of welfare- to- work. The GMCR 
Devolution Settlement now includes major infrastructure, planning, 
housing, health and social care, welfare and employment investment 
initiatives. In the area of employment and social inclusion, GMCA 
has piloted a health and employment programme ‘Working Well’, 
which was subsequently rolled out as a Work and Health Programme 
within the devolved welfare- to- work programme in 2017. The Work 
and Health Programme is commissioned nationally by the DWP by 
regional contract package areas, as was the case with the WP. However, 
as part of the Devolution Agreement, Greater Manchester is a distinct 
contract package area and the programme has been jointly designed 
based on the learning from the Working Well programmes. The 
GMCA and individual LAs have established internal and external 
partnerships in order to manage the implementation of UC and the 
‘managed migration’ from ‘legacy benefits’ on to UC (Manchester 
City Council, 2019a).
The devolution settlement though has essentially involved the 
devolution of austerity, which impacts on civil society in a variety 
of ways, some of which have been highlighted above. The following 
further features need to be exposed:
• The Health and Work Programme, as described above, which is 
aimed at assisting those who are ‘furthest away’ from the labour 
market, will be smaller and more focused than the WP and Work 
Choice, formerly the major welfare- to- work programmes that 
were wound up in 2019. Both programmes comprised a combined 
expenditure of £540.8  million in 2015/ 16 (£416.4  million 
WP, £124.4  million Work Choice). This compares with the 
£130 million allocated for specialist employment support. Spending 
on specialist support under the new Work and Health Programme 
has a projected budget of £130 million representing a cut of more 
than 80 per cent from the WP and Work Choice alone.
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• NHS devolution has major implications for welfare- to- work 
policies for claimants with long- term health conditions. Because 
of devolution, Greater Manchester was already a long way ahead 
of other areas in producing plans about transforming services, new 
models of care, improving outcomes, radical upgrades in population 
health, and prevention. But underlying it all is the ‘financial 
challenge’. With a devolved health and social care budget for GM 
of just over £6 billion, the ten councils and NHS commissioners 
must find ‘massive savings’. Nationally, Sustainability Transformation 
Partnerships are largely about making those massive savings, as well 
as exposing the NHS to even more private sector involvement 
(Bedale, 2016).
• Keep has observed that the nature and intensity of cuts to the Adult 
Skills Budget (post- 2013) have been such that the system reached 
unsustainable levels (Keep, 2016). Keep’s analysis is corroborated by 
the Institute for Public Policy Research, which states that ‘by 2020/ 
21 adult skills funding will have been nearly cut in half in real terms 
from 2010/ 11’ (Dromey and McNeil, 2017: 3).
• Similarly, the area based reviews (ABRs) relating to the Further 
Education Sector, which devolved authorities must manage, 
involve a rationalisation based on major cuts in Further Education 
funding. Government guidance on the review process, included in 
a parliamentary briefing on post- 16 ABRs, states that the ABRs 
need to be undertaken ‘in a way which also addresses the significant 
financial pressures on institutions including a declining 16– 19 
population and the need to maintain very tight fiscal discipline in 
order to tackle the deficit’(HoC Library, 2018: 14).
• City region and LAs, which are subject to significant funding cuts, 
will have to absorb the impacts of the cuts in welfare within city- 
region and local areas (see Gray and Barford 2018; and below).
From welfare to increasing low  pay and labour market insecurity
Greater Manchester had a large manufacturing base and in 1959, the 
manufacturing industry employed over half of the Greater Manchester 
workforce; today, it accounts for less than 1 in 5 jobs. The de- 
industrialisation of the latter 20th century hit the regional economy 
hard, as it did much of the UK’s industrial north. Some parts of the city 
were particularly affected – East Manchester, a former centre for heavy 
engineering and chemicals, experienced 24,000 job losses between 




sector. Financial and professional services account for one- sixth of all 
jobs, one- fifth of GVA and almost half of GVA growth in the decade 
leading up to the onset of the recession. The manufacturing sector 
contracted by 37.6 per cent over the period 1998 to 2008, reflecting 
the wider structural shift in the economy from manufacturing centre 
to service economy (Hunt, 2015).
Pike et al (2016) provide some empirical analysis of some of the 
embedded precarious and unstable nature of the regional economies 
described above. Their study addresses the question of how many more 
and better jobs need to be created to address the demand deficiency 
in the major industrial cities. They categorise the labour market in 
terms of the ‘more jobs gap’ and ‘better jobs gap’. The more jobs gap 
comprises those people who are unemployed, inactive people who 
want to work, and underemployed workers who would like more hours 
such as people working part time. The better jobs gap incorporates 
those on low paid work, with those jobs classed as insecure such as 
temporary contracts, while workers prefer a permanent employment 
contract. In short, economic disadvantage within civil society is stark.
In this context, the number of people in GM who earned less than the 
low pay threshold (defined as two- thirds of national median income, or 
£7.74 an hour in 2014) increased to 233,500 in 2014 (New Economy 
Manchester, 2015). Furthermore, the chances of progressing out of 
low pay are limited. According to one key source:
Most people who were low paid at the start of our period 
of study were low paid at the end. Our findings are in line 
with others that suggest that in many low wage labour 
markets, there is very limited scope for progression to 
better paid work. There appear to be substantial numbers 
cycling in and out of low paid work as they change jobs. 
Yet a relatively small minority show a clear sense of moving 
up out of low pay. (New Economy Manchester, 2015: 68)
Insecure and low- paid work is linked to the ‘de- unionisation’ and that 
people within the welfare system become vulnerable to exploitation. 
Trade union density (proportion of workers who are members of a 
trade union) is 26 per cent in Greater Manchester, slightly higher than 
the England average (23 per cent) and collective bargaining coverage 
is 30 per cent, also higher than the England average (27.9 per cent) 
(EWERC, 2017: 12). These figures show that most workers in Greater 
Manchester do not have access to, or are members of, trade unions. 
Furthermore, these are workplaces where trade unions have difficulties 
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in accessing terms of recognition. According to the European Work 
and Employment Research Centre:
For trade unions and civil society organisations, the 
proliferation of insecure jobs has caused a diminishing in 
the social and economic status of individuals. The more 
that employers depend on insecure employment forms 
and contractual forms of work that reduce entitlement to 
employment rights and social protection the greater the risk 
that segments of the more vulnerable workforce (whether 
due to age, disability, or limited education for example) are 
rendered ‘invisible’ and both the worker and their work 
become marginalised in the city … For their part, unions 
are playing a clear role in promoting core rights to which 
all workers should be entitled to such as sick pay, holiday 
pay and the chance to contribute to a pension scheme. 
(EWERC, 2017: 8)
Yates’s study of the labour market in respect to young people in 
Greater Manchester provides an interesting and insightful lens into 
these dynamics of low pay and welfare policies in terms of the way 
they tend to reinforce low pay and insecure work (Yates, 2017; Peck 
and Theodore, 2000). This argues that young people are a source of 
cheap labour and various policy instruments, such as training and 
welfare, reinforce their exclusion and marginalisation (see also Finn, 
1987). With respect to training, there has been a trend towards a 
shift from training without jobs towards education without jobs as 
an increasing number of graduates compete for low paid jobs (see 
Allen and Ainley, 2013; Roberts, 2017). Apprenticeship programmes, 
where the majority offered in Greater Manchester tend to be run by 
low paying employers who offer below minimum wage rates, tend 
to be poor quality and undercut wages. The other factor that shapes 
the labour market transitions of young people is the discriminatory 
practices of the welfare system, where young people are denied access 
to benefits transferring the costs of social reproduction from the state 
on to young people and households. Yates adds:
But since 2010 the dominant form which labour market 
interventions towards young people have taken are coercive 
and disciplinary. Young people have experienced removal 
of state welfare such as housing benefit and have been 
targeted by punitive active labour market policies such as the 
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‘Work Programme’ and ‘Youth Obligation’; these schemes 
force young people to engage in compulsory training or 
work placements or have their already diminished welfare 
payments completely removed entirely. (Yates, 2017: 475)
Yates acknowledges that this trend has been shaped by the absence of trade 
unions and enforcement of employment rights (only a small percentage 
of young people are members of trade unions) in workplaces into which 
the majority of young people move (whether from the welfare system 
or outside it). In Greater Manchester, the lack of resources to support 
people of all age groups to retain their jobs with continued in work 
support is seen as a factor as to why many disadvantaged groups return 
to the benefit system. The impact of cuts to benefits and social support, 
including vocational training, underpins and shapes this trend towards 
poverty and exclusion. We discuss this impact in more detail below.
Implementing welfare reform and the reduction in 
social protection
The migration to UC from legacy benefits has been observed by the 
authorities to have major negative implications for people’s incomes 
and wellbeing (see SSAC, 2018). This has had a major impact on 
disabled people claiming disability related benefits. A relatively high 
proportion of claimants were being found ‘fit to work’ even though 
many of these decisions have been challenged as being incorrect. One 
of the consequences of incorrect assessments is the relatively high 
proportion of sickness benefit claimants vulnerable to benefit sanctions 
and benefit cuts (GMLC, 2017). According to the GMCA (2018: 10), 
the migration numbers are significant in terms of the roll out in 
GM – involving 198,500 from out of work benefits (Employment and 
Support Allowance, Job Seeker Allowance), 211,000 from tax credits 
and 207,600 housing benefit claimants. The GMCA has emphasised the 
complex nature of the migration process and challenges in estimating 
the impacts. Furthermore, the GMCA has not been able to quantify 
the impacts except that there is a proportionally greater increase in 
the use of Trussell Trust foodbanks in the city region (19 per cent) 
compared with 13 per cent for the North West Region. In addition, 
the GMCA has through reference to national assessments identified 
the various ‘threats’ from UC in terms of reduction in incomes and 
vulnerability to financial hardship (GMCA, 2018: 5).
To sum up, benefit cuts hit the Greater Manchester area 
disproportionately as there are large numbers of out of work benefit 
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claimants and those who are in low paid work claiming tax credits 
(Beatty and Fothergill, 2017: 8). Benefit freeze has significant financial 
consequences for families and individuals in the GMCR. Manchester 
City Council has summarised these impacts when it states:
The combined and cumulative impact of these welfare 
reforms alongside the introduction of UC is difficult to 
monitor due to its complexity and the fact that individuals 
will have very different experiences based on their 
circumstances. However, evidence suggests that vulnerable 
residents in particular, who have barriers to employment 
could be at risk of greater poverty and housing instability. 
(Manchester City Council, 2017: 7)
As the new system involves cuts in social support this is leading to 
the undermining of benefits or social security as a safety net. Data 
collated by Beatty and Fothergill (2016) on the financial implications 
of welfare changes across civil society focuses on estimated changes 
to key benefit including Employment and Support Allowance, UC, 
Benefit Cap Extension and Benefit Freeze, which together amount to 
significant cuts in income for claimants. Accumulated loss in income 
from the post 2015– 20 reforms and the implications of financial changes 
for working- age adults equates to nearly £1,000 per person across 
the GMCR. Accordingly, Whitham’s study of local welfare support 
illustrates how austerity has impacted on the capacity to respond to 
increasing impoverishment and destitution when it is pointed out that 
the funds for local crisis support have taken a significant cut – spending 
on crisis support in 2017/ 18 was £3.8 million. This is over £15 million 
lower than spending under Crisis Loan and Community Care Grant 
provision in 2010/ 11. The number of successful applications for support 
through local schemes in Greater Manchester was just over 10,000 in 
2017/ 18 compared to 123,000 Community Care Grants and Crisis 
Loan awards made in 2010/ 11 (Whitham, 2018: 13).
Universal Credit displacing austerity on to local authorities
UC has major impacts across the board on a variety of services delivered 
by LAs. The Joseph Rowntree Foundation has made a detailed 
assessment of the impact and cost of cuts on local government; its case 
studies highlight the crucial role LAs play in the growth agenda, as 
well as providing essential support to disadvantaged groups (Hastings 




geographical impacts of LA cuts with those in the more deindustrialised 
and disadvantaged regions, where LAs are more reliant on central 
government, experiencing more disproportionate cuts.
Taking Manchester City Council as an  example – the largest economy 
and source of employment within the city region – between 2011/ 
12 and 2016/ 17 the Council had to deliver a massive £339 million of 
savings with a further £14 million required in 2017/ 18, following the 
cumulative effect of reductions in funding from central government 
(Manchester City Council, 2019b:  26). Despite these cuts and 
retrenchment, LAs are, in terms of ‘their duty of care’ having to manage 
the impact of the UC migration process. A  key Manchester City 
Council source sums up the impact of UC on the city council services:
Research identified the risk of welfare reforms pushing 
additional unmet costs on to local authorities and partners 
including voluntary and community sector (VCS) 
organisations, as they manage both the administrative and 
wider policy consequences of welfare reform creating 
significant workload pressures. Councils are uniquely 
placed to support families to adjust to changes brought 
about by wider welfare reforms. (Manchester City Council, 
2019a: 11)
This raises an important question in terms of the city- regional roll- 
out implementation of UC in the context of austerity. At the time 
of writing, this has been stalled by the government but there will be 
thousands of workers transferred from Working Tax Credit to UC, 
which in turn will have major implications for in- work poverty and 
its impact on local welfare services.
The contested politics of devolution, austerity 
and welfare
We have attempted to capture the multiple civil society actors and their 
agendas in terms of negotiating and contesting welfare and employment 
policies in Table 3.1. Building on Chapter 1, our analysis of the role 
of actors and collective action includes trade unions, the voluntary 
sector, community organisations and representational structures such 
as local government which act as ‘anchor institutions’ in terms of 
engagement with unemployed and disadvantaged groups (see Hastings, 
et al, 2017; Etherington and Jones, 2018). As highlighted by the ‘Just 
Work’ programme (Johnson et al, 2017), it is important to understand 
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Table 3.1: Actor strategies for opposing labour market policies
Policy interventions Tensions and conflicts Key actors and sites of 
negotiation
Devolution deals Growth versus distribution
Inclusion, funding 
for devolution
Deals, modes of 
representation
Trade unions, civil society, 
LAs; negotiating ‘social 
dialogue’ formalised in 
Greater Manchester; 
devolution and democracy;
Inclusive growth politics via 
Inclusive Growth Analysis Unit
Employment rights Low level of unionisation 
high levels of insecure work
North West TUC, Greater 
Manchester trade unions and 




Impact of austerity 
increasing labour 
market marginalisation
Working poor, cuts 
in funding
PBR model, negative impact
Conditionality and sanctions,
delays in benefit, tough 
claimant regime
Local authority employment 
and anti- poverty strategies 
and role of anti- poverty 
coalitions, disability rights
Organisations advice services 
(Greater Manchester Law 
Centre, Greater Manchester 




Links between non-governmental 
organisations and trade unions in 
Greater Manchester
Negotiating with central 
government (submissions to 
Work and Pensions Select 
Committee)
Social, health and 
community support 
services
Impact of austerity 
on both LAs and 
disadvantaged groups
Local authority conflicts with 
public sector trade unions
LAs, frontline services and 
WP providers, NHS providers, 
advice services; advocacy for 
benefit claimants trade unions




Cuts to skills funding, 
including adult skills budget, 
area- based reviews, phase 
out of European funded 
skills programmes, extent of 
employer buy- in in face of 
recession, quality of provision 
and engagement of limited 
access to advanced skills 
by disadvantaged groups to 
skills
Skills providers especially 
further education colleges 
(playing an advocacy role for 
disadvantaged groups), trade 
unions negotiating funding 
gaps in work representation 
around apprenticeship quality




the economic context in order to situate social and spatial agency and 
mobilisation. De- industrialisation has involved the loss of unionised 
work and led to the fragmentation of both the labour market and 
business structure, which creates significant challenges for trade unions 
to organise and coordinate collective action. This said, there exist active 
trade councils within the GMCR. The metropolitan geography and 
relatively strong interconnectedness from previous rounds of city- region 
building has provided a platform for social action to be networked 
across the city region.
There is an emerging agenda then, which recognises that quality of 
work and employment rights needs to be built into policy agendas. 
The North West TUC has outlined its own devolution employment 
charter (North West TUC, 2018) and the University of Manchester 
Inclusive Growth Analysis Unit has played an active role in shaping a 
discussion on ‘responsible businesses’ along with the GMCA, which 
has developed its own employment charter that seems to be broadly 
similar to that of the North West TUC (Rafferty and Jelley, 2018). 
The increasing awareness and discourse around representational gaps 
and lack of employment rights within the city- region economy has, 
therefore, brought to the fore campaigns around living wages and 
anti- poverty strategies.
One of the features of devolution under neoliberalism though is the 
tendency to marginalise trade unions and voluntary sector engagement 
within the devolution political process (see Smith Institute, 2017). In 
many respects this may explain why there have been tensions between 
the trade unions and the devolved authorities around the devolution 
process. This can be illustrated in the UNISON trade union response to 
the Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Plan, which goes to the 
heart of trade unions’ lack of engagement with the devolution process 
and the way devolution embodies the implementation of privatisation:
Our concerns include:  the lack of employee and trade 
union involvement in the production of the Plan; the lack 
of focus on improving the quality of employment as a means 
of improving health outcomes and the absence of any plan 
to implement the living wage at a Greater Manchester 
scale; the implications on our members delivering public 
services of new delivery models. We believe that health 
service delivery and employment in Greater Manchester 
should be very much part of the National Health Service. 
(UNISON, 2016: 6)
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Furthermore, the TUC argues (2014) that LEPs often do not recognise 
or understand the role that unions can play as agents for change. 
While it is recognised that LEPs should be held accountable for their 
development, there are no mechanisms currently in place for this 
to happen (see Pike et  al, 2018). Furthermore, the devolution of 
employment policy tends to be taking place without any structural 
changes or adjustments that will allow the voice of disadvantaged 
groups to be heard within the city- region policy process, especially as 
there is no trade union representation on the Greater Manchester LEP. 
As GM has involved the devolution of major public services such as 
health and social care, it is of little surprise that some form of social 
dialogue has been established with the trade unions via the Greater 
Manchester Strategic Workforce Engagement Board and a Workforce 
Engagement Protocol. The election of a high- profile Labour mayor 
(Andy Burnham) in 2017 ‘was seen by the trade unions and voluntary 
sector organisations as an opportunity to contribute to a progressive 
agenda around poverty and inequality’ (Johnson et al, 2017: 7). Within 
this context, Oldham Borough Council established its own Fairness 
Commission to track and monitor the impact of welfare reform. Salford 
Borough Council established its own inquiry into the impact of benefit 
sanctions. Of course, this is a contradictory process as they are also at 
the same time implementing public expenditure cuts.
The significance of LAs as ‘anchor institutions’ in terms of mitigating 
the impact of austerity and as a source of contestation in relation to 
negotiating and opposing austerity cannot be overstated. GM possesses 
a history of coordinated action across the different LAs, which has 
aided city- region wide network building within civil society (Hincks 
et al, 2017). There is evidence of this in the submissions and critical 
engagement with the welfare reform agenda, such as Manchester City 
Council’s submission to the Work and Pensions Select Committee, 
Oldham Fairness Commission and the Tameside Poverty pledge. 
There are, however, tensions around these arrangements, as devolution 
involves devolving and managing austerity; devolution authorities 
efficiently administer centrally determined cuts. This means while there 
is greater (and formal) engagement of trade unions in the GMCR, this 
is tenuous given their opposition to the overall thrust of the devolved 
economic and social strategies (Nelson, 2017: 8).
Another pressing tension is the lack of control the devolved LAs 
have over the implementation of welfare reform, UC and skills 
policies. An example of this is the operation of advice organisations 
such as the Greater Manchester Law Centre, Greater Manchester 
Centre for Voluntary Organisation and TUC that provide some 
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form of basis to negotiate and challenge regressive welfare policies. 
The Greater Manchester Coalition of Disabled People has responded 
to devolution by making demands on the mayor to shape a more 
progressive agenda:
whilst the Greater Manchester Mayor does not have direct 
responsibility for delivering all of the services that we require 
to protect and promote our independence, the Mayor will 
have an important ambassadorial role and opportunity to 
promote best practice. This manifesto for disabled people 
has been produced to assist the Mayor in becoming our ally 
and champion in our fight for equality. (GMCDP, 2018: 3)
The forging of cross city mobilisation is also illustrated by the campaign 
against welfare reform and UC, as part of a national campaign, 
comprising a wide range of organisations across GM. The campaign, 
supported by the incumbent Mayor, has focused on resisting evictions 
due to non- payment of rent as a result of benefit cuts and delays built 
into the UC system (GMLC, 2018). Added to this, the upscaling or 
‘scale jumping’ of engagement around the GMCR has proved to be a 
challenge for the likes of the Greater Manchester VCSE Devolution 
Reference Group, which has been historically embedded in localised 
civil society networks, and is consequently sub- regional in its 
mobilisations (see Chapter 1).
Conclusions
Manchester has been termed ‘mythic Manchester’ by some academics 
(Haughton et al, 2016) who cut through the hype of devolution to 
reveal a city region at breaking point, with cracks appearing in many 
services. As we have highlighted in this chapter, massive cuts in welfare 
benefits, leading to a depth and intensity of social problems, are pushing 
a series of critical capacity issues across civil society. Getting behind 
this and exposing its ‘dynamics’ (Shukaitis, 2013), we have argued that 
civil society ‘precarity’ is being reproduced through the GMCR labour 
market and economy through social struggles and the capital- labour 
relation, exhibited through the local politics of welfare- to- work – the 
‘new politics of austerity’ (MacLeavy, 2011).
The growth model and trajectory of GMCR is pitted with multiple 
tensions as local and city- region institutions come to terms with the 
failure to redistribute the gains of ‘growth’. The implementation of 
welfare reform and the UC benefit migration will only accentuate 
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social and labour market inequalities because this is taking place within 
the context of major cuts in LA and welfare spending. Moreover, the 
austerity- neoliberal growth ‘model’ undermines democracy and system 
accountabilities. Devolution has an inbuilt democratic deficit in terms 
of the way local actors are highly constrained by central directives. As 
Finn (2015) has noted, the UK has one of the most centralised welfare- 
to- work systems within the OECD countries and this is reflected in 
the nature of the implementation of welfare reform. UC becomes 
a vehicle for downloading austerity and a source of contestation 
rather than negotiation and influence by local actors and institutions. 
City- region authorities, LAs and civil society institutions are acting 
as ‘buffers’ to mitigate the regressive impacts of austerity on poorer 
communities (Hastings et al, 2017).
The other element is the scope for influencing devolution policies 
by trade unions and civil society organisations. The institutional and 
governance changes have not in any way integrated social dialogue 
between those organisations representing trade unions and disadvantaged 
communities. This has major implications for the establishment of 
employment rights, fairness at work and bridge building between 
policymaking stakeholders and disadvantaged groups and communities. 
As Rubery et al (2018: 524) point out, the contradictions described in 
this chapter are not necessarily new, but there is a need to recognise 
through the introduction of city regions ‘the state’s political orientations 
towards work disciplining of the unemployed or allowing employers to 





As was stated by then Secretary of State for Wales, Ron Davies (1999), 
‘devolution is a process, not an event’ – a sentiment deployed to express 
the dynamics and opportunities of devo- statecraft. In following this 
process within the context of Welsh devolution, this chapter seeks 
to highlight an interesting series of dynamics with regards to the 
development of city regions as the latest phase in a broader process of 
sub- national government restructuring under devolution. As stated 
throughout City Regions and Devolution in the UK, city regions have 
been vaunted as the appropriate scale for economic growth and this 
has informed the intentions of both the Welsh Government and the 
LAs of the CCR towards creating city regions in this context.
The chapter seeks to engage empirically and analytically with the 
broader body of literature on civil society vis- à- vis central– local 
relations in regional and local economic development. Particularly in 
the context of previous interventions by Duncan and Goodwin (1988), 
we show how the empirical case study of the CCR is actively recasting 
central– local social relations, and in doing so, building on Chapter 2, 
this raises interesting questions on the evolving dimensions of 
metagovernance. When Duncan and Goodwin formulated their ideas 
on states and uneven development during the 1980s, devolution in the 
UK, of course, did not exist. The chapter recasts central– local relations 
through devolution and suggests inter- scalar relationships increasingly 
coming to the fore. It suggests that notions of being scalar ‘agent and 
obstacle’ (Duncan and Goodwin, 1988) can provide an analytical lens 
in and through which to view the shifting and sticky relationships 
emerging between local state(s) and national state(s) in Wales. In 
particular, the chapter looks at how new territorial relations are being 
created within the devolved state of Wales through city regions. We 
suggest that this is recasting tensions between different governance 
institutions, as the local and national governments seek to legitimise 
different policy opportunities in the pursuit of economic growth.
The process of implementing the CCR has not been as 
straightforward as the successful signing of the city- deal on 15 March 
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2016 might suggest. This is because it raises several interesting empirical 
and theoretical concerns with regards to the implementation of sub- 
national economic policy in the wake of devolution and austerity 
(Waite, 2015). This reflects questions concerning: the historic difficulty 
in terms of local government structure in Wales (Pemberton, 2016) 
(and more broadly the UK); the process of deal making itself (O’Brien 
and Pike, 2015) – as an elite, technocratic process that was highly 
contested among elite actors (Ayres et al, 2017); the framing of the 
city region as a growth machine to enable specific actors within a city 
region (see Harding, 2007); and finally how such processes skew the 
representational regime of city region away from what could broadly be 
termed civil society. In short, we seek to expose some of the legislative 
contradictions of the Welsh state. Since devolution, the Welsh state has 
in various ways attempted to position civil society within processes of 
governance (see Chaney, 2016); however, the implementation of the 
city- region agenda suggests a more elitist approach is being taken in 
the pursuit of building a city region. This raises a series of questions 
with regards to social relations (MacLeod and Jones, 2007) within 
the development of the Welsh state and the representational regimes 
(MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999) of city regions (Beel et al, 2017).
In working through the above arguments, we first give further 
context as to why the city in Welsh policy is the ‘go- to’ scale for 
engendering economic growth and what in turn underpins its 
economic rationale. This section will also consider how city deals are 
made. Second, the chapter considers what underpins the CCR City 
Deal, how it was constructed and what it intends to do by looking 
at how such a policy is transformed when it is transferred over space 
(Peck and Theodore, 2015). Third, it will look at the process itself to 
delineate how central– local relations in Wales are being actively recast. 
Fourth, in highlighting these central– local processes of what can also 
be termed ‘scalecraft’ (Fraser, 2010; Pemberton, 2016), the chapter 
discusses how civil society and non- economic concerns are being 
positioned differently through the political geometry of devolution.
City regions and uneven development revisited
As we suggested in the Introduction, the UK Government has 
embarked on creating city regions within England through a deal- 
making process, which has sought to combine metropolitan LAs 
together via LEPs. LEPs and CAs are being presented as the ‘natural’ 
and ‘functional’ scale of economic activity around which each city 




The process is asymmetric in its application due to waves of bespoke 
public- policy deals, which have devolved a variety of different 
competencies to CAs. This has meant central government policy has 
played out very differently in different places, as some city regions 
(such as GMCR, discussed in Chapter 3) have seen greater devolution 
granted to them, whereas other areas (such as the Leeds City Region) 
failed to get a deal until 2020. As such, a select number of city regions 
have (potentially) benefitted from being favoured by ministers to 
implement such deals and others have missed out (O’Brien and Pike, 
2015). However, such processes have posed many problems for both city 
regions with devolution deals and those without, who are potentially 
striving to negotiate them for competitive advantage (Harrison, 2007). 
Surrounding these questions are several factors that have undermined 
the devolution process and weakened its potential to develop more 
inclusive forms of growth in city regions (Etherington and Jones, 2009).
Firstly, as noted above, austerity has undermined many of the deals 
put in place (see Davies and Blanco, 2017; Peck, 2012; Shaw and 
Tewdwr- Jones, 2017) before they have even been enacted. Austerity 
has consistently impacted heaviest on LAs where higher proportions 
of welfare claimants can be found. This often coincides with areas 
which have been granted deals such as GMCR and SCR; in GMCR 
this equates to around £6 billion and in SCR £1.1 billion to the 
constituent LAs (Etherington and Jones, 2016a, 2016b, 2017). This 
has meant real terms cuts to a variety of services and a harsher welfare 
environment for claimants as LAs have had to cut their budgets 
accordingly (Muldoon- Smith and Greenhalgh, 2015). Therefore, 
immediately, what has been potentially gained in terms of extra funding 
from a devolution or city deal is lost (see Beatty and Fothergill, 2016). 
As austerity impacts those most who have least as services are cut, it 
undermines any of the potential for devolution and city deals to move 
those people who are least skilled into the new city- regional economies 
they are trying to create (Penny, 2016).
The lack of a consideration to the social formation (Jonas, 2012) 
within city regions from austerity and the deals themselves, secondly, 
means a cycle of underachievement for city regions will be perpetuated, 
as LAs are both tasked with implementation of cuts to public services 
alongside developing the city region itself (Ward et al, 2015). This is 
then re- enforced by a growth model focused on agglomeration, the 
desired outcome that highlights the second missing connection. The 
agglomerative trickle- down model (Haughton et al, 2014), alongside 
historic spatially selective growth (Omstedt, 2016) and a stagnant 
economy at a national and local levels (Bailey and Budd, 2016), means 
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that any potential growth will be undermined by a continuing process 
of uneven development, which will continue to play out within the 
city region (Etherington and Jones, 2009).
Thirdly, there has been a failure to address cultural and historical 
differences that exist across city regions and empower civil society in the 
process (see Breathnach, 2014). This relates most strongly to questions 
of accountability but also reflects concerns with regards to processes 
of depoliticisation (see Burnham, 2014; Etherington and Jones, 2018; 
Foster et al, 2014; Jessop, 2014). Due to the state centric nature of 
city and devolution deals, they have not involved a ‘broader sense’ of 
public, civil society or grassroots movements in the construction of 
new forms of governance (see Newman and Clarke, 2009). This has 
meant that city- region governance structures, such as the CA and 
LEP, have been somewhat distanced from public scrutiny and the 
spatial scales on which they operate seem to have little resonance with 
the publics they seek to serve. This means that the process of city- 
region building raises serious questions with regard to the governance 
structures created, due to the creation of a democratic deficit (Buser, 
2013; Swyngedouw, 2009, 2018; Tomaney, 2016). As we noted in 
previous chapters, city- region institutions and mayors are supposed to 
partially address this, but with the creation of a variety of soft or fuzzy 
spaces of governance (see Haughton and Allmendinger, 2015; Hincks 
et al, 2017) such as LEPs and Transition Boards, this can be questioned. 
Within these spaces, only certain actors have agency, which suggests 
a skewing of city- regional social relations towards economic interests. 
The city- region building process then in itself is a purposeful act of 
‘depoliticisation’ (see Burnham, 2014; Etherington and Jones, 2018; 
Jessop, 2014), whereby the ‘elite/ expert’ growth model is presented as 
the only viable option and there is sparse opportunity to successfully 
contest this model within formal governance structures. We take 
forward these arguments in the next section, which examines city- 
region building and civil society in CCR.
Creating the Cardiff Capital Region
The above context concerning UK Government policy development 
is important, for in the process of creating the CCR a similar set of 
policy stimuli were cited by the Welsh Government and the city deal 
for CCR was negotiated directly with the UK Government. Because 
devolution is to the Welsh Government, an important differentiation for 
Wales, no devolution deal has been offered to the Cardiff City Region 




Affairs Committee, 2019). The following section highlights how this 
played out differently within the devolved structures of Wales. This is 
to highlight what Peck and Theodore (2015: 29) term ‘policy transfer’, 
whereby:  ‘Policies are not, after all, merely being transferred over 
space; their form and their effects are transformed by these journeys, 
which also serve continuously to remake relational connections across 
an intensely variegated and dynamic socioinstitutional landscape’. In 
following this transformation of the city region construct to fit the 
political geography of the CCR, we can trace how the city- region 
concept has been spatially deployed and geographically reshaped by 
its transference journey.
Fixing central– local relations in Wales
Wales has its own specific policy trajectory since devolution, which 
is both divergent and aligned to that of the UK and the development 
of city regions highlights this. Therefore, to create a bridge to the 
previous contextual section on city- region developments in England 
there is a need to consider how Wales has developed differently over a 
similar period. The consolidation of Wales as a regional/ national space 
of social and economic governance, with increasingly sharp territorial 
definition since the introduction of devolved government in 1999, 
has refocused attention on the dynamics of spatial difference within 
Wales. Persistent uneven geographies of socioeconomic performance, 
as well as seemingly entrenched geographies of political and cultural 
difference, suggest the existence of ‘locality effects’ within Wales and 
present challenges for the delivery of policy. However, the shape of 
Wales’s constituent localities is far from clear. Although Wales has a sub- 
regional tier of 22 LAs, these have only been in existence since 1995, 
when they replaced a two- tier local government system established 
in 1974. Moreover, the administrative map is overlain and cross- cut 
by a plethora of other governmental bodies including health boards, 
police authorities, transport consortia and economic development 
partnerships – to name a few – that work to their own territorial remits. 
An attempt to produce a more nuanced and process- led representation 
of Wales’s internal geography was made with the WSP in 2004 (updated 
in 2008) – see Jones et al (2016).
Heley’s (2013) insights reveal that this ‘new spatial planning’ for 
Wales attempts to create a more regional and relational approach to 
governance. Defined as uniquely Welsh by Haughton et  al (2010) 
but reflecting a regional approach as had been adopted in England, it 
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attempted to ‘regionalise’ the 22 Welsh LAs into reciprocal relationships 
of working together. As Heley adds:
The WSP has six ‘area visions’  … North- West (Eryi a 
Môn), North- East (Borders and Coast), Central Wales, 
Pembrokeshire (The Haven), Swansea Bay (Waterfront and 
Western Valleys), and South- East (The Capital Network). 
These ‘areas’ are not defined by administrative boundaries 
and this, it is suggested, enables partners to work together 
on common issues in a flexible way, to improve efficiencies, 
and to overcome problems associated with a limited local 
leadership base. These partners include the Welsh Assembly 
Government, its agencies, local authorities and private and 
voluntary/ third sector organizations, and each area has a 
committee chaired by an Assembly minister and involving 
senior representatives of organizations working as part of 
the area network. (Heley, 2013, 1331– 2)
The approach, therefore, built on pre- existing regional relationships and 
sought to foster these via what was termed a ‘fuzzy’ approach. Heley 
(2013) suggests the approach genuinely did shift the spatial imaginaries 
of policymakers towards a more relational approach; however, the 
inability to generate sufficient economic growth and the subsequent 
downturn in the global economy meant a new approach was desired 
(Jones et al, 2013). Added to this, efforts to align the initially ‘fuzzy’ 
boundaries of the WSP regions with the hard boundaries of LA areas 
demonstrates the accretional power of fixed institutional geographies 
in shaping the representation of localities (Haughton et  al, 2010). 
With the removal of the WSP, focus shifted away from fuzzy, relational 
approaches to more territorial defined and metro centric approaches. 
Key here was the City Region Taskforce in Wales, headed by Elizabeth 
Haywood in 2012:  it sought to develop two city regions in Wales 
following an agglomerative- growth logic. According to Government 
discourse at the time:
The main factors in our decision to recommend recognition 
of two city- regions in south Wales were:  critical mass; 
traffic flows; community identification; existing structures 
of governance, and the fact that our cities contribute less 
to the economy than cities anywhere else in the UK, 




The above quote highlights the shift in spatial emphasis of the Welsh 
Government towards city regions and its alignment to approaches in 
England as led by the UK Government. This also then positioned 
both the Welsh Government and the LAs that sit within city regions 
surrounding Cardiff and Swansea with the task of implementing and 
building their respective city regions.
Alongside this as Pemberton (2016) highlights, the long history of 
LA restructuring in Wales, which has shifted between more ‘regional’ 
municipal areas historically to the more ‘local’ framework presently 
in use. The appropriate territorial- fix has also been difficult in Wales 
due to both major cities being in the south with a largely rural 
population in the north, which is fragmented by a difficult physical 
geography. It is this constitutional geography of the Welsh State and 
its local government structure that has therefore propelled the city 
region to produce CCR. This process is important as it highlights 
several important contextual issues: the actors involved; the process 
of negotiating multilevel governance; and the shifting relationship 
between local and national states, as both agents and obstacles to 
different policy regimes.
Alongside the development of the CCR was a concerted effort 
by the Welsh Government, via then Minister Leyton Andrews, to 
redraw the LA map of Wales. The purpose was to make a strategic 
move from twenty- two LAs to eight (see Jones et al, 2016). This failed 
due to resistance from Welsh LAs and territorially aligned Assembly 
Members, who did not wish to be forced so quickly into a process 
of consolidation:
‘Similarly, before the recent – or last year’s election in the 
Assembly when you had a very forceful approach from 
Welsh Government and they were looking to drive through 
a reorganisation, there was an awful lot of bad feeling, not 
only between political parties but within political parties 
because of that issue I just mentioned was heightened and 
I think a lot of authorities felt their numbers had been cut 
to pay for an increase in the Assembly and it was a shift 
in the balance of power.’ (Interview, LA Rep Body, 2017)
This has led to a slowing of the pace of LA ‘regionalisation’ but, as 
the ‘Reforming Local Government: Resilient and Renewed White 
Paper’ (Welsh Government, 2017a) hints, this will not disappear as a 
possibility, especially within the context of continuing austerity. The 
unfolding of the above greatly shaped the relationships between ten 
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LAs in the CCR (see Figure 4.1) and the Welsh government, which 
led to two parallel processes of city- region building being put in 
place. Figure 4.2 represents this; in the left- hand box there is CCR 
Transition Board, which the Welsh Government created. This was to 
push through the development of the city region via a selection of local 
elites, primarily from business and education (not too dissimilar to the 
structure of a LEP board), with the purpose being to strategically plan 
the city region’s implementation. To directly negotiate a city- deal with 
the UK Government, the LAs themselves, circumventing the Welsh 
Government, sidelined this approach:
‘We’d had positive soundings from the UK Government, 
we had a bit more of a challenge to make the Welsh 
Government see the benefits of a City Deal, but as you 
know, a City Deal is in the ownership of local authorities, 
so we were leading on the concept. We had ten Leaders 
who … some may have had a bit of scepticism about it, but 
were willing for us to explore it out, so we decided then 
that we would put together a bit, and we had some support 
in helping us to create what a City Deal bid ought to look 
like.’ (Interview, Local Authority Leader CCR, 2017)
This created the governance structure on the right- hand side of 
Figure  4.2, which is continuing to evolve presently through the 
implementation of the city deal itself. The process of negotiating the 
city deal raises two interesting points: first, it was negotiated between 
LA leaders and the UK Government, whereby it circumvented the 
Welsh Government and had little public consultation. This raises 
both an issue of accountability due to little consultation being given 
and, second, it suggests that local government can be both agent and 
obstacle simultaneously in the implementation of central government 
policy – resistant to the city region via the Welsh Government, but 
accepting to it from the UK Government.
Cardiff Capital Region City Deal
The CCR City Deal was released on 15 March 2016; it is 
approximately worth £1.2 billion over 20  years and has a strong 
emphasis on the implementation of transport infrastructure. Also 
included within the deal are further opportunities in terms of 
developing digital infrastructure, improving skills and unemployment, 




and regeneration. It seeks to reflect the ‘natural’ economic footprint of 
the city- regional area: ‘City- region boundaries must reflect economic 
reality and not political or administrative boundaries. Genuine 
engagement and meaningful collaboration across many LAs will be 
needed. This will certainly involve ceding power, funding and decision 
making to a more regional level’ (Welsh Government, 2012:  7). 
Although the city deal reflects many of the same policy opportunities 
included in English city and devolution deals, as Figure 4.2 highlights, 
the structure stops short at devolving revenue generating powers to 
the region, hence no mayor is required. Instead, a ‘CCR Cabinet’ 
acts and comprises the leader from each LA, complemented by a 
‘CCR Economic Growth Partnership’, or as it has been termed 
the ‘CCR Business Council’, which looks similar to a LEP, and 
the ‘CCR Business Organisation’, which will channel business 
investment for the city region (see HM Government, 2016; House 
of Commons Welsh Affairs Committee, 2019). Table 4.1 highlights 





















Source: Produced by Sam Jones, WISERD
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the continuation of the privileging of ‘business elites’ in the process 
of city- region building, as the appointments to the CCR Business 
Council only engages active business leaders.1 This again represents a 
further difference from the previous Transition Board, which included 
trade union representation.
The CCR City Deal, like other settlements, focuses its primary 
concern on strategies for generating economic growth within the 
city region and for the most part this aims to bolster the opportunities 
for agglomerative growth within the metropolitan centre of Cardiff. 
Figure 4.2: Shifting governance of the Cardiff Capital Region
Cardiff Capital Region Transition Board
Ann Beynon − Former Wales Director, BT 
Cllr Peter Fox − Monmouthshire County 
Council
Dan Langford − Acorn Recruitment 
Cllr Andrew Morgan − Rhondda Cynon Taf 
County Borough Council
Prof Brian Morgan − Cardiff Metropolitan 
University
Mike Payne − GMB Union 
Lynn Pamment − PwC, Cardiff Office
Chris Sutton − Cardiff Enterprise Zone, Jones  
Lang LaSalle Cardiff.
Prof Kevin Morgan − Cardiff University. 
Cardiff Capital Regional 
Business Organisation
Cardiff Capital Region 
Cabinet
Cardiff Capital Region 
Economic Growth 
Partnership
Cardiff Capital Region Growth
and Completitiveness Commission
Prof  Greg Clark
Alexandra Jones − Centre for Cities 
Kevin Gardiner − Rothschild  
Helen Molyneux − New Law. 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis
Table 4.1: Business Council membership, 2018
Business Council for the Cardiff Capital Region
Neil Brierley, Faithful + Gould
Ann Beynon, Severn Trent Water and CBI
Katy Chamberlain, Business in Focus
Huw Lewis, Cardiff Airport
Heather Myers, South Wales Chamber of Commerce
Jo Rees, Blake Morgan
Grant Santos, Educ8 Group and FSB
Richard Selby, Pro Steel Engineering
Paul Webber, Arup
Karen Wenborn, SSE PLC, Cardiff







Despite traversing into other areas, which are related to more social 
concerns such as skills and unemployment, the focus and success will 
largely be measured against GVA growth. This represents the overall 
framing of what a city region is meant to do, that is to generate 
economic growth, and this is made explicit within the city- deal 
document itself:
This City Deal will provide local partners with the powers 
and the resources to unlock significant economic growth 
across the Cardiff Capital Region. It is a deal that builds 
on the region’s sectoral strengths, its high skill base and 
three successful universities. The City Deal also provides 
an opportunity to continue tackling the area’s barriers to 
economic growth by:  improving transport connectivity; 
increasing skill levels still further; supporting people into 
work; and giving businesses the support they need to 
innovate and grow. (HM Government, 2016: 2)
The process of enabling ‘local partners’ is then central to the process of 
creating economic growth but the focus on economic growth alone 
hints at those it is specifically aiming to enable. Added to this, the 
surrounding media releases on the gov.uk website (see Table 4.2), by 
various actors involved in creating the deal suggest little else.
Ideologies of growth run deep though the press release statement 
and several discourse- analytic (Fairclough, 2010) points stand out 
with regards to the model of growth desired (Clarke et al, 2016) and 
the prescribed ‘representational regime’ (Rutherford, 2006) in and 
through which the city region is envisioned. Table 4.2 represents the 
order in which the statements were published online cascading from 
1st to 5th. This is interesting because it highlights how geographical 
spatial scale and the production of an information- content hierarchy 
are deeply intertwined with each other; UK Government first, then 
Welsh Government, and finally local government and civil society 
actors last. Each of the statements opens the broader policy framework. 
Interestingly, the first four respondents all focus on very similar things 
with regards to: devolution to empowering local leaders; increased 
private sector investment; the city region as a growth engine to drive 
investment; more power to local decision makers for transport and 
infrastructure to aid further aid investment; and the importance of 
local leaders and authorities working together. Rather poignantly, 
it is only at the local territorial scale whereby we see a break in this 
discourse, as the City of Cardiff Council Leader suggests something 
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Table 4.2: City- deal cascading of representation
Political actor Quotation




‘I want to create a devolution revolution around the UK and 
empower local leaders in Wales, so it’s fantastic to announce a 
historic City deal in the Cardiff City Region worth over £1.2bn.’
‘This landmark deal is expected to create up to 25,000 jobs 
and leverage £4 billion of private sector investment by handing 
real power to local decision makers that are best placed to 
ensure the welsh economy is fit for the future.’
2nd Secretary of 
State for Wales 
Stephen Crabb
‘Cardiff is one of Europe’s youngest and most dynamic capital 
cities, with a growing international profile and a burgeoning 
reputation as a destination for businesses to invest.’
‘The City Deal provides the springboard for Cardiff to emerge 
as a leading engine of growth in the UK. It will help transform 
Cardiff city region, expecting to unlock billions of pounds of 






‘I’m very proud to be able to sign this historic deal – the first 
of its kind in Wales. The UK Government’s £500m investment 
in the economy of South East Wales will help ensure that the 
infrastructure and transport links in the region come up to the 
standard that local people and businesses deserve.’
‘It’s vital that those making these decisions are local leaders, 
the people that know Cardiff and the wider region best.’




‘We have lobbied hard for a City Deal for the Cardiff Capital 
Region and put more than £500m on the table to support 
improving transport infrastructure within the region. Today’s 
announcement sees that vision become a reality – it is a vote 
of confidence in the region and a huge economic boost.’
‘Central to the success of a City Deal is the close collaboration 
and partnership between all ten LAs. It is a great example of 
what can be achieved by coming together for the greater good 
of our Capital region.’




‘We have worked long and hard to bring a City Deal to the 
Cardiff Capital Region and I’m delighted we’ve been successful. 
Financially we have secured a bigger deal for our residents than 
the Glasgow City Deal, but the real work starts now.’
‘We want this Deal to make a real difference to people’s 
lives, improving prospects for all our citizens. Today’s signing 
means work can begin on creating a more inclusive and 
prosperous region.’
‘I want everyone to know we are determined to deliver better 
opportunities for all our residents. Securing the City Deal can 
help us do this. We want to create better job opportunities 
for people and we want to enable them to take those job 
opportunities when they arise. At the end of the day we want 
to improve everyone’s chances of enjoying a better future.’
Note: Names and title reflect those in post at the time.
Source: Press Release following the signing of the CCR City Deal, 15 March 2016, www.gov.




slightly more progressive in terms of how this will benefit the lives of 
people living in the CCR. Hence the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ (Jessop, 
2016a) for these ideologies of growth is rather telling with regards to 
what is being envisioned in and through the city deal and then which 
actors it seeks to spatially select.
Placing civil society
The above discussion points towards the defining of what Jenson 
and Phillips (1996) have termed a ‘new citizenship regime’, where 
governance structures are designed in such a way that they legitimise 
some preferred groups over others. Accordingly: ‘Who qualifies and 
is recognized as a model citizen is under challenge. The legitimacy of 
group action and the desire for social justice are losing ground to the 
notion that citizens and interests can compete equally in the political 
marketplace of ideas’ (Jenson and Phillips, 1996: 112). In designing 
the city region to focus primarily on economic growth as its primary 
target, this suggests that concerns with regards to more social issues at 
city- region scale are not as important. Therefore, although each city 
region will implement its city deal differently, the ‘rules of the game’ 
appear to be shaped in one direction. This in turn, enables specific 
actors, such as those detailed in Figure 4.2 to be active in the process 
of building the city region. As Jessop (1990, 2008, 2016a) reminds us, 
the state has ‘no power of its own’; state power is defined and aligned 
according to who has access to, and makes, the state apparatus, and 
the spatial contexts within which this occurs. In this case, business 
and political elites are effectively licensed social and civic capital (see 
Mohan and Mohan, 2002; Painter, 2005) to deliver the city- region 
neoliberal growth model. As is highlighted by the views of a Transition 
Board member:
‘And equally, you don’t get the benefit of sufficient quality 
of advice, because you need someone at a sufficient level 
where you can attract the right quality of person with the 
level of expertise across a wider area. So, my view is very 
much we need that more strategic focus, but we need to 
achieve economies of scale of delivery, and my view is 
that we should be having a more technocratic approach 
to delivery, with targets, and we should have a Regional 
Development Corporation.’ (Interview, Business Leader, 
CCR, 2017)
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This makes it difficult for those who would argue for more socially just 
or inclusive forms of growth to be implemented as they are distanced 
from being active in the new citizenship regime. In highlighting how 
economic growth is envisioned and will be enacted by CCR, the 
following sections will now discuss the ways in which this has been 
problematic for civil society members.
Struggling with the economic growth model
The key emphasis, as noted above, is to deliver and enable a governance 
scale which is best suited for economic growth above all other 
concerns. This means that other concerns such as social, cultural or 
environmental factors are considered less important in comparison to 
creating economic growth. For example, building on our arguments 
in Chapter  1, the insight below highlights how the agglomerative 
model of ‘boostering’ Cardiff may cause further uneven development 
elsewhere, if not appropriately managed:
‘We are pushing for the Region as a whole in terms about 
how the impact will have on those communities furthest 
away from the nucleus, so you automatically think north 
in Cardiff’s case, so the northern Valleys. It’s probably not 
difficult to correlate the further north you go, then the 
worse the indices are in terms of deprivation, further away 
from the economic heartland … I constantly talked about 
northern hubs, so actually, because you can’t concentrate 
the economic investment purely into the centre of Cardiff, 
because we will have to invest billions into infrastructure 
to create the flow of people that we need to have and then 
we will stimulate more ghost communities, where people 
live further away from their caring needs in terms of where 
they have ageing parents, they have children that they’re 
not close to where they work and they’re not spending 
their money within those communities, so you don’t get 
secondary spend within those communities.’ (Interview, 
Welsh Civil Society Organisation, 2016)
But as has been highlighted above, city deals are not concerned with 
delivering a spatially even form of growth. They are looking to increase 
agglomerative growth in urban centres. Consequently, contesting the 
agglomerative growth logic that sees any growth as good (see Nathan 




approach to the market itself, which is absent from policy discourse 
as this does not fit with the dominant growth logic presented in the 
city- deal approach. The quote below articulates this well as it suggests 
that environmental or social responsibilities sit in the background to 
economic growth and that raising such concerns makes you less relevant 
to the process of city- region building:
‘My view is very much that it’s about creating economic 
drivers within the region to regenerate and to challenge some 
of the key matters around things like employment, which in 
turn should impact on poverty etc. And I think one of the 
reasons that we’re not at the table is we don’t talk about the 
city- region … Certainly I’ve never picked up there being a 
sense of the city- region having a similar if not identical … 
responsibility towards things outside of the economic 
agenda, things like – environmental responsibilities or even 
more fundamental social responsibilities. In terms of that 
definition of it, we’re probably seen as not having much 
of a voice. More likely to speak to businesses and get their 
views on what is good and what is right about city- region 
as opposed to the third sector.’ (Interview, CCR/ Welsh 
Civil Society Organisation, 2016)
This suggests that the neoliberal market driven approach contained 
within the CCR City Deal lacks the mechanisms to contest the 
historic failings of the region with regards to uneven development. 
The above and below quotes note this, as they suggest that the growth 
model is repeating the mistakes of the past due to the reliance on a 
‘trickle-down’ approach:
‘Well at the moment, we seem to be looking at measures 
for economic development, transport and a market- based 
model. What I would – I think it’s that terrible phrase, in 
terms of the wealth that we generate ‘trickling down’ into 
other communities which again historically is not really 
showing there’s much to be said for that.’ (Interview, CCR/ 
Welsh Civil Society Organisation, 2016)
Scale and accountability
Interviews with CCR civil society members also raised an ongoing 
tension between the concept of localism and the city region. The 
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production of the city region changes the relationships of scale 
between civil society organisations and how they may engage with 
the ‘local’ state:
‘All of a sudden we become completely insignificant 
so whereas at the moment locally we can lobby quite 
hard and push the direction on certain things, all of that 
power would go away and how to influence rather than 
power. So that for us would cause quite a significant 
problem. If we start working more collaboratively with 
other similar organisations then great, we can form a nice 
little consortium and then we can retain the same level of 
perceived power and all will be well with the world. But it 
doesn’t fit well with how any of us work really; we work 
with quite defined communities, we do quite tailored things 
for them.’ (Interview, CCR Housing Association, 2015)
As we noted in Chapter 1, the process of what Cox (1998) refers to 
as ‘scale jumping’, alluded to in the above quote, again represents a 
significant problem to civil society organisations working in the city 
region. As for the most part civil society organisations do not exist on a 
city- region scale and hence due to their size cannot scale up to address 
both the needs of the entire city region or contest its rhetoric: “In 
terms of the city- region stuff, I feel we’ve been stung in how we can 
engage. We’ve been very interested in engaging but I  don’t think 
organisations like ours are perceived as being a big enough hitter or 
having a big enough economic impact to interest them” (Interview, 
CCR Community, 2016). This means local voices can be marginalised 
through what Fraser (2010) and Pemberton (2016) call ‘scalecraft’ 
(the layered processes and practices of making geographical scale) 
as the governance structures of city region make them inactive and 
less relevant to the larger strategic plans for economic development. 
Pemberton adds:
A focus on scalecraft highlights that a wider range of actors – 
including states, social and political groups and individuals – 
are all involved in scalar practices (Fraser, 2010: 334), and 
may be attempting to produce, restructure and rescale local 
government. In so doing, they seek to create competitive 




This is being employed through the city region to depoliticise its 
economic intentions (see Etherington and Jones, 2018). We have 
highlighted how contesting the economic model was difficult and 
this section compounds this by the process of shifting the governance 
regime on economic development away from democratic accountability 
at the local level. This intervention of state restructuring and the 
creation of soft space institutions (Haughton et  al, 2013) that hold 
power chimes with others’ observations of how urban governance 
regimes seek to displace dissent away from their activities as they build 
a hegemonic consensus to create economic development (Burnham, 
2014; Etherington and Jones, 2016a; Foster et al, 2014; Jessop, 2014). 
In moving forward, this raises serious questions around the future 
of representation in soft institutional spaces such as growth boards 
especially if large proportions of civil society actors are placed outside 
the new citizenship regime. This has left civil society actors precariously 
positioned with regards to responding to new ‘devolved’ governance 
structures and reduced LA budgets. Wales, however, does operate 
differently to England and there is provision within law through the 
Wellbeing of Future Generations Act (Welsh Government, 2015a) 
that suggests local and civil society organisations are entitled to forms 
of representation.
Austerity geographies
Austerity in Wales has landed differently to the way it has been 
delivered in England, due to the Welsh Government passing on the 
cuts differently (see Jones et al, 2016). This has meant that LAs did 
not need to cut as deeply and as quickly, initially. Significant cuts have 
come later to LAs, as the respondents below suggest:
‘Well obviously, we’ve seen massive, massive cuts in Welsh 
Government budget and that has been, in the main, passed 
on to local government so it’s the local government, I would 
say, is probably the largest hit.’ (Interview, CCR/ National 
Level Trade Union, 2016)
‘So, in my own view, just from what I  can see, the 
impact of austerity, yes, it was back- loaded, but actually, 
when it came about, would have had a higher impact on 
those communities where we’ve got less private sector 
employment opportunities, so it would probably be very 
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similar within inner- city areas as well, if they’ve lost some 
of their key services and they haven’t been replaced with 
jobs from the private sector.’ (Interview, Welsh Civil Society 
Organisation, 2016)
This has impacted civil society groups in a number of ways, but 
primarily it has left them squeezed between reduced national and local 
state funding opportunities, while at the same time facing increased 
demand for the services they offer. For example, the phasing out of 
Communities First has substantially affected several local community 
groups (Dicks, 2014). Further to this, austerity has been viewed to be 
shifting the relationships between ‘civil society’, ‘state’ and ‘business’.
‘Well that is a very interesting one; I think the tectonic plates 
are changing. For us, the future in terms of being grant- aided 
by government, that really isn’t going to happen. We know 
that the public sector and its days of supporting the third sector 
in the way it has are coming to an end. We have to find, if we 
are going to thrive and grow, new relationships and those new 
relationships are probably going to have to be with business.’ 
(Interview, CCR voluntary and community sector, 2016)
The above insight is interesting because it suggests a changing set of 
relationships between state, business, and civil society whereby as the 
state reduces its support, civil society may potentially have to face a 
difficult choice. Should it slot more deeply into the neoliberal growth 
model, which makes it difficult for such actors to then contest the 
economic rationale of the city region? The respondent reflects on this 
further, suggesting a number of different possibilities into the future:
‘Is there going to be businesses falling by the wayside? Will 
there be more of a collaboration – a merger approach? Will 
new business opportunities be sought and be successfully 
sought, where the emphasis very much is on winning 
new business opportunities rather than going for grants, 
looking for investment? – are we going to have to move 
to a low investment scenario which people haven’t whole 
heartedly embraced in the past? As I  say, I  do get a bit 
focused on services, I do see social businesses working in 
services, complementary to public services or non- statutory 
public services of picking up services. I guess there hasn’t 
been a massive push for externalisation that there has been 
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in England.’ (Interview, CCR voluntary and community 
sector, 2016)
Hence, as the above suggests, the terrain is shifting quickly and this is 
reshaping the very structure of civil society organisations and the way 
in which they will or will not have a role in to the future with regards 
to the building CCR.
Conclusions
This chapter has sought to traverse and situate the complexities of 
devolution, city- region building, and the (re)positioning of civil society 
through the development of the CCR. We have looked at the ways in 
which the UK state both defines and limits devolution and in this case 
frames the CCR City Deal. This is, of course, a geographical process, 
with existing geographies influencing the form and shape of any 
outcomes from deal- making public policy (Peck and Theodore, 2015).
In the context of building the CCR, a simplistic top down narrative 
of central government implementation and civil society reaction would 
not have addressed the complexity of the realpolitik in play. Hence, 
the historical legacy of economic and governance failures has created 
new geographies of governance and these are playing out differently 
in Wales. Welsh city- region building reflects this as devolution, with 
austerity and local government reorganisation creating different 
structures for city deals. Although on- the- surface city regions from the 
UK Government are the ‘same policy’, when filtered through scales 
of governance, the city region is being transformed differently. This 
reflects a recasting of central– local relations (Jones, 1999; Peck, 1995) at 
all scales of governance: LA – city region – Welsh Government – UK 
Government. Added to this, the city- region agenda has also attempted 
to construct nascent relationships of reciprocity between city regions. 
In the case of CCR, this means looking to the east and working with 
Bristol through the creation of the ‘Western Powerhouse’.2 Again 
this raises a series of further questions for the notion of ‘scalecraft’ for 
CCR and the Welsh state.
Specifically, this chapter has sought to empirically demonstrate how 
both an ‘agent and obstacle’ (Duncan and Goodwin, 1988) relationship 
has unfolded in Wales, as different governance institutions interact 
spatially. Therefore, despite their political manoeuvrings to secure 
a city deal, the CCR LAs are still greatly constrained by a lack of 
fiscal powers and in their subservience to both the Welsh and UK 
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Governments. This is highlighted by their inability to negate austerity 
and they are hence forced to deliver the necessary cuts as they are 
passed down to them while still implementing the city deal. Within 
these processes, we have revealed how civil society has been positioned 
outside the representational regime, but is also expected to play along 
in terms of engaging with the neoliberal growth model as austerity 
reshapes public service reform. This raises interesting questions with 




Beyond cities in regions
Introduction
This chapter questions where rural regions are being placed within 
the context of neoliberal growth strategies that posit agglomerative 
accumulation, that is policies to nurture value growth (primarily 
measured by GVA uplift), which is mainly aimed at the urban and more 
recently city- region spatial scale (Brenner and Schmid, 2011; Woods 
and Heley, 2017). The rural development question (Pemberton, 2019; 
Ward, 2006) is an enduring puzzle, which has eluded policymakers 
globally (Bock, 2016), while being consistently undermined by an 
urban bias (Hoggart, 2005). The global focus on the development of 
city regions and their implicit scalar, geopolitical and geoeconomic 
framing (Jonas and Moisio, 2018; Calzada, 2017), continues to reinforce 
this dynamic. Focusing on urban growth strategies, the chapter 
considers what this means for rural regions as they attempt to articulate 
growth strategies of their own, while being entangled within broader 
metagovernance processes surrounding economic development (Jessop, 
2016b; see also Nelles, 2012; Winter, 2006). We highlight how rural 
regions struggle to create effective economic policy when they are cast 
as peripheral, or in the orbit, of major urban conurbations (Harrison 
and Heley, 2015), as such disparities have the potential to exacerbate 
the problems of combined and uneven development.
We have argued throughout this book that the UK is witnessing 
important ‘state spatial restructuring’ (Brenner, 2004, 2019) 
developments through the creation of ‘city- region building state 
projects’ (Jones, 2019a, 2019b). Since the election of the Coalition 
Government in 2010, UK policy on economic growth has shifted 
towards a ‘city- first’ approach (Deas, 2014). This can be seen in a 
multitude of city and devolution deals to UK city regions (see O’Brien 
and Pike, 2015). This has somewhat left non- core city (second- tier) 
and rural areas behind in policy terms, but attempts are being made 
to address this in more rural areas such as North Wales (see Harrison 
and Heley, 2015). With the development of two city regions in South 
Wales (CCR and SBCR), this has left the rest of Wales somewhat 
lacking with regards to the future of economic development outside its 
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metropolitan areas. This has partly led to a process of ‘region- making’ 
within the rest of Wales as the remaining eight of twenty- two LAs have 
sought to find ways to collaboratively work together (Jones et al, 2016).
Alongside this has been an ongoing reform process of LAs in Wales 
that has sought to find ways for LAs to work more ‘collaboratively’ 
together (Welsh Government, 2015b). The North Wales region is 
advancing both agendas by signing a Growth Deal (NWGD) with the 
UK Government. This though raises several questions, which need 
to be addressed, if such a deal is to be compatible with the region’s 
existing economic footprint and its continuing struggle to address issues 
of uneven development. The chapter highlights how policy discourses 
have been transferred from a primarily city region – metrocentric – 
approach to a rural, regional, approach that combines North Wales’s 
LAs into a growth deal. This raises a series of tensions and challenges 
around how policy is transferred and transformed when it moves 
geographically. More critically, the chapter questions the mode of 
growth implied in such policy for North Wales as not addressing the 
spatial constraints already being placed on this region. Further, the 
‘tangled governance’ (Jessop, 2016b) of the deal- making process itself, 
due to the often- misaligned policy intentions of the UK and Welsh 
Governments and the LAs themselves, raises a series of questions with 
regards to what policy options are viable. In turn, this reflects the 
significant tension with regards to what each stakeholder seeks from 
the growth deal process itself (see Economy, Infrastructure and Skills 
Committee, 2017).
North Wales consists of six LAs1 along the A55 coastal corridor, 
from the island of Anglesey (Ynys Môn) in the north west (NW), to 
Flintshire in the north east (NE). The region could be described as a 
‘tale of two halves’; or alternatively, ‘East, West and the bit in the middle’ 
(Mann and Plows, 2016). The labour market of NE Wales is very 
different to NW Wales; essentially NE Wales is more industrial, with 
a strong manufacturing base, and greater existing connectivity to NW 
England; NW Wales is more rural, peripheral and de- industrialised, 
with a much higher percentage of its workforce in sectors such as 
tourism and agriculture, sectors of the labour market which are 
traditionally lower- paid and precarious – often seasonal and/ or short 
term. Collectively, across the region, there is no main metropolitan 
centre, with the largest town being Wrexham (circa 60,000 people) 
in the NE.
It is within this majorly rural spatial context that the chapter considers 
the development of a Growth Deal for North Wales and the problems 
it has faced in attempting to transfer (urban) economic policy into 
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the region. The chapter is divided into three main sections. It first, 
conceptually and in terms of policy interventions, considers what 
this means with regards to the transfer of policy from urban areas to 
rural ones – in particular, the transference of economic policy that is 
focused on creating agglomerative growth in a region with only small 
and dispersed centres of population. This places rural regions within 
the context of city- region building and due to a city- first approach, 
not only are rural areas often left behind, but there is also a lack of 
policy imagination being deployed to serve the economic needs of rural 
regions. Second, it unpacks the specifics of the NWGD and focuses on 
how this is seeking to generate economic growth and how this more 
broadly sits within the devolved nation of Wales as a whole. Wales is 
a devolved nation within the UK (alongside Scotland and Northern 
Ireland) and has its own policy trajectory within certain parameters, 
economic development being one such area (Heley, 2013; Jones et al, 
2016). This is important to comprehend, because with the development 
of two city regions across South Wales, this has left a policy vacuum 
on economic development across the rest of Wales, which the chapter 
highlights within the devolved sub- national context of Wales. Third, it 
looks at how actors in North Wales are seeking to influence and shape 
a growth deal, replete with inbuilt tensions and challenges around this 
urban model for growth, set against the ground realities of the North 
Wales rural economy.
Making non- metropolitan spaces in a city- region world
As this book has suggested, the city region has been identified as 
the de facto scale for urban governance in contemporary economic 
development policy. We argued in the previous chapter that in the UK’s 
devolved context, this has reflected the failure to deliver economic 
growth previously in Wales and a shift has taken place from the ‘soft 
spaces and the fuzzy boundaries’ of the WSP (Heley, 2013) to a more 
territorialised city- regional spatio- temporal fix (Waite et  al, 2013; 
Waite, 2015). This, of course, has paralleled similar territorial shifts 
in England and Scotland, reflecting a dominant and ‘triumphalist’ 
city- first approach (Glaeser, 2012). Waite and Morgan (2019) refer to 
this as ‘metrophilia’, whereby it is seen as fashionable to uncritically 
embrace such approaches.2 They suggest that:
cities are the quintessential spaces where knowledge 
is generated and valorised because cities are the chief 
beneficiaries of agglomeration economies  … Although 
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exhibiting national variations, Metrophilia has international 
currency as we see governments, supported by think tanks and 
travelling bands of consultants, championing the metropolitan 
narrative regardless of spatial context. (2019: 384)
This, as the quote above suggests, means such processes move across 
(devolved) state boundaries as their application becomes scaled on the 
perceived problem in economic performance they are trying to fix (see 
Blackaby et al, 2018; Harrison, 2007; Waite and Bristow, 2019; Waite 
and Morgan, 2019). With such policy movements, there is only often a 
circumstantial evidence base to such ‘successes’ and the literature often 
has a habit of only picking the ‘winners’ to such strategies (Jonas and 
Ward, 2007). Rehearsing our argument again, the central tenant of this 
is theories of urban- scaled agglomeration (see Overman, 2012). The 
city region is nothing short of a crucible for creating economic growth, 
whereby through creating an agglomerating critical mass of economic 
activity in central urban areas, harnessed around public– private 
partnerships and involving civil society actors, economic development 
can be ubiquitously secured (see Ellison et al, 2007). This in turn helps 
to construct a specific ‘spatial imaginary’ for North Wales in relation 
to economic development, which attempts to construe a narrative or 
cultural hegemony for the North Wales region, in part reflecting on 
historic geographic differences to the rest of Wales and England, while 
at the same time ignoring differences that exist at the sub- regional level. 
As MacLeod (1998) has argued in the case of Scotland, ‘historically 
contingent’ specific administrative boundaries and regional spaces were 
created and imposed onto communities for whom these boundaries 
were perhaps less meaningful. Here, growth deals can also be seen to 
be a new type of region- shaping, whereby North Wales and its sub- 
regional geographies are policy- squeezed into a hegemonic construct 
for the purposes of economic development, where there is perhaps 
minimal consideration to the specificity of place or differences between 
rural and urban areas (Harrison and Heley, 2015).
All this raises critical questions for predominantly rural areas and 
regions (such as North Wales) due to the type, nature and geographic 
focus of growth being aimed for, which is also problematic to cities 
in a variety of ways (Jonas, 2012). Rural areas in this model of growth 
are either presented as the periphery to the city- regions urban 
centre (Pain, 2008) or are faced with finding ways to map onto their 
existing economic strategy more agglomerative strategies which may 
further increase uneven development (Etherington and Jones, 2009). 
Harrison and Heley (2015) highlight the normative nature in which 
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this casts the relationships between urban and rural via city- regional 
policy. They suggest that this places the ‘rural development problem’ 
within the ‘new territorial politics’ of the city region, whereby the 
urban– rural divide can be overcome by ‘functionally networked, not 
territorially- embedded administrative, geographies’ (Harrison and 
Heley, 2015:  1114– 15). For Ward (2006), alongside Harrison and 
Heley, this represents a regressive policy framework for rural areas:
The city- region approach reproduces a rural development 
problem. It establishes and reinforces out- of- date notions 
of geographical centrality and hierarchies, and it actively 
marginalises places, consigning them to the periphery, 
dividing and polarising. City regions are taking root in 
regional economic development and spatial planning 
across the UK, and they are raising profound challenges 
for those involved in the economic development of rural 
areas. (Ward, 2006: 52)
The city- region agenda, therefore, applies a geographic concentration 
on urban areas while attempting to relationally network rural areas; the 
question then becomes does this approach lead to the empowerment 
of civil society and an even spreading of economic and social gains? 
As highlighted above and by others, such an approach potentially 
marginalises the rural due to the dominance of metropolitan centres, 
creating further uneven growth for rural areas (Shucksmith, 2008). It 
also fails to consider the ways in which areas external to the city region 
are capable of creating different models of economic growth that do 
not rely on urban agglomeration (Harrison and Heley, 2015; Haughton 
et al, 2016). The city- region agenda, therefore, shapes geoeconomic 
policy with a specific geopolitical focus and as Harrison and Heley 
suggest, this needs to be unpacked when looking at the building of 
rural regions, where a city- region building approach is dominant:
This is due in large part to their different geo- political 
constructions of city- regionalism. In this way it also 
provides a revealing context from which to unpack how 
and why city- regionalism continues to be constructed 
geo- politically to the detriment of rural spaces and rural 
development needs, and to begin considering how to build 
these interstitial spaces between metropolitan areas into 
our theories of city- regionalism. (Harrison and Heley, 
2015: 1116)
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In the context of this chapter and developments within North 
Wales, we take several points of departure from the above discussion 
on rural development and city- region building. These include:  a 
need to think through what rationales underpin the government(s) 
policy towards delivering economic growth in North Wales; the 
ways in which policies reflect the on- the- ground economic reality 
of North Wales, this includes existing successful economic growth in 
the region alongside problems of continuing combined and uneven 
development; and how policies for economic growth are transferred 
and shaped in different geographical settings. These points, therefore, 
allow for broader discussion to consider how policy should address 
‘interstitial spaces’ in a city- region world. By interstitial spaces, we 
mean considering spatial formations that sit outside the dominant city- 
region discourse and how they form their own approaches to delivering 
economic development. Currently and what the following critique 
will suggest is that such interstitial spaces, like developing rural regions, 
still sit within an economic policy focus that is too heavily skewed 
towards and driven by a city- region approach. This fits with what 
Midmore (2018) comprehends as the economic ‘myths’ embedded in 
conventional economic thinking for rural regions, whereby the process 
of regionalisation gives credence to a discrete rural economy, that in 
reality does not exist. In the case of Wales, as we note in Chapters 4 
and 6, the process of delivering city deals for the CCR and SBCR has 
partly driven the need to then address how to regionalise the regions to 
the North in the pursuit of economic growth (Blackaby et al, 2018). 
The chapter argues for the need to consider a new economic paradigm 
for rural regions – one that steps outside of the city- region approach.
Making interstitial spaces: the Growth Deal 
approach revisited
With the ‘swing’ (Jones, 2019a, 2019b) of UK sub- national policy 
moving towards city regions, and specifically a metropolitan focus post- 
2010, a variety of policy mechanisms have been deployed in an attempt 
to boost economic growth, with one of these being the ‘Growth Deal’ 
approach (BIS, 2011; HM Government, 2013). The policy of delivering 
Growth Deals by the UK Government began in England and has 
been a mechanism by which to fund and fuel LEPs. As noted in the 
Introduction, they have sat alongside various forms of deal- making 
public policy, which include both City Deals and Devolution Deals 
(see O’Brien and Pike, 2015). Growth, City and Devolution Deals, as 
the name(s) suggest, require negotiation, which takes place between 
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the UK Government and the specific LA or CA (LEPs and LAs in 
England) (Etherington and Jones, 2018; Pugalis and Townsend, 2012). 
There have been several rounds of deal- making whereby in simple 
terms, collaborating LAs (in England) have progressed on a continuum 
from Growth and City Deals to Devolution Deals, although this has not 
been a linear or even process on speed and resources. There has also 
been a priority on granting such deals to metropolitan- combined LAs 
first (such as the Core Cities – see Deas, 2013), before deals are granted 
to less urban and more rural collaborating LAs. The metropolitan 
centres have consequently seen much larger and wide- ranging deals 
being granted (Shaw and Tewdwr- Jones, 2017).
In Wales, there have been City Deals to both the CCR and the 
SBCR (HM Government, 2017, 2016). These came later in the deal 
negotiating process (the CCR was signed in March 2016; the SBCR 
in March 2017) compared to those in England and Scotland, which 
were delivered much earlier in the Coalition Government’s tenure 
(National Audit Office, 2016). This reflected a slow process of 
negotiation between the collaborating LAs and then a protracted 
negotiating period between those LAs, the Welsh Government and UK 
Government. Such deals though have only covered South Wales and 
this leaves the rest of Wales without any growth framework in place 
not counting Welsh Government and individual LA plans. This has 
led to the North Wales LAs, since late 2017, to seek and lobby for a 
Growth Deal to shape economic development practice outside of this 
urban context but constrained- by- design within the city- first policy 
frameworks (Blackaby et al, 2018). The UK and Welsh Governments, 
alongside the Welsh LAs all have different visions as to what this process 
of deal making is for. This is highlighted by the Welsh Assembly’s 
Economy, Infrastructure and Skills Committee (2017), that reveals 
how the processes and practices of city and growth deal- making mean 
that respective governance institutions have very different ambitions. 
Its negotiation and the possible policy levers available are, therefore, 
constrained in potentially disparate directions (cf. Chapter 4, with its 
focus on the CCR City Deal). In the case of the NWGD, this has led 
to a slowing in the ability to close the growth deal and a protracted 
wrangle over funding contributions.3
Devolved regions in action: placing North Wales
Wales has a complicated and difficult geography, which reflects the 
main centres of population being in the south with the cities of Cardiff 
and Swansea, and a mountainous physical geography to the north, 
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which makes for more rural and dispersed population demographics 
(Lovering, 1983). This impacts on how policy is applied in Wales 
with regards to governance (Pemberton, 2016) as the Welsh Assembly 
attempts to address the problems created by this difficult geography. 
This, therefore, influences how investment is spread and attracted to 
Wales as well as how services are provided across the nation. This has 
led to several overlapping governance territorialisations across Wales, 
as different actors exist on different footprints (Local Government, 
Health, Police, Fire Services and DWP). At a national level, since 
devolution, Wales has struggled to develop economically to the extent 
that proponents of devolution would have liked, and in comparison 
to the rest of the UK (Bristow, 2018; Blackaby et al, 2018; Gardiner 
et al, 2013). Added to this, since 2010, as in much of the UK, austerity 
has been an important factor impacting on the functioning of the 
Welsh Government and the LAs. This is reflected in how the Welsh 
Government has sought to restructure local government under a time 
of austerity, via the Williams Commission, whereby it has looked for 
LAs to find ways to consolidate services and, if desired, combine them 
(Welsh Government, 2017a). Current developments fall well short 
with regards to what was suggested by the Williams Commission, but 
highlight a rationalisation and collaboration direction of travel for the 
Welsh Government.
It is within this climate of joint working between LAs that, in South 
Wales, two city regions have been created via LA collaboration and in 
turn this has led to North Wales seeking a Growth Deal for. The ‘region’ 
of North Wales also reflects a complicated geography, highlighted by 
The WSP (Welsh Government, 2008), which identified the different 
regions of Wales as having extremely ‘fuzzy boundaries’, with stretched- 
out and relational public policy interventions occurring in some 
instances (see Orford and Webb, 2018). ‘North Wales’ stretches into 
what has been called the ‘Deep Rural’ (Wales Rural Observatory, 2009) 
of mid- Wales; for example, where southern Gwynedd (Meirionnydd), 
blurs into the mid- Wales LAs of Powys and Ceredigion. Then to the 
north and east, the Mersey Dee Alliance (MDA) reflects the cross- 
border relationships linking Flintshire and Wrexham with Cheshire 
and NW England (see Figure  5.1). ‘North Wales’, then, stretches 
and blurs across different borders and boundaries (Mann and Plows, 
2016) and this blurring is reflected in policy initiatives such as the 
MDA. Further to this, North Wales is surrounded by a plethora of 
English City regions, particularly Liverpool and Greater Manchester. 
Importantly, North Wales is also made up of very distinctive and more 
territorially bounded sub- regions, or localities, with their own local 
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characteristics and with very different labour market and other social 
demographics, such as the very marked difference in the percentage 
of Welsh language speakers in NE and NW Wales. These differences 
in local characteristics are important; they present locally specific 
challenges and opportunities.4
This is further reflected in a series of economic regional variations 
across North Wales. The differences highlight the variegated nature 
of the region and questions whether it exists as a truly economically 
functional region. The regional divergence, for instance, in the labour 
market is reflected in the GVA per head for North Wales (Figure 5.2).
These differences in the labour market are also reflected in the 
relative size of employers situated across North Wales. There is a 
marked regional split between NE and NW Wales, whereby larger 
firms predominate in the east, whereas small to medium enterprises 
are more significant in the west.
Collectively, this suggests a variegated economy across North Wales, 
as well as a region that does not have a functional economic area of its 
own (Lovering, 1983). This means that developing policy that enables 
economic growth across the region is difficult; different sub- regions 
require different forms of support to better enhance their economic 
performance. The aim of generating agglomerative economic growth 
for a metropolitan centre then means that sub- city regional and 
peripheral differences do not matter if the centre is growing (see 
Figure 5.1: North Wales political geography 
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Figure 5.2: Gross value added per head, 2016
£26,374 £26,339
£20,226 £20,021 £19,573 £19,140 £19,026
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Fujita and Krugman, 1995; Krugman, 1998; Overman, 2012). In a 
rural region such a centre does not exist, therefore, there is no focal 
point for growth. The labour market and firm composition differences 
between NE and NW Wales, therefore, will affect the likely impacts 
and uptake of economic development opportunities in the region. This 
is because as growth stimuli is applied and if successful, it will have 
uneven impacts across an already unevenly developed regional space. 
It is important though to note here that the Welsh Index of Multiple 
Deprivation shows that there are micro localities (Lower Layer Super 
Output Areas, LSOAs) with very high levels of deprivation within 
LAs across North Wales, so the picture is much more complex than 
simply one of an ‘affluent NE Wales versus a struggling NW Wales’.
This means the NWGD faces a series of challenges that are quite 
different to that faced by most urban areas, which to date have 
benefitted from Growth Deals. For North Wales, we identify a series 
of key challenges facing the region which are: the before mentioned 
regional imbalances; the lack of a Welsh ‘Mittelstand’ and supply chain 
capacity (CRESC, 2015); the potential impact of Brexit; and a lack 
of quality employment opportunities and the related skills gap. These 
also sit alongside the considerable challenges of continuing austerity; 
lack of infrastructure (although problematic in itself); various health 
challenges related to geography and deprivation; and the changing 
demographics of the region. There is, therefore, a critical question 
moving forward  – does the NWGD tackle these issues of rural 
development or exacerbate them?
The North Wales Growth Deal
In attempting to deal with these difficult and overlapping geographies, 
LAs have sought to develop a Growth Deal for North Wales with the 
UK Government via the North Wales Economic Ambition Board 
(NWEAB). This is because local and national actors are promoting the 
growth deal framework as the only opportunity available to the region 
to address its economic needs, whereby, the collective effort of North 
Wales LAs could deliver growth for the region: “The North Wales 
county councils are proud to have submitted a growth bid for North 
Wales. The region is unified in recognising the need to transform the 
way the region’s economy is structured” (Interview, Wales Leaders 
Group for Economic Growth, 2017). The NWGD and its negotiation 
reproduces the ‘spatial imaginary’ of North Wales as a bounded region, 
which can then be connected to other spatial imaginaries such as 
the Northern Powerhouse (see Berry and Giovannini, 2018). This is 
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important because, despite the differentiated nature of the region, the 
narrative of a collaborative, functioning and bounded regional entity 
is essential to giving sufficient scale to make a potential growth deal 
plausible. To date, a deal has not been finalised but the direction of travel 
for the deal is relatively clear. This is because, like other Growth, City 
and Devolution Deals at this regional scale, only certain competencies 
are offered to LAs in pursuit of economic development (O’Brien and 
Pike, 2015).
The six LAs have pitched to the UK Government a deal worth £1.3 
billion (with leveraged finance) with £383.4 million coming directly 
from UK and Welsh Governments. With regards headline figures, this 
aims to create an uplift in GDP for the region from around £12 billion 
(2015) to £20 billion by 2035 and to create 5,000 jobs (NWEAB, 
2018). The bid has three main themes: ‘Smart North Wales’, focusing 
on innovation in high value sectors; ‘Connected North Wales’, 
addressing transport and digital infrastructure; and ‘Resilient North 
Wales’, seeking to retain young people, raise employment levels and 
improve skills to achieve inclusive growth (NWEAB, 2018: 3). Broadly, 
this includes focusing on low carbon and nuclear energy – including 
regeneration at Trawsfynydd; university research; better transport links; 
growing digital businesses; and increasing skills and opportunities to 
keep more young people in the area. Several stakeholders interviewed 
are hopeful that the Growth Deal could help with regard to political 
and economic ‘clout’: “It’s a new way of working … we need to be 
more like the private sector … they don’t recognise [LA] borders” 
(Interview, Anglesey Council, 2016).
Several stakeholders are of the opinion that this approach could help 
a ‘parochial and inward- looking’ (Interviewee, Anglesey Council, 
2017) NW Wales to become more outward facing. Partnership working 
is seen as potentially facilitating additional ‘clout’ because all LAs and 
different agencies are ‘speaking with one voice’. It is clear that the 
stimulus of the Growth Deal has already catalysed a significant amount 
of regional partnership working – ‘Team North Wales’. According to 
one commentator:
‘Economic leaders across the region are agreed on a 
collaborative approach, and are driving the work collectively 
on a singular regional approach to the Growth Bid – this is 
supported by regional leaders and key politicians, and is to be 
further developed and promoted as an inclusive approach that 
delivers “Team North Wales”.’ (Interview, NWEAB, 2017)
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The NWGD is aimed to strategically enhance the impact and value 
of independent but strategically linked inward investment/ economic 
development initiatives, some of which are well developed (such as 
Parc Adfer, Deeside, and HMP Berwyn prison and others at least 
under way or stalled – such as a new nuclear plant on Anglesey- Wylfa 
Newydd). The NWEAB’s Growth Vision report (2016) sets out a very 
comprehensive ‘roadmap’ of these inward investment projects, which 
are (strategically and discursively) linked to the region’s three Enterprise 
Zones (manufacturing in Deeside, energy on Anglesey and ICT and 
aerospace in Snowdonia).
Several of the stakeholders interviewed are understandably ‘bullish’ 
and optimistic about these projects, which are described as being 
‘significant opportunities’ (Interview, 2017) for the region’s economy 
and labour market, with positive impacts on employment and for 
developing supply chain opportunities. There was a great deal of 
optimism from the stakeholders most closely involved with strategic 
planning and delivery of these initiatives, who have built additional 
capacity as a result of learning from the economic shocks of the 
recession, de- industrialisation and associated mass redundancies: “there 
is a sense of real opportunity for change and growth in the region 
[which] is aspiring to grow … The impacts and implications of mass 
redundancies of the past has resulted in the growing, aspirational 
economy that North Wales is today” (Interview, NWEAB, 2017). One 
of the primary focuses to the NWGD is on transport infrastructure, 
which aims to do two things: to better connect the region internally and 
then externally to NW England. With specific reference to bordering 
English LAs, such as those contained within the MDA, this reflects 
the existing ‘functional economy’ of the region, which sits across the 
Wales/ England border. Added to this, is also the pre- existing ‘spatial 
imaginary’ of the Northern Powerhouse, which is also seen as a strategic 
opportunity for the North Wales economy due to its geographical 
positioning and relative ease of commuting:
The North Wales Growth Bid will be aligned to the 
strategies for the Northern Powerhouse and the immediate 
North West of England, specifically the strategy of the 
Mersey Dee Alliance and close partnerships including the 
Cheshire and Warrington Local Enterprise Partnership … 
The work is strongly aligned to the national aims of the 
UK Industrial Strategy and the WG [Welsh Government] 
Economic Plan. (NWEAB, 2018: 12)
City Regions and Devolution in the UK
112
The NWGD, therefore, seeks to align itself towards the North (West) 
of England and the developing agglomeration economies of two city 
regions. This interestingly focuses the NWGD away from South Wales 
and Cardiff (see Economy, Infrastructure and Skills Committee, 2017). 
This has meant strong emphasis has been placed on the development of 
road and rail infrastructure, which is especially focused on the north east 
of the region, with the North East Metro cited as a key infrastructure 
development (Welsh Government, 2017c).
The NWGD also seeks to address what is seen as the underperformance 
of the region due to its peripheral location in both the UK and 
Welsh economies. This seeks to unite actors at all levels (LA, Welsh 
Government and UK Government) in wishing to negotiate such a deal 
and highlights the economic rationales that are in play with regards to 
how best secure growth:
A North Wales growth deal will revolutionise the way our 
towns and villages in North- Wales govern themselves  – 
shifting powers down from London and Cardiff to local 
leaders who are better placed to take decisions that 
affect their communities. The Northern Powerhouse, 
coupled with a growth deal represents our best chance 
to bring transformational change to North Wales. 
(Welsh Government, 2017b, quoting Guto Bebb, Wales 
Office Minister)
Approximately, the NWGD hoped to secure a £335.5 million split 
between the Welsh and UK Governments, with a further £219 million 
coming from universities and colleges and around £109 million upfront 
from businesses. The NWGD, therefore, hoped to secure around £3.1 
billion of private sector funding alongside this over the long- term of 
the growth deal. Signed in November 2019, this was negotiated down 
to a £240 million package, split equally between the UK and Welsh 
Government, with the private sector and other partners committing to 
make up the rest of the investment (see HM Government and Welsh 
Government, 2019).
Discussion: Does the Growth Deal ‘fit’? Critiques 
and caveats
The chapter turns to consider whether such a deal is appropriately framed 
to address the needs of North Wales and in what ways the Growth Deal 
is deeply problematic in its approach for addressing those locality needs. 
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Drawing on the interviews, stakeholders voiced concerns about the lack 
of evidence for the (urban- transferred) growth deal model, in relation 
to cross- border working relationships; the focus on infrastructure and 
skills; the ‘city deal’ trickle-down approach; and the evidence base for 
‘cluster’ approaches. Further concerns were raised around the potential 
for these approaches to have negative impacts, such as displacement and 
disruption, particularly at the periphery. The following section, therefore, 
seeks to raise a series of concerns that the Growth Deal approach creates, 
as the proposed growth policies shift to a rural setting.
Policy discourse versus geographical reality
‘There’s a disconnect between these big schemes and 
peripheral economic wellbeing … the jury’s out on city 
deals and growth deals; there’s patchy evidence at best … no 
data to say it’s contributing positively.’ (Interview, Colegau 
Cymru, 2017)
One of the central problems with the Growth Deal approach is the 
circumspect evidence on which it is built. Ward and Jonas (2004) 
suggest that such approaches often have a habit of only focusing on areas 
that have been successful for their evidence base, while neglecting areas 
that have failed in the implementation of such strategies. Interviewees, 
in several contexts where they perceived evidence gaps to be present, 
further highlight this. Examples given include: little evidence on the 
successful working of cross- border economic partnerships with few 
examples of what ‘best practice’ is, or an understanding of what the 
pitfalls to this approach could be; the viability of the ‘trickle-down’ 
effect of inward investment and infrastructure development to local 
suppliers, local economy, the periphery; and whether infrastructure 
and skills investment actually delivers sustainable and evenly spread 
economic growth and quality employment or whether it exacerbates 
uneven growth. On the ‘what, why and how’ of micro businesses and 
self- employment, which make up the bulk of businesses especially in 
rural (North) Wales, there has also been little attempt to find out more 
about what they need/ want, particularly regarding their willingness 
and capacity to ‘scale up’. Throughout, possible impacts of ‘Brexit’ on 
current/ planned initiatives and policies run deep as concerns. Added 
to this, the viability of North Wales as a functional economic area is 
questioned, due to the region’s divergent east/ west split. Therefore, 
the NWGD continues to perpetuate a ‘spatial imaginary’, which 
may be geographically defined, but is poorly connected in economic 
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terms – especially when the importance of cross border relationships 
defines more accurately the functional economy of the region. This, 
therefore, suggests that for North Wales the Growth Deal will deliver 
at best very uneven benefits for the region.
The key proposals of the NWGD are more likely to deliver enhanced 
economic development for NE Wales than for NW Wales. This is 
an issue of existing capacity and connectivity; stakeholders note that 
Flintshire/ Wrexham is already ‘more aligned’ with Cheshire and 
Warrington, as embodied in the MDA; NE Wales LAs ‘already work 
with Manchester, Liverpool’; this cross- border work is ‘business as 
usual’ for NE Wales. While the hope is that improving connectivity 
will provide opportunities, which penetrate to the peripheral areas of 
NW Wales, several stakeholders felt that the benefits were realistically 
more likely to accrue to NE Wales.
‘On a certain level its already happening – the Mersey/ 
Dee Alliance – Wrexham/ Flintshire – they are currently 
able to access cross border relationships … [there are 
further developments of cross border schemes which are] 
aspirational at the moment … I  think some of the NE 
industries, chamber of commerce [are more likely to] see 
the opportunities.’ (Interview, NWEAB, 2017)
For example, in terms of infrastructure, several stakeholders felt that 
there are ‘real benefits’ with regards to improving transport connections 
between the already closely connected regions of NE Wales and 
Manchester/ Crewe (NW England), but that this would not necessarily 
help NW Wales.
Several stakeholders also felt that it is uncertain and unproven that 
cross- border growth and development in NW England and NE Wales 
will stimulate or facilitate supply and demand side capacity in peripheral 
NW Wales, to any significant extent.
‘I don’t think that you get trickle down/ spin out to the 
periphery … culturally and politically that’s very difficult 
to do  … it’s wishful thinking [that the periphery will 
benefit] … capital infrastructure accrues capital to areas, 
which are already strong.’ (Interview, Colegau Cymru, 2017)
‘We want to grow the whole of North Wales as a region [of 
Wales] rather than suck people into the NE … we shouldn’t 
rely on [cross border growth] as the only growth deal for 
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N Wales … there’s a danger of hype which could turn the 
NW Wales population off. There are regional opportunities, 
which are immediate and current.’ (Interview, Civil Society 
Stakeholder, 2017)
The labour market differences between NE and NW Wales outlined 
earlier were identified as central to some interviewees’ concerns 
about the NWGD as it currently stands. A concern raised by several 
interviewees is, therefore, that the emphasis on big infrastructure 
projects does not sufficiently address the locally specific characteristics 
of the North Wales region. This raises a series of questions with regards 
to the Growth Deal approach to address the needs of an economically 
unaligned region such as North Wales, with urban, semi- urban, rural, 
deep rural and an East/ West geographic split. This suggests from the 
outset that any economic benefit from the Growth Deal is going to 
be deeply uneven when delivered to the region.
Agglomeration and spatial displacement
Several interviewees raised concerns that NW England and NE Wales 
investment projects and cross- border capacity growth, while designed 
to simultaneously boost capacity in NW Wales, could actually have 
the opposite effect and could catalyse displacement in NW Wales (see 
Figure 5.1). Peripheral areas could lose human and financial capital, 
which could ‘leak out’ from Wales; this is agglomeration essentially. 
According to one perspective:
‘[T] he problem with agglomeration is that it doesn’t 
happen equally around the region … does North [West] 
Wales have the human capital to win the agglomeration 
battle? … Liverpool/ Manchester is a massive gravitational 
force pulling things in … dark matter … pulling resources 
in rather than sending resources spinning out … its where 
the financial capital, and consequently the human capital, 
lies … it’s a myth that there are no casualties.’ (Interviews, 
Colegau Cymru, 2017)
Therefore, whether transport infrastructure improvements will provide 
economic benefits to NW Wales or not is a contentious issue; there are 
significant differences of opinion between stakeholders on this issue. 
There has, of course, been a number of studies which have questioned 
the economic benefits of such transport focused approaches (see Melia, 
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2018) and the actual economic benefit they bring to the populations 
they serve. Several stakeholders suggest that the focus on infrastructure, 
particularly transport infrastructure, may be misplaced. Transport 
improvements are important, but it depends on the context, such as 
where and what sort of business you are. Transport and infrastructure 
improvement can:  “cut both ways … could actually exacerbate an 
outflow of capacity … it depends what the infrastructure is connected 
to … infrastructure doesn’t necessarily take you anywhere … [when] 
there are more efficient nodes elsewhere” (Interview, sustainability 
consultant, 2016). Several interviewees made this potential for 
transport connectivity and infrastructure improvements to ‘cut 
both ways’ and potentially catalyse displacement. This is an area of 
significant disagreement between those promoting the NWGD and the 
interviewee stakeholders above, who felt that there was little evidence 
to show that transport infrastructure brought economic benefits; 
instead, exacerbating a long- history of out- migration/ displacement, 
particularly at the periphery. Whereas the LAs who are developing 
and driving strategic initiatives (informing the NWGD) argue that 
investment in transport infrastructure is key to developing the region’s 
economic potential.
Conclusions
‘The Northern Powerhouse model is a good brand, a 
hook even, but a lack of tangible investment runs deep … 
how will it actually translate in terms of opportunities for 
Anglesey and North Wales is limited.’ (Interview, Anglesey 
Council, 2017)
This chapter has discussed non- metropolitan city- regional alternatives 
in the context of the (academic and policy) city- regional debate. It 
has specifically sought to raise a number of concerns based on the 
imposition of an urban ‘spatial imaginary’ through city- region building. 
The city- region agenda, although not transported and dropped into 
a rural region per se, shapes the possibility of what a rural region can 
become when aligned to a city- region policy prescription (in both 
discursive and material terms). We have highlighted how such an 
approach potentially marginalises ‘the rural’ due to the dominance 
of metropolitan centres in this policy approach. The chapter has 
demonstrated the way in which the NWGD has been constructed in 
order to align with city- region developments, though this is revealed 
to be deeply problematic for rural regions. The NWGD, premature in 
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its evolution, is being implemented with little or no acknowledgement 
of the various concerns raised above. We have questioned the rural 
viability of the implied and applied urban growth model. This approach 
to economic development also has the potential to create further 
uneven growth for rural areas, by failing to consider the ways in which 
areas external to the city region are capable of creating different models 
of economic growth, which do not rely on urban agglomeration. 
All this said, a Mid- Wales Growth Deal is being prepared, which is 
also without a core city context to drive economic development and 
experience could mirror some of pitfalls and dilemmas of the NWGD.5
North Wales’s unique selling point is its natural resources and unique 
identity as a bio- diverse region with important cultural heritage, 
which arguably chimes uncomfortably with a hegemonic discourse 
of partnership- based inward investment. Only specific actors from the 
local business communities, the LAs and the two national governments 
have agency to enact what a growth deal should or could be. There is 
limited evidence that such a model can and will succeed; and certainly 
limited ‘periphery proofing’ has been undertaken. With infrastructure 
and skills lagging over time, based on limited rounds of investment, 
the jury is out on whether the growth deal model will exacerbate 
historic patterns of displacement (out- migration) and skills capacity 
to sustain any growth within economic development. There is a dire 
need to improve the quality of jobs and the strategic roles played by the 
cultural heritage and agriculture tourism sector, as well as community 
level economic development possibilities around green energy. As two 
commentators point out:
‘We know the kinds of activity that will persist … the kinds 
of economic activity that are geographically bound  … 
Welsh language tourism, green infrastructure.’ (Interviews, 
Colegau Cymru, 2017)
‘We are not an industrial powerhouse, but we have an 
extraordinary landscape based on our environmental 
credentials … there is an opportunity to develop the image 
of North Wales; successful businesses do (re)locate here for 
lifestyle reasons.’ (Interview, sustainability consultant, 2016)
In addressing this and offering new knowledge, future research in this 
rural vein can contribute to the emerging literature on inclusive growth 
via city- region building (see Bevan Foundation and Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation, 2017; Lee, 2019; Vickers et al, 2017). This is seeking out 
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a new economic model and for the likes of the Royal Society of Arts 
(2016, 2017), with regards to social and economic policy, reducing 
inequality and deprivation can itself drive growth. This requires 
investment in social infrastructure, including public health, early years 
support, skills and employment services, which should go hand in hand 
with investment in physical infrastructure, and in business development. 
This will have a first order impact on productivity and living standards. 
This sits within a broader framing of events whereby the context of 
Brexit has stimulated: a new Shared Prosperity Fund with potential 
for regional actors; increased demands for greater devolution; and a 
strengthening of calls for Welsh independence (see Welsh Government, 
2017b). The rural challenges of delivering on this in the context of 
the NWGD have never been so pressing and the need for alternative 
economic development approaches, sensitive to the geographies of 




This City Deal will provide the region and its partners 
with the new ways of working and resources to unlock significant 
economic growth across the Swansea Bay City Region. It is a Deal 
where both Welsh and UK Governments have committed 
to jointly invest, subject to the submission and approval of 
full business cases in relation to the eleven identified projects 
and the agreement of governance arrangements for the 
deal, up to £241 million on specific interventions which 
seek to support and further build on the region’s strengths 
which include health, energy and manufacturing sectors 
and are underpinned by a world- class digital infrastructure, 
successful universities and innovative health boards. (HM 
Government 2017: 3)
Introduction
In this chapter, we consider the implications of applying the city- region 
concept to a medium- sized city and whether such an application of 
a spatial and governmental policy is appropriate when the central 
city in question is also not necessarily economically dominant or 
connected to its wider city region. Building on the previous chapter, 
this raises the wider question that, within the process of sub- nation 
state restructuring, how can the city- region construct a deal with its 
application in what are often ‘relational’ and ‘stretched’ (MacLeod and 
Jones, 2007) polycentric city- regional contexts. We focus on the case 
of the SBCR, based in South West Wales, observed through the lens 
of Welsh devolution and through the concept of the city region as a 
scalar narrative for the delivery of economic development.
This chapter suggests that as a concept for delivering economic 
growth in Wales, the ‘fit’ of the city- region concept to Swansea Bay 
pushes the very essence and dynamics of the economic model in 
question to its spatial limits, hence the title. This is questioned via 
comprehending how and why the scale and differences across the 
SBCR stretch the spatial construct of city- region building. Swansea 
as a smaller, geographically peripheral UK metropolitan centre, lacks 
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economic dominance over a city region, which is polycentric and 
porous in its social and spatial nature. This means it struggles to embed 
the dynamics of the city- region neoliberal growth machine model, 
outlined in the Introduction, into a coherent centric local growth 
framework. This, in turn, suggests that with regards to sub- national 
state spatial restructuring in Wales, a different model may well be 
much better to suited to this region in question. Our critique, then, 
is not just applicable to Swansea Bay, but also to other medium and 
smaller- sized city regions attempting to deliver a city- region agenda. 
The transference of the city region as a geopolitical policy footprint 
for economic growth (Jonas and Moisio, 2018), therefore, needs to 
be more carefully thought through in its implementation. Its usage, 
whereby a city- first or urban centric model is deployed without a 
dominant agglomerative centre, becomes mired in the difficulties of 
the more complex and diverse economic geographies.
To address our wider conceptual arguments with regards city regions, 
as well as the implementation of the SBCR, the chapter is organised 
in three sections.
The first section develops further some of the conceptual arguments 
in the book with regards to city- region building, to situate Swansea 
within its nuanced contexts. The second details the SBCR within 
the City Deal Approach being deployed by the UK and Welsh 
Governments. The third section looks at the emerging caveats and 
critiques of this approach to local and regional economic development 
in this part of South Wales.
The city- regional world revisited
With the city region becoming the dominant discourse in urban 
development policy and the appropriate scale on which economic 
actors can position themselves within the global economy as ‘scalarly’ 
sufficient to react to changes, we have suggested throughout this 
book that agglomeration tendencies privilege economic growth on 
centralised urban areas. Here, the consensus relates to the idea that if 
you centralise as much of your economic activity as possible, greater 
economic returns follow from spatial proximity and in turn, cumulation 
causation can operate (see Nathan and Overman, 2013; Overman 
et al, 2007). The city- region model has thus shaped economic growth 
policy as a metropolitan scale concern, which as we highlighted in 
Chapter 5, lends itself to the critique of ‘metrophilia’ – the ‘sweeping 




social challenges, in the process ignoring the needs of ‘marginalised 
strata’ within the city and of ‘non- metropolitan places’ beyond the city 
(Waite and Morgan, 2019: 384).
The critical approach to metrophilia is useful in the context of 
this chapter as it highlights the way in which despite the vaunted 
‘bespoke’ nature of the city- region building process, it is underpinned 
by a city- first agenda, which places far more emphasis on the 
importance of the urban. This in the context of some city regions 
may posit some forms of success, but as this policy framework is 
applied to ever more varied cities and regions, the underpinning 
approach becomes much less applicable and plausible. Building on the 
arguments in the Introduction, the economic rationale of defining 
city regions by their ‘functional’ or ‘natural’ economic area draws 
attention to the need to also examine the spaces of economic and 
social flows vis- à- vis Travel to Work Areas around the city region. 
This can sometimes cross pre- existing and historic administrative and 
cultural boundaries, as well as reflect the different spatial structures 
of settlements and the geographies of urban and rural economic 
growth. In the case of Swansea Bay, as the chapter will develop, 
as a medium- sized city in an enlarged geographical city region, it 
lacks the agglomerative pull economically to make the city- region 
function as, for example, Storper (2013) would suggest. This means 
that due to weak economic ties alongside a polycentric makeup 
of other settlements such as Llanelli, Carmarthen, Neath and Port 
Talbot, the city- region model for economic growth is both ill- 
conceived and ill- fitted in its application on Swansea Bay. This does 
not, however, stop a process of city- region building taking place, 
in what Haughton et al (2016: 356) would suggest is informed by 
‘decontextualized economic theory that uses abstract economic laws 
to develop problematic policy prescriptions focused on the assumed 
potential of large cities to generate growth’. Haughton et al are taking 
aim at agglomeration as a model for growth directly as well as the 
city- region concept more broadly and it is within this critique that 
we see parallels to the SBCR’s attempt to implement and harness 
such policy concepts. This follows with Waite and Morgan (2019) 
above, in that the city- region concept is mistakenly being applied 
as a ‘panacea’ for a series of economic problems. This means it is ill 
equipped to actually address them, to fit the pre- existing geography 
or to provide any real ‘inclusive growth’ (see Lee, 2019); in many 
respects, through agglomeration, it has the potential to exacerbate 
uneven development.
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Swansea Bay City Region and City Deal
The city region as a policy construct for economic development is built 
on a variety of factors that attempt to institutionalise an agglomeration 
economy over time and across space. As we suggested in Chapter 5, 
the opportunity to territorialise this city region came through city 
deals, which create a bounded SBCR, but in doing so, also create 
the conditions for a series of contradictions and tensions within this 
mode of state intervention. These tensions reflect the relatively small 
economic foot print of Swansea, as the metropolitan centre in a wider 
region (see Figure 6.1), but also refuel the difficult and competitive 
geographies of the Welsh state, whereby the two primary cities of Wales 
(Swansea and Cardiff) are relatively close in geographical proximity, 
contain collectively the largest proportion of the Welsh population, 
and have historically been deeply competitive with each other (see 
Gooberman, 2017). This makes delivering a sub- nation state structure 
for Wales and particularly South Wales difficult. Therefore, piecing 
together that perceived sense of scale for Swansea Bay is difficult, as 
it is required to stretch into a rural hinterland and it is constrained to 
the east by the CCR and its own economic footprint.
The SBCR consists of the four LA Areas that make up what 
could loosely be called ‘South West Wales’. The city region includes 
Figure 6.1: Swansea Bay City Region
Pembrokeshire
Swansea Bay City Region
N













Pembrokeshire, Carmarthenshire, Neath Port Talbot and Swansea itself, 
with the latter two being more distinctively urban. This urban/ rural 
split between the LAs is considerable and the economic footprint of 
Swansea itself, as the metropolitan centre across the region, is relatively 
small. Using Travel to Work Areas data as a proxy for the economic 
connectedness of the city region, Swansea has relatively weak connections 
to its rural hinterlands. Figures  6.2 and 6.3 highlight this picture, 
suggesting that there is little in the way of flow between Swansea and the 
rural parts of Carmarthenshire and Pembrokeshire. There is little travel 
between these LAs to Swansea for work, alongside there being relatively 
weak infrastructure connections (whether road or rail) to even facilitate 
this, which over time has significant impact on patterns of economic 
development and settlement growth.
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This reflects an economic reality of the city region with areas possessing 
very different economies and, therefore, somewhat divergent economic 
interests. This variable picture at the LA level is also reflected in the 
descriptive statistics for the city region (see Table 6.1), which suggest 
further patterns of divergence. This divergence and urban/ rural split, 
paints a mixed picture for the city region, whereby there is reduced 
employment in Swansea and less businesses per 10,000 people in 
Swansea and Neath Port Talbot (with higher populations) but there 
are higher incomes in the more urban LAs and Swansea achieves a 
higher GVA per head than its surrounding LAs.
This is compounded by a relatively weak economic performance for 
the city region as a whole, when compared to the rest of Wales and 
the UK. Using Welsh Government (2019) statistics, it has the lowest 
employment rate (71.1 per cent), the second highest employment rate 
(4.4 per cent), the highest inactivity rate (21.7 per cent), the lowest 
GVA per head (£17,600) and the lowest gross disposable household 
income per head (£15,600).
It is on this mixed and varied economic picture that the city deal 
was negotiated between the four LA areas, the UK Government 
and the Welsh Government (see Figure  6.1). This presented a 
complicated process for negotiation and much like the CCR City 
Deal (discussed in Chapter 4) was a product of tensions between LAs 
and the Welsh state in the context of potential local government 
restructuring plans, alongside tension between the Welsh and UK 
Governments in terms of delivering the city- region concept (see 
Pemberton, 2016). The delivery of the city deal was proceeded 
by the Swansea Bay Transition Board, which was led by Sir Terry 
Matthews (a leading private- sector elite and Wales’ first billionaire), 
Table 6.1: Swansea Bay City Region descriptive statistics


















Swansea 68.3 4.9 21.3 19,300 506.90 454
Pembrokeshire 71.9 5.6 22.1 18,400 457.30 644
Carmarthenshire 73.1 3.1 21.5 15,900 495.70 560
Neath and Port 
Talbot
72.7 4.0 22.1 16,200 586.70 363
Source: Welsh Government (2019)
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and this initiated as a process of city- region building by the Welsh 
Government (Swansea Bay City Region, 2016). The initial plans were 
based on the ambitious concept of an Internet Coast to secure 5G 
digital capability for South Wales and bring about an upward shift in 
the productivity capability of Swansea’s advanced manufacturing base 
through ‘catapulted’ technology. The SBCR City Deal document, 
signed in March 2017 (HM Government, 2017), though reflected 
the product of negotiations between the LAs themselves over their 
immediate (rather than forward looking) priorities and the UK 
Government over what was permissible Treasury expenditure at 
that time. This complicated deal- making structure, alongside the 
economic geography of Swansea Bay, therefore, greatly reflects 
what was delivered and supports the claims made by Scott that ‘city- 
regions are always at the same time conditioned by idiosyncrasies 
related to local material, social, and cultural circumstances’ (Scott, 
2019: 574).
In summation, the SBCR City Deal secured £1.3bn of funding 
for its 11 proposed projects, whereby £637m was projected to be 
leveraged finance from the private sector and with the Welsh and UK 
Governments having committed in principle to £241m of that total. 
The city deal further aims to deliver a ‘collective focus’ for the city 
region. The signed version notes that:
The City Deal provides clarity of purpose, consistency of 
approach and absolute focus on collective action over the 
next two decades. We aim to tackle the structural challenges 
holding back our economy and reduce the gap between 
our performance and the rest of the UK in terms of wealth 
creation to the benefit of both. (Swansea Bay City Region, 
2016: 2)
The deal was to be implemented over the next 15 years, aiming to 
boost the regional economy by £1.8 billion and generate almost 10,000 
new, high- quality jobs. It was split into four main themes: Internet 
of Economic Acceleration; Internet of Life Science & Well- being; 
Internet of Energy: and Smart Manufacturing. These four themes were 
then further split into eleven different projects, of which, only three 
operate on across the city- region scale as a whole (see Figure 6.4).
The lack of operation across the city region as a whole highlights 
the lack of economic convergence, as well as the need, in political 
terms for each LA, to see some aspect of the deal landed in their area 





Figure 6.4: Swansea Bay City Deal project map
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clear that it is about ensuring economic growth for the city region 
and widening its economic footprint:
The Deal provides an opportunity to continue tackling the 
area’s barriers to economic growth through:  developing 
higher value sectors and higher value employment 
opportunities to match; increasing the number of businesses 
within these sectors to widen the economic base; and 
improving the region’s GVA level against the UK average. 
As well as taking forward programmes to drive economic 
growth the City Deal commits local leaders and partners to 
implementing effective leadership across the City Region. 
(Swansea Bay City Region, 2016: 3)
The deal, therefore, attempts to improve a struggling city- region 
economy following specific markers of success such as GVA uplift. It 
attempts to do this via attracting, or creating in situ, high- end businesses 
primarily related to health, improving digital infrastructure and in the 
specific regeneration of parts of Swansea’s urban core.
Quite a city- regional stretch: emerging critiques
The above SBCR City Deal, despite the bombast and optimism of local 
elites involved in its implementation, papers over a number of structural 
and strategic weaknesses within the South Wales economy and its 
‘geo- constitution’ (Wills, 2016). Not least, there was a breakdown 
in the governance of the city deal implementation itself due to gross 
misconduct, which resulted in several high- level suspensions from 
public office and later criminal investigations by the Regional Crime 
Unit for Southern Wales over the misuse of public money to support 
private business interests in the controversial Llanelli Wellness and Life 
Science Village project.1 These were ongoing during the period of 
our research and are outside the scope of this chapter, but needless to 
say they do not support the argument that devolution through localist 
city- region building represents a role model of democracy, the basis 
for civil society awakening, or virtuous economic and social renewal 
more broadly. The scope of this chapter is not the governance of the 
SBCR City Deal per se, but with the deeper concern with applying 






As has been alluded to, the city region has been negotiated between a 
set of conflicting aspirations, which are presented via each of the key 
institutional actors’ concerns as to what they wish to see developed 
from the city- region building process. This is reflected in the views of 
the Welsh Assembly’s Economy, Infrastructure and Skills Committee 
which suggests that:
It is clear that Deals and the investment that follows them have 
given the UK Government a role in economic development 
that (as a devolved area) would normally be the preserve of 
the Welsh Government. If this joint working is harmonious, 
then there is strong potential for it to benefit all parties. 
However, there is a history of fractiousness and finger- pointing 
between the two governments, particularly when it comes 
to economic development and infrastructure projects in areas 
where devolved responsibilities are not 100% clear. (Economy, 
Infrastructure and Skills Committee, 2017: 18– 19)
From this grounding for conducting and delivering a city deal, a deal 
that keeps all groups happy was always going to be difficult and to 
require significant compromise. This is especially pertinent in terms 
of thinking through what sort of economic growth is wanted and who 
does it benefit. For example, there are differing legislative approaches 
to economic development from the UK and Welsh Governments; for 
the UK Conservative Government there is an emphasis on ‘city- first’ 
agglomerative growth. This fits well with perhaps what local elites 
in Swansea would emphasise as important too, as it places emphasis 
on the city itself and the search for urban wealth creation. Whereas, 
the Welsh Government (Labour), although not ideologically against 
agglomeration per se, supports an alternative ideological model of 
economic development predicated more on achieving spatial justice 
(see R Jones, 2019; Welsh Government, 2015a) via the Wellbeing of 
Future Generations Act (2015). This is reflected in the below quote:
‘I guess strategically where we were and in the four 
months of negotiations strategically we had to fulfil the 
ambitions of both governments and as you say you’ve got 
a Labour Government here, a Conservative Government 
in Westminster, so we had to have the capability really 
of knowing what both governments’ agendas were and 
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how to marry those two agendas and we’re still doing 
it post- negotiation. We still have to marry two strategic 
ambitions together but I guess it helps that officials from 
Welsh Government and UK Government can come to 
an agreement themselves and have one path forwards.’ 
(Interview, Local Government Leader, 2018)
This implies the need to integrate the desires of both governments in 
terms of what they consider to be appropriate economic growth, but 
it also positions the divergent rural and urban LAs away from more 
long- term strategically planned approaches. As we suggested above, 
local political legitimacy becomes important. This is because for the city 
region as a whole, partners are required to deliver a deal from which 
they derive some form of benefit. This, in turn, localises policy away 
from city- region wide projects and concerns, which are unable to be 
integrated with local territorial concerns. This, in empirical terms, also 
points to the need to consider the dynamics of ‘metrophilia’, which 
we now turn to examine.
Dealing with metrophilia
‘You’ve got an opportunity here as a region, Swansea is 
known globally now because of the football, you’ve got to 
use that brand to reach out to the world to attract people 
to come here.’ He said, I think that was accepted. And on 
top of that then, if you accept Swansea is “As much as we 
would like to describe Carmarthenshire and Pembrokeshire 
and all the other great areas within the region, Swansea is 
your brand. That’s why it’s Swansea Bay ...” the engine of the 
region, the major urban centre, the major economic centre 
of the region, then if you get the engine running well you 
are going to disperse that wealth out into the other parts 
of the region.’ (Interview, Local Authority Leader, 2018)
The logic of the above LA leader gets to the nub of the point – “Swansea 
is your brand” – not the ‘South West Wales City Region’ or any other 
name, but Swansea itself is front and centre. The emphasis is also made 
on the city being the major economic and urban centre, in short the 
metro- centre for making the city region ‘work’. The quote also highlights 
the belief in a trickle- down effect from the development of Swansea 




and the unevenness of agglomerative growth, suggest this will struggle. 
This argument is shared by actors in the region:
‘Now Pembrokeshire was not keen on the city- region 
approach I think because of our experience of city- regions. 
When we’re sitting on the periphery of it the Region looks 
very different sitting in West Wales than it does sitting in 
Swansea. So, if you’re sitting in Swansea the City Region 
Deal looks like a pretty good thing, but we’re a long way 
from Swansea.’ (Interview, Civil Society Leader, 2018)
The positioning here of Pembrokeshire as the most peripheral (and 
rural) to Swansea is key to the discussion and the comprehension of 
what a city- region economy will bring. For the SBCR, then, this is 
the ‘construal’ (Jessop, 2016a) within the city- region building narrative; 
that for underperforming and smaller metropolitan centres, any form 
of trickle- out to the rest of the city region is highly unlikely to surface. 
Metrophilia is clearly not the answer here for ensuring city- region 
wide economic and social development. This is further compounded 
by genuine rural development question for the city region and the 
arguments rehearsed in the previous chapter on North Wales also 
apply to the SBCR.
As we have noted above (Figure 6.1), a large proportion of the 
region can be defined as rural and has minimal economic connection 
to Swansea itself. It also presents a series of other and differing 
development needs. The quote below highlights this in terms 
of health:
‘Well we’re very, very concerned about it. Whilst the City 
Deal will concentrate on health and life science as a major 
investment, rural health is not being taken care of … It’s 
also got the issue of attractiveness, we’ve got this shift from 
rural areas into urban areas which leaves a vacuum then in 
terms of skills and the linguistic skills in that rural area so 
health is a growing issue … That’s where I believe an English 
city- region has got the advantage in that it is an urban area, 
good communication links, high volume of people, good 
learning resources distributed. We haven’t got that; we’ve 
got this rural aspect, which is difficult.’ (Interview, Former 
SBCR Board Member, 2018)
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Within the city deal, there are a variety of projects that look to develop 
aspects of the city region’s health economy, but the specific rural needs 
are not addressed. Added to that, the above participant highlights a 
growing issue for rural areas due to the emphasis on projects that 
are urban: this in turn creates the reverse of agglomeration in rural 
areas, as people leave. Interestingly, the SBCR does not differentiate 
its policy interventions along rural and urban lines. Again, the 
overly metrocentric focus is not the answer to rural problems – it 
exacerbates them.
Austerity and financialisation
Further problems are aggravated by the ongoing impact of austerity and 
the question as to how the city region will be sustainably financed. As 
noted in Chapters 4 and 5, austerity has landed differently in Wales to 
England, with the Welsh Government buffering some of the impact, 
but this has still impinged on Welsh LAs severely. In the quote below, 
the continuing effects of austerity against the LA are even cited as a 
reason to not continue with the city- region process.
‘We were going into a time of … well we’re in a period of 
austerity, we cannot afford extra expenditure on things that 
are not known. This, to me, was opening the doors – could 
be a series of unknowns, so I was very, very, very cautious, 
yes … I go back to my point at the beginning; in these 
days of austerity we’ve not got the funds. We are being cut 
back, cut back, cut back for the last five, six years. And we 
shouldn’t, councils should not be relied upon as a charity for 
business expansion. There are programmes that are grants, if 
your business plan stacks up, there are banks that will lend 
you money. What I’m saying is, I think, that the Assembly 
and the English Government could be … forming their 
own bank, if you like, just allowing businesses to borrow 
cheaper money. That’s the only reason that these schemes 
want in on this because it’s borrowing cheap money, they 
can’t get it the same rates from the banks or the private 
sector so of course they want a part of it.’ (Interview, Local 
Authority Leader, 2018)
Here, the interviewee links the two projects, city- region building 
and austerity together, but also more fundamentally questions the 




Chapters 1, 2 and 3 indeed highlighted this Janus- faced nature of city- 
region devolution in England. Against a backdrop of austerity, based 
on these insights, a similar devo- dynamic is in play. This is further 
reflected in an uneasiness surrounding the financing of a city deal too 
and the risk each LA faces in supporting it (in the wake of austerity). 
Below, the discussion as to whether the city deal is based on ‘capital or 
revenue’ is illuminating, particularly as to how stretched LAs are and 
the actual value placed on the city deal. According to one perspective:
‘And then there’s the issue around what is the nature of the 
funding in the City Deal, if you read it, it says two different 
things; on one page it says that it’s “funding”, so that could 
be capital or revenue, over the page it says it’s capital. Now 
I need revenue for one or two of the projects so I’m asking 
them to clarify, essentially. They started off saying it’s all 
capital and I said, “oh dear”. And now they are starting to 
back- track a bit, so it’s all part of the negotiation. But of 
the – we’ve got a revenue requirement of thirty- four million 
quid, on two main projects, one of which is here and the 
other one is the regional skills programme and a few bits and 
pieces elsewhere, but basically there’s a deliverability issue 
around the projects if we can’t get the clarity.’ (Interview, 
Local Authority Official, 2018)
For the LA official, the city deal being financed via capital funding is 
untenable, due to the upfront cost of project delivery. The vagueness 
in the city deal documents does not help and in turn, with stretched 
resources, has meant the need to negotiate further before the deal 
can be implemented is a stark reality of this devolution through city- 
region building process. Here, austerity and the process of negotiating 
the deal between multiple actors, and the requirement of the state to 
support businesses with funding, raise a series of difficult questions for 
the ongoing implementation of the city deal.
Trickle- out …
The possibility of around £1.3 billion in funding being available for 
investment does offer a number of opportunities to deliver the projects 
in the SBCR City Deal and this level of funding is, of course, attractive 
to private investment. Therefore, as the LA leader below suggests, the 
scale of this interest is genuinely global in its offering:
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‘I think the investment from both governments is just giving 
us the profile that private sector want to invest and it’s the 
catalyst. Because both governments want to invest in the 
region. We’re already seeing global investors wanting to 
talk to us … there are companies talking to us now that 
we’ve never seen in Carmarthenshire but they’re here now 
because of the City Deal and what that offers and that’s 
great to see.’ (Interview, Local Government Leader, 2018)
Although there are questions as to whether the projects outlined in the 
city deal will have their desired effect over time, as city- region actors hope 
for, is very much open to debate, but with such ‘global’ external interest, 
another fundamental question opens up. How much of the proposed 
£1.3 billion investment will remain in the city region, to be appreciated 
by the regional civil society of the Swansea Bay? For some, this is another 
failing of city- region building process itself, whereby not enough attention 
has been concentrated on city- regional welfare capture, to influence the 
politics of distribution thereafter. According to one source:
‘I had probably three or four objectives the biggest one 
being fair procurement. Probably the second one a voice 
for construction and hopefully probably lining up with 
“yours localism” as well. I wanted to get the local point 
across that construction is the first rung on the ladder 
when it comes to investment and so on … Obviously a 
lot of people didn’t agree with my views. I did bang on 
all the time about procurement and it needed to start 
with Smart Fair Procurement but I’ve written there that 
was totally lost to be honest with you. I  couldn’t get it 
written into the City Region Deal and I think that’s the 
most important. The enabler for the whole of the City 
Region Deal is the construction so whether or not the 
project is on infrastructure or it’s on life science, wellness 
centre as one is or it’s on the city centre regeneration it 
starts with construction.’ (Interview, Former SBCR Board 
Member, 2018)
The above quote highlights how as a Board Member participant 
within the process of developing the city region, there is an inability 
to guarantee that the funding coming to Swansea Bay will remain with 
its economy. Again, this highlights a further critique to the city- region 
policy construct as it is currently premised; this spatio- temporal fix 
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cannot find ways to ensure that, even if it creates an agglomerative effect 
from investment, that investment may not necessarily remain within 
the city- region crucible. This instead represents a form of trickle- out, 
whereby infrastructure, new buildings and so on maybe built, but 
with an increasingly fragmented or even ‘dismembered’ (Toynbee and 
Walker, 2017) local state, little of its economic footprint will ultimately 
remain in the city region.
Conclusions
‘You could call it the hegemony of a laissez faire  – the 
neo- liberal hegemony. To use that phraseology:  it’s the 
dominant philosophy, isn’t it? And I don’t think that has 
been challenged. You’ve got Jeremy Corbyn and John 
MacDonald coming in but even there I suspect that’s more 
about macro- economic policy and it really strikes me again 
that, in my experience of politicians, they know very little 
about this area so they tend to assume what (hacks it) in 
terms of economic development is big buildings and roads, 
something tangible. I come back to my point, in economic 
development terms in Wales there’s too much development 
and not enough economics.’ (Interview, Health Board 
Chair, 2018)
This chapter has sought to expose the immense difficulties of instituting 
a city- regional model of economic and social development for the 
SBCR, which is a collection of polycentric medium- sized urban 
entities, historically battling for recognition as nodes in the increasing 
globalisation of capital networks. We have highlighted the pre- 
existing economic tensions in this locality of South Wales, namely 
an agglomerative economy riddled with weak links and connections 
within and between the towns and cities. The city deal does nothing 
short of replicating and extenuating these economic and social 
problems. Over time, the LA and city- centric dominated strategy has 
led to the lack of a city- region wide spatial strategy, with emphasis 
being placed on too many geographically discreet projects, which are 
used to both secure political legitimacy and partially plug the gaps 
left behind by the decade of austerity. In the words of one influential 
academic commentator:
Dylan Jones- Evans … reportedly said that the deal had gone 
away from ‘investing in infrastructure and people’ towards 
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Figure 6.5: Swansea Bay City Deal revised project map






‘building more buildings’. He argued that the strategy 
taken had ‘been discredited by economic development 
organisations around the world’. Professor Jones- Evans 
criticised the deal for moving away from funding and 
skills for business by no longer having an infrastructure 
or investment fund and claiming that less than 1% of the 
budget specifically earmarked for skills. In addition, he 
argued that the emphasis on new digital technologies, 
which was at the heart of the proposition document, had 
been cut back to a single funded project. Most worrying, 
he argued, was the absence of any funding to support the 
proposed installation of a new transatlantic cable from North 
America into Oxwich Bay. This project, Professor Jones- 
Evans argued ‘has the potential to totally transform the 
economic fortunes of the whole of South Wales’. (Quoted 
in House of Commons Welsh Affairs Committee, 2019: 19)
Within this context of political capture by certain local state elites, 
Figure 6.5 captures the current (August 2020)  status of the SBCR 
City Deal projects. Essentially, three projects in the original vision 
(Centre of Excellence in Next Generation Services, Factory of the 
Future and Steel Science) have been replaced by the Supporting 
Innovation & Low Carbon Growth project in the Neath Port Talbot 
area.2 Economic development officers within the supporting LAs are at 
pains to point out that steel science and smart manufacturing elements 
are now contained within the Supporting Innovation & Low Carbon 
Growth project. Critics point to this being more about protecting the 
initially allocated funding parameters and safeguarding the interests of 
steel production in Port Talbot than providing the basis for increased 
economic productivity and shared prosperity across the SBCR.
As the city- region building ‘round of institutional investment’ (Peck, 
1995), then, has been rolled- out over this existing complex geography, 
we would argue that in years to come, this (curtailed) model of 
economic development will indeed exacerbate combined and uneven 
development, and furthermore it will not lead to the empowerment 
of civil society actors to be able to ‘formulate an agenda, act and make 
change’ (Wills, 2016: 13). This raises questions with regards to what 
an appropriate ‘growth’ strategy would be for places like the Swansea 




Conclusions: City- regional futures
Learning from a civil society perspective has great value, especially 
very early on before decisions are made. Firstly, it broadens the 
set of knowledge available for the deliberative stages before any 
pens are put to paper. As already noted, it does so in a way that 
is as close to communities and their localities as feasible at this 
stage. Secondly, it is a step towards making connections and 
having good communication with potential future partners. 
(UK2070 Commission, 2020b: 6, emphasis added)
The building of a spatially balanced and inclusive form of 
growth is a task that Westminster and Whitehall have failed 
to fully embrace. That has got to, and looks set to, change. As 
the Government sets about its task, it is right to invest in towns 
(and cities). But places will be helped rather than profoundly 
changed by the policies on offer thus far. This is because the 
economic forces that are making some towns more prosperous 
and hollowing out others are much more powerful, more 
poorly understood and harder to change than we are yet as a 
country ready to acknowledge. That said, the link between 
towns and successful cities is a good start for building successful 
policy in many places. (Emmerich, 2020a: 6)
Introduction
The first quotation is taken from civil society perspectives within 
the UK2070 Commission, which as noted in the Introduction, is 
investigating spatial inequality and proposes an agenda for strategy 
long- term action. The study examines experiences in ‘left behind’ 
places, by looking at perspectives on inequality of those civil society 
organisations who are already working in these contexts. This chimes 
with City Regions and Devolution in the UK: The Politics of Representation, 
which has probed on the ‘symptoms’ rather than the ‘prevalence’ of 
the phenomenon and the role of civil society actors therein. We have 
provided an overview of city- region building and considered how local 
governance restructuring shapes political, social and cultural landscapes. 
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Reviewing the GMCR, SCR, SBCR, CCR and the NWGD, we 
have exposed the tensions and opportunities for local elites and civil 
society actors. Moreover, the nature of the economic development 
that civil society actors are expected to work within is contradictory. 
We have identified the tension between civil society autonomy at the 
margins of city- region devolution and the abrogation of responsibility 
at the centre. Like the social economy localism debates that preceded 
this wave of devolution, dependent on state and its agents, city- region 
building with civil society is ‘a vehicle by which social and economic 
risks can be moved away from the state and on to local communities, 
which are expected to assume responsibility’ for economic governance 
(Leyshon and Lee, 2003: 19– 20). We maintain a position, then, that 
to conceptualise and understand the dynamics of civil society within 
city regions requires, firstly, close attention to the state and its spatial 
manifestations and, secondly, to the links between the state and the 
mainstream economy. In short, this spatially selective incorporation of 
civil society only moderates the city- regional effects of capitalism and 
certainly does very little to actually reform or replace the prevailing 
growth model.
A new approach is clearly needed that recognises and empowers 
the ‘agency of those who are facing disadvantage directly, and 
brings insights about how civil society offers assistance’ (UK2070 
Commission, 2020b:  3). Nothing short of a ‘fundamental shift is 
needed to address the deep- rooted or structural problem of regional 
inequality’. Yet, as this book has highlighted, inequality is also a 
problem that is directly experienced – communities live with it and 
‘have agency in making changes’ (UK2070 Commission, 2020b: 3). 
This implies that policymakers and communities must work together 
in order to define the problem and work out solutions to it. An 
era of ‘civic repair’ is emerging in the UK on the back of a series 
of economic, cultural, political and technological upheavals that 
collectively and individually are reshaping patterns of social cohesion 
and stratification and the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in 
communities, labour markets and the practice of citizenship. Civil 
society is central to these dynamics, as a site in which change is 
negotiated and responses developed and implemented, but also 
the need for further study. Chapter  3 noted and warned though 
that relational and empathic aspects of civil society mobilisations 
vis- à- vis the economy and city- regional governance should not be 




This chapter looks at two pathways for the development of city 
regions in the UK. The first is the current preoccupation with 
city regions as agglomeration nodes in neoliberal networks  – the 
‘giantist’ (Lefebvre, 1976:  103) trickle- down sentiments expressed 
by Emmerich and others (see Katz and Nowak, 2017). Founder 
of the consultancy Metro- Dynamics and former HM Treasury and 
10 Downing Street policy guru, Emmerich has played a key role in 
developing devolutionary momentum, advancing the agglomeration 
arguments in the Introduction (see Emmerich, 2017a), and specifically 
being central to the Greater Manchester devolution deals. The idea 
that ‘levelling- up’ (see King and Ives, 2019; Pitt, 2020; Tomaney and 
Pike, 2020) is a geographic issue though is misplaced and skews focus 
by putting emphasis on ‘regional investment’ (Emmerich, 2020b), 
rather than challenging the overall economic elite model, which 
remains overly driven by financialisation and the marginalisation of civil 
society actors. The chapter highlights a depoliticising condition being 
coined ‘the post- political’, where an array of players, stakeholders and 
organisations are playing active roles in the transformation of relations 
between state and market economy by also involving and increasing the 
influence of corporate interests and the privatisation of public services 
(Haughton et al, 2013; MacLeod, 2013). Related to this, power is often 
being transferred to, or captured, by an elite formation in terms of 
political, social and cultural influences (Crouch, 2004, 2020). Rather 
than promoting democracy and civil society empowerment, this new 
‘regime’ of politics can undermine it; governance per se has bypassed 
direct elected and representative democracy (Swyngedouw, 2010: 6).
The second is an alternative socioeconomic model of economic 
governance being called the ‘foundational economy’, which 
encompasses those goods and services, together with the economic 
and social relationships that underpin them, that provide the everyday 
infrastructure of civilised life (Foundational Economy Collective, 2018). 
A non- exhaustive list includes gas and electricity, water, waste sewerage, 
retail food supply, telecommunications, health and social care, housing, 
education and public transport. Over the past 50 years or so, many of 
these goods and services have been increasingly incorporated within 
market logics by policies that promote commodification, privatisation 
and financialisation. Previously this would have be placed in the domain 
of civil society and subsequently a central– local nationalising state (see 
Duncan and Goodwin, 1988). The failure of these unfettered market 
policies and their impact on the daily lives of citizens in city regions is 
evident throughout the pages of this book, and the series of economic 
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and social events that unravelled across the world in early 2020. The 
chapter concludes by looking at the opportunities for instituting a 
‘foundational city- regional economy’.
Post- political city regions and the depoliticisation of 
civil society
According to ‘post- political’ approaches a ‘regime’ of governance, 
which operates at different spatial scales and territorial reaches, is 
increasing the actors in policy implementation. Accordingly, the ‘status, 
inclusion or exclusion, legitimacy, system of representation, scale of 
operation and internal or external accountability of such actors takes 
place in non- transparent, ad hoc, context dependent ways and differs 
greatly from those associated with egalitarian pluralistic democratic 
rules and codes’ (Swyngedouw, 2010: 6). One of the key elements to 
this approach is the parallel role of depoliticisation – the narrowing of 
the boundaries of democratic politics, the displacement strategies used 
by the state to frame engagement, and the emergence of technocratic 
and delegated forms of governance (see Wood and Flinders, 2014). In 
the context of neoliberalist city- regional agglomerations, this process 
reinforces dominant ideologies and imaginaries around what is possible 
and required, restricting or foreclosing avenues for debate around 
alternative and critical discourses (Darling, 2016; Deas et al, 2020).
Extending Jessop’s analysis in the Introduction, depoliticisation is an 
increasingly important governing strategy for exercising state power, 
removing the political character of decision making by privileging certain 
elite interests in the state- making process, in turn framing politics and 
shaping political opportunities. The existence of the state being, among 
other things, a ‘political’ sphere, which presupposes the possibility of a 
depoliticisation of civil society, makes it ‘clear that the depoliticisation of 
civil society could only be achieved through bloody legislation against 
the expropriated – producing a “class” free from the means of production 
and “free” to sell their labour power – a process that could not in essence 
be more political’ (Burnham, 2014:  191). This is contemporised by 
Wood and Flinders (2014: 152), who emphasise that depoliticisation 
is a contingent neoliberal political strategy for managing conflicts and 
rationalising urban governance, which exhibits three forms:
• Governmental depoliticisation: focusing on the switching of issues from 
the governmental sphere through the ‘delegation’ of those issues by 
politicians to arm’s- length bodies, judicial structures or technocratic 




• Societal depoliticisation:  involving the transition of issues from the 
public sphere to the private sphere and focusing on the existence 
of choice, capacity deliberation and the shift towards individualised 
responses to collective challenges;
• Discursive depoliticisation: the role of language and ideas to depoliticise 
certain issues and through this, define them as little more as elements 
of fate.
State agents deploy three patterns of intervention across these forms 
for deferring, displacing, and transferring the political moment and 
containing, albeit temporarily, crises further. By deferring the political, 
the state can enact strategies of deferral of conflict to some future point 
in time. By displacing, the state can shift political problems to other 
arenas and groups. By transferring the political, conflict can be removed 
from immediate community and representative processes into new, 
fuzzy communities of interest and democratic processes that may not 
align or map onto experiences of change ‘on the ground’ (Allmendinger 
and Haughton, 2015: 44).
In short, depoliticisation characterises the neoliberal political- 
administrative state system, the operation of which requires a careful 
unpacking of the ‘organizational form and sociopolitical bases of the 
state’ (Jessop, 1990: 345). In this approach though there is a need to 
not only examine where it takes place (such as sites of government 
and governance), but also how policy and politics are defined by 
their contents and in situations where choice, capacity for agency, 
deliberation and social interaction prevail. In short, depoliticisation, 
as Jessop points out, can only be guaranteed through a process of 
‘repoliticisation’ and an assertion of the ‘political’ in and through the 
state – underlying the point that both are integral to each other (Jessop, 
2014). Moreover, these ‘attempts may involve reorganising the integral 
state in the shadow of hierarchy and, indeed, serve to enhance state 
power by exercising influence indirectly and/ or at a distance from the 
state’ (Jessop, 2014: 214).
City Regions and Devolution in the UK has accordingly sought to 
demonstrate how the city region– state nexus operates not just in relation 
to the state’s organisation form and sociopolitical bases, but also how 
crises, contradictions, depoliticised politics, and struggles can emerge 
within a devolved governance framework and create opportunities for 
civil society. In effect, through depoliticisation as a governing strategy, 
state managers are also able to spatially reorganise the state apparatus 
to retain arm’s- length control over crucial economic and social 
processes, while simultaneously benefiting from the distancing effects of 
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depoliticisation. As a form of politics, depoliticisation also seeks to change 
market expectations by rationalist assumptions regarding the effectiveness 
and credibility of policymaking in addition to shielding the government 
from the consequences of unpopular policies. Depoliticisation, then, 
draws attention to the representational regimes of state- making through 
civil society: those social forces outside the political system.
Depoliticisation operates through hegemony- seeking ‘discursive 
institutions’ (Fuller, 2017), which establish semantic links between 
the discursive aims of those seeking to control, and the pragmatics of 
the everyday lives of those subject to such institutions. The various 
chapters of this book have highlighted these processes at work through 
the creation of precarious city regions in the context of a central– local 
politics of austerity fiscal localism. In short, as argued throughout the 
book, ‘ideologies of growth’ (Lefebvre, 1976: 102) and devolved forms 
of austerity are being reproduced through city regions and the ability of 
civil society groups to set the agenda, including proposing alternatives 
to the urban regime, is limited. The perceived post- political consensus 
around the ‘local growth agenda’ though implies that to critique this 
is not in the spirit of being a city- region team- player and ‘scuppering 
social progress’ (Emmerich, 2017b:  6; cf. Etherington and Jones, 
2016a). There is, indeed, to further paraphrase Lefebvre (1976: 102) 
on the politics of growth poles, almost blind- trust agglomeration 
ideologies hiding reality: ‘an idyllic picture of the economic situation, 
ignoring the clouds on the horizon …’
Civic repair and the foundational economy
One alternative to this growth model starts with a reconsideration of 
the socioeconomic foundation of the city- regional economy and offers 
a more ‘constitutional’ political economy for promoting ‘place- based 
social innovation’ (Morgan, 2018). The FE rejects the traditional focus 
city- region based agglomeration and productivity in favour of ‘that 
part of the economy that creates and distributes goods and services 
consumed by all (regardless of income and status) because they support 
everyday life’ (Bentham et al, 2013: 7). FE draws on Braudel’s (1981) 
tripartite architecture of society, where the economy is conceptualised 
in three layers: the world economy of large companies and institutions 
engaged in global export markets; the local market economy of anchor 
institutions, SMEs and the self- employed addressing local needs; and 
a subsistence economy of informal activities (see Haughton, 1999: 9). 
Whereas conventional sector- based city- region economic development 




latter layers – those more mundane and overlooked, yet fundamental, 
economic activities that constitute the foundation of everyday life and 
as Lefebvre argues, ‘the critique of everyday life’ and its reconstitution 
holds the future for understanding and challenging capitalism (see 
Brenner and Elden, 2009; Whitehead, 2005).
Reflecting Polanyi’s (1957) concept of embeddedness, the FE 
presents public services and civic infrastructure – frequently delivered 
‘outside’ the economy by the state and third sector – as much a part of 
the economy as the ‘world economy’ of marvellous export industries. 
Foundational sectors are seen not as some unproductive drag on the 
‘real’ economy, paid for out of tax receipts from ‘productive’ sectors, 
such as high- tech and knowledge- intensive industries, but as the real 
foundation of our economy generating social value and providing 
the majority of jobs (at least 50 per cent in some city regions). FE 
scholars, then, posit the ‘grounded city’ as an alternative to the free- 
floating and disconnected agglomerative ‘competitive city’  – ‘the 
city as a space of collective civic provision, which meets social needs’ 
and whose economy is ‘grounded’ in its locale and local population 
(Engelen et  al, 2017: 408). ‘Grounded’ means three things:  a city’s 
development is inter- dependent with, and rooted in, its metropolitan 
regional hinterland of resource and labour inputs; that one of the 
major ‘accelerators’ of urban- economic growth is rising land values; 
and grounded in the sense that cities are built on their FE, acting as 
a ‘stabiliser’. While accelerators provide opportunities for (inclusive) 
growth, stabilisers help ‘ground’ a city, acting as a ‘buffer’ to the vagaries 
of changing market dynamics. With the FE, city- regional growth 
can refocus on more controllable and locally embedded ‘accelerators’ 
of growth balanced by ‘stabilisers’ of provision of essential services. 
Thompson et al (2020) cite grassroots innovation and entrepreneurship 
at a local level as an important accelerator, in capturing ‘unearned social 
increment’. Rather than rely on large corporations from elsewhere 
to drive economic growth (and extract wealth created rather than 
re- investing locally), this involves incubating SMEs, social enterprises 
and entrepreneurs in ways that not only generate economic value 
through new business activity but also connect local labour markets 
with large- scale ‘innovation assets’ and ‘growth sectors’ (Thompson 
et al, 2020: 1177). Focusing on Greater Manchester, Folkman et al 
build on this to suggest a ‘new civic offer’ based on:
the city and economy as it is. With 80,000 on the housing 
waiting lists of the ten GM boroughs, the first priority 
should be social housing; with so many on low wages, the 
City Regions and Devolution in the UK
146
first priority in transport should be much lower public 
transport fares; with so much employment in sectors like 
retail and hospitality, the first priority should be to ensure 
that all chain based operators in these sectors pay the GM 
Living Wage. The Brexit result is a warning to Greater 
Manchester politicians who need now to reconnect with 
their voters, by renewing the civic offer. Instead of relying 
on property development as the accelerator in the centre, 
they need to rely on the foundational economy as the 
stabiliser in all ten boroughs. Because the quantity and 
quality of foundational goods and services is the social 
precondition of civilized life, and in activities like adult care 
the GMCA could start out on the road of social innovation 
and radical experiment to benefit all citizens. (Folkman 
et al, 2016: 3)
Enacting and embedding this strategy, of course, requires a fundamental 
challenging of the logic of indefinite agglomeration and rebalancing 
of the priorities between the market economy and social economy. 
Deas et al’s research on Greater Manchester’s ‘agglomerationist growth 
model’ notes the arrival of FE discourses in policy interventions, with 
some 27 references in key documents pertaining to spatial and industrial 
strategies, but ‘it is merely used as a loose signifier for low wage sectors 
such as retail and social care, rather than concerns over subsistence economies 
and alternative coping strategies’ (Deas et al, 2020: 9, emphasis added). 
Much research is still to be done on the ways in which civil society 
organisations have emerged as key players in the delivery of public 
services with consequences for civic gain and loss. The challenge, of 
course, is upscaling, as a ‘perennial issue’ this is how ‘the influence of 
these groups and the lessons learned from them can spread beyond their 
immediate locality’. An ‘urban platform’ mechanism is often needed to 
allow for the ‘integration and deliberation of these multiple concerns’ 
(Hodson et al, 2020: 213). Moreover, advancing Deas et al (2020) and 
previous research on the social economy and civil society (Amin et al, 
2002, 2003), strategies and their interventions need to move beyond 
mitigating against the effects of capitalism and make that shift towards 
fundamentally challenging and replacing the current growth model.
In Wales, FE thinking is beginning to address some of these 
difficult questions, by focusing on underpinning policies and action 
plans as part of the proactive ‘governance of the future’ (R. Jones, 
2019) agenda within civil society. In the context of the Wellbeing 
of Future Generations Act (Welsh Government, 2015a), which as 
Conclusions
147
noted in Chapter 5 is central to new narratives of justice, the Welsh 
Government has been supporting and developing the FE as part of 
a desire for a better and more socially and spatially just Wales by the 
year 2050 (see Davidson, 2020). State strategy since 2019 has focused 
on three areas.
First, a £4.5 million Foundational Economy Challenge Fund has 
been established to support a series of experimental projects that 
test how the Welsh Government can best support the FE and which 
government interventions work best. Second, a renewed focus has 
occurred, growing the ‘missing middle’ to increase the number of 
grounded firms in Wales and establish a firm base of medium-sized 
Welsh firms, which are capable of selling outside Wales but have 
decision making firmly rooted in communities. Third, spreading and 
scaling best practice follows this by looking at social value within 
procurement. Critical here are the strengthening of local supply chains 
and changes to local governance within city regions via the recently 
created Public Service Boards. These have been designed to renew local 
state democracy, but suffer the initial problem of adding to ‘regional 
partnership complexity’ (WLGA, 2017: 2) and alongside city- regional 
governance, not linking with the more progressive Future Generations 
Act interventions on spatial justice (Axinte, 2020). Monitoring these 
developments and their impact on civil society will prove critical for 
assessing if, how, and where the FE is being translated from theory, to 
manifesto, then into geographical practice.
Postscript: Landing the foundational economy 
post- COVID- 19
CORONAVIRUS ALERT. New rules in force now: you 
must stay home. More info & exemptions at gov.uk/ 
coronavirus Stay home. Protect the NHS. Save lives. (Text 
message from UK Government to all UK mobile phones, 
15 March 2020)
It’s important for me to level with you – we know things 
will get worse before they get better. But we are making 
the right preparations, and the more we all follow the rules, 
the fewer lives will be lost and the sooner life can return 
to normal. (Letter sent by Prime Minister Boris Johnson 
to all UK homes, 8 April 2020)
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At the time of writing, there is a coronavirus global pandemic 
(COVID- 19) outbreak. This started in Wuhan, China, possibly 
originating in a seafood wholesale market as the original source of 
transmission from bats to humans. As of 1 February 2021, there have 
been over 2.1 million confirmed worldwide deaths and 101 million 
confirmed cases. The pandemic has resulted in mobility restrictions 
and nationwide ‘lockdowns’ to slowdown the rates of infection and 
ease the pressure on national health and other services.
The lockdown has created the conditions for a worldwide recession 
by exposing the ‘frailty of the social contract’ (Financial Times, 2000: 10) 
and the ‘imbalances in contemporary society’ (Elliott, 2020: 2). With 
productivity slowing and large groups of individuals on either short- 
terms contracts and or unable to work from home, millions have 
been forced out of work and onto a series of welfare benefits such 
as (in the UK) UC. In the early months of lockdown, for instance, 
the UK unemployment count rapidly increased with over 1.5 million 
new benefit claims and predictions of 8 million (25 per cent of the 
workforce) jobs being at risk (McKinsey & Company, 2020). This 
has impacted disproportionality on civil society, heavily reinforcing 
existing patterns of labour market inequality and precarity. Weak labour 
markets dependent on low skills and localities of poverty within the 
areas of multiple deprivation have taken the brunt of intense economic 
restructuring (compare the accounts of Berry et al, 2020; Centre for 
Cities, 2020; Etherington, 2020; Guinan et al, 2020; Local Trust, 2020). 
Moreover, COVID- 19 related death rates in the most deprived areas 
are more than double those of the less deprived and the socioeconomic 
gap in COVID- 19 mortality is larger than the general mortality gap 
(ONS, 2020).
Economic recovery and growth models
The political economic geography of (de)growth and recovery is 
critical, with predictions of economic contraction being at least 20 per 
cent for the UK economy, compared to an OECD average of nearly 
10 per cent, with time periods being modelled and supply- chain 
critical sectors (such as advanced manufacturing) being hit hardest (see 
Gregory and Arnold, 2020; Midlands Engine, 2020). In March 2020, 
with a Coronavirus Act, the UK Government stepped in to rescue 
the economy with an unprecedented £350 billion financial package 
to support jobs, incomes and businesses, acting in nothing short of 
a ‘wartime … do whatever it takes’ measure by the Conservatives. 




‘furloughing’ 8 million jobs (covering one- third of all private sector 
employees), a massive new government loan guarantee scheme for 
businesses and a three- month mortgage holiday, was worth around 15 
per cent of the UK’s total GDP and far exceeds the scale of the rescue 
measures taken in the wake of the 2008 financial crash. There is limited 
provision for contingent workers identified by zero- hour or seasonal 
work and those in rented accommodation (see Etherington, 2020; 
Thomas et al, 2020). In short, the spectre of Lefebvre looms: ‘[t] he 
reproduction of the relations of production, both as a concept and as 
a reality, has not been “discovered”: it has revealed itself ’ (Lefebvre, 
1976: 7).
At the local level, LAs were asked by the government to ‘make things 
happen’ to prevent societal collapse, particularly for older and disabled 
people at risk. Councils were to be given ‘the resources they need[ed] 
to do the job’ (Jenrick, 2020:  1). The Local Resilience Forums, 
created under civil contingency planning legislation, were activated 
and previous discourses of ‘big community’ and ‘self- contained social 
units’ (Senior, 1969: 46) deployed at LA spatial scales in England and 
the city- region scale in Wales to provide the conditions for multi- 
agency strategic and operational responses. Gaps immediately emerged 
between the metagovernance rhetoric of planning (see Haughton 
et al, 2020) and the continued march of austerity and its impact on 
the local state. A study undertaken by the Special Interest Group of 
Municipal Authorities estimated, for England’s 343 LAs, a financial 
shortfall of £8  billion for 2020  – caused by increased emergency 
expenditure (food packages, social care, and so on) not covered by 
central government and lost revenues from business rates, council 
tax and commercial activity (Butler and Syal, 2020: 6; see also LGA, 
2020). In the case of Greater Manchester, the city- regional ‘comeback 
kid’ (Williams, 2020a: 3), government intervention initially covered 
only 12 per cent of the forecast financial impact of COVID- 19. 
This produced a shortfall of £541 million, putting Manchester City 
Council ‘on the brink of ruin’ (Williams, 2020b: 2). With civil society 
actors claiming locality experiences of ‘nothing like this since 1930s’ 
(Williams, 2020a: 3), wider claims of the fracturing and even ‘collapse 
of central- local relations’ in the wake of this crisis have been made 
(Harris, 2020; Williams, 2020c).
The ‘COVID- 19 crisis’ exemplifies what many who have made 
arguments around the FE and more broadly the concept of Social 
Reproduction (Bhattacharya, 2017) have been outlining. In simple 
terms, the functioning of the economy is fundamentally built on these 
concepts and when these foundations are rocked, the entire economy 
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very quickly starts to shake and crumble (see Berry et al, 2020). In 
this context, as we noted in the Introduction, the state is forced to 
reconcile an ongoing tension between the neoliberal necessity to 
maintain the expansion of surplus value, the accumulation strategy of 
the economy at large, with the need to sustain social harmony and 
its own legitimation during the crisis. This is most prescient in the 
context of care, healthcare being obvious, but also broader notions of 
social care (including childcare, disability care, care for the elderly and 
so on; see Askew, 2009). Many currently working from home have 
discovered this for themselves; without the support of nurseries, schools 
and home caring services, their ability to complete a day’s labour has 
become increasingly difficult. Added to this, has been an awareness of 
what industries really matter in a crisis by what is comprehended as 
‘key work/ worker’; those who have had to keep going despite obvious 
risk represent the parts of economy and society that cannot be allowed 
to stop in order to not only maintain the current economy, but the 
fabric of society itself. There are also parts of the economy and society 
that simply cannot afford to stop or cannot work remotely from home. 
This is either due to the nature of their employment, particularly those 
self- employed, or the nature of the work they do, which has meant 
COVID- 19 has increased their precarity.
The need for and belief in a FE solution to the contemporary crisis, 
however, has not been reflected in the policy choices of the past 10 
to 15 years. Whereby, the focus shifted towards the maintenance and 
recovery of the neoliberal accumulation strategy, for the UK state, 
following the 2008 global financial crisis. This coincided with an 
ideological attack on the functioning of the state (especially the local 
state) via austerity, as we have outlined here. ‘Austerity localism’ (Griggs 
et al, 2017), which we have identified through this book, and associated 
with austerity plus the devolution of risk and responsibility away from 
the state to protect both state and market from undue demands on their 
resources, defines this retrenchment of the local state and has greatly 
undermined a whole series of foundational institutions therein. This 
means austerity, combined with multiple waves of privatisation, in 
the years prior to the COVID- 19 crisis has routinely stripped sectors 
(particularly those around health, social care, worker support, police 
and LAs themselves) of their capacity to act with, or without, the 
current crisis, while focusing spending on other sectors of the economy 
(Monbiot, 2020). Yet, it is these underfunded parts of the economy, 
the state and more broadly civil society that are now most crucial to 
dealing with the crisis. Summarising these manifold economic and 
social concerns across the UK:
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The Covid- 19 pandemic has caught the United Kingdom 
woefully underprepared. The present crisis has revealed 
the distressed state of our local economies and the brittle 
condition of the local public sector, following decades of 
underinvestment and disrespect. At the same time, this dual 
public health and economic emergency has underscored 
the centrality of community to our everyday lives. As 
we ready ourselves to rebuild and reconstruct within the 
shattered post- Covid- 19 landscape, we must strive to make 
the economic recovery the starting point for economic 
reform and a new birth of community in this country. (Guinan 
et al, 2020: 3, emphasis added)
The redistributive switching of the UK state under austerity has 
also, in a deeply contradictory sense, sought to empower the ‘local’ 
via devolution to city regions. This has been a very specific form of 
‘empowerment’ (Amin et al 2002, 2003; Bailey and Wood, 2017), that 
should be viewed as a broader metagovernance state strategy, which 
is ‘spatially selective’ (Jones, 1997) and seeks to only give agency to 
certain strategically- significant actors. As we have demonstrated in this 
book, this economy- first narrative with an emphasis on agglomerative 
growth (often measured in terms of GVA uplift) has been written 
through the process of building city regions. This agenda has focused 
on high- end growth, while simultaneously ignoring the foundational 
aspects of the economy on which it is built (see Jonas, 2012; Schneider 
and Cottineau, 2019). This further distances ‘non- economic’ actors 
from positions of agency and through the creation of institutions such 
as LEPs, alongside devolution, city, and growth deals, new ‘citizenship 
regimes’ (see Jenson and Phillips, 1996) are collectively instilled. As 
our chapters have revealed, this positions civil society on the outside, 
whereby they have to contest (with some albeit limited success,) the 
prevailing direction of city- region building.
The cumulative consequences of the above have, of course, resulted 
in an unbalanced form of economy being developed. We have argued 
that the paralleled or entwined processes of austerity and city- region 
devolution have disempowered, depoliticised and weakened the 
structures of social reproduction in favour of a neoliberal growth 
model. This means that during the COVID- 19 crisis itself, the state 
is and has been less well equipped to deal with the strains that are 
being placed on it (Berry et al, 2020; Dodds et al, 2020; Etherington, 
2020). This could have catastrophic effects in the short to medium 
term with regards to how the crisis will develop, but it also grants an 
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opportunity to think through what next and what sort of economy 
should be built post- the- crisis.
Research agendas on foundational economy city regions
Commentators are talking about the need for ‘Local Marshall Plans’ to 
guide the economy in and through a period of ‘multifaceted recovery’ 
(Localis, 2020). In the coming months and years, it is hoped that the 
mistakes of austerity in the context of the COVID- 19 crisis, as well 
as the increased awareness to what the FE does as a vital service for 
people’s lives and livelihoods, pushes societal and governmental thinking 
towards a new way of conceptualising the economy that places these 
needs first. The FE is that part of the economy which produces essential 
goods and services consumed by all (regardless of income and status). 
This part of the economy is well suited to developing new models of 
co- production for the design and delivery of public services such as 
education, care for the elderly and housing, where LAs need to work 
with civil society. This different approach to areas of our lives, such as 
the provision of food in schools and social care, requires politicians to 
leave behind the austerity agenda and instead tap the power of purchase 
in more strategic and transformational ways to promote public health, 
social justice and ecological integrity. The Foundational Economy 
Collective (2018: 7– 11) accordingly points to a ten- point plan for post- 
crisis restructuring and renewal, which we feel provides city- region 
building with new opportunities and challenges:
 1. Start the extension of collective responsibility for foundational basics 
with health and care.
 2. After health, housing and energy are the other immediate 
foundational priorities.
 3. Food is altogether more complex but needs tackling.
 4. Introduce social licensing:  regulation which imposes social 
and environmental obligations on all corporate providers of 
foundational services.
 5. Reform taxes on income, expenditure and wealth to greatly increase 
the capacity of government to raise revenue.
 6. Disintermediate investment from pension funds and insurance 
company bailouts so that it goes directly into provision of 
material infrastructure.
 7. Shorten fragile long supply chains in foundational commodities 




 8. Every city, town and peripheral rural area should develop a live/ work 
transition plan within nation state and EU enabling frameworks.
 9. Rebuild technical and administrative capacity at all levels 
of government.
 10. Finally, the European countries need to accept some responsibility 
for completely inadequate foundational systems like health care in 
adjacent regions.
This extensive list points to a very different conception as to how 
to form governmental city- regional infrastructures and what their 
priorities should be. In short, it seeks to rebuild the capacities of 
the economy and the state (many lost through austerity) to give 
the support needed for citizens to live better lives in all places. This 
deviates greatly from the direction of travel perpetuated by the UK 
Government and development of city regions discussed throughout 
this book. City regions, if they are to have a future post- COVID- 19, 
need to be reconstituted to embrace the foundational aspects of the 
economy and be opened up towards more politicised and open forms of 
democratic participation. A repoliticisation project is urgently needed, 
which ‘attempts to rekindle political debate, whether by engaging 
with formal democratic institutions or by fusing “soft” institutions 
with mechanisms through which ideas and antagonisms can play out’ 
(Deas et al, 2020: 4). Finally, as the COVID- 19 crisis in the UK and 
globally deepens, the unprecedented response, which has required, 
at high speed, increased investment in foundational aspects of the 
economy, as well as for new forms of financial support to be given, 
hints at what could and should be maintained after the crisis period. 
Whether this happens is a very different question.
A future research agenda for civic expansion and ‘civic repair’ 
(Lockwood, 1999) city regions should be concerned with action and 
other research in specific FE sectors. This should draw on heterodox 
conceptions in which social innovation, place- based innovation, 
smart cities and mission- led innovation oblige us to reconsider what 
‘innovation’ actually means today and who are its principal agents. The 
‘foundational turn’ points to the following questions: to what extent are 
local and regional growth policies focusing on foundational sectors? Are 
they addressing inclusive growth through social innovation in specific 
sectors? What forms of social innovation are being adopted in different 
regional contexts? How can interventions in FE sectors contribute to 
regional growth and civic gain? Addressing these points will deliver 
significant theoretical and empirical findings of relevance to academics 
and policymakers addressing the area of city- regions research. These 
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include: economic development (broadly), smart cities, regional studies, 
urban studies and place- based innovation in the contemporary crisis 
and beyond. In the UK context, 50 years on, a key question raised by 
the Royal Commission on Local Government in England remains for 
civil society and city- region building endeavours, with a contemporary 
reminder offered by Cumbers on democratic structures now being 
urgently needed to underpin economic life:
If one wants the interests of a region as a whole to prevail 
through the democratic process, one must create a structure 
which enables these interests to find effective expression in action. 
If one creates a structure that gives only sectional interests 
the power to take positive action, it is no use expecting the 
electoral process to negate itself in order to avert the natural 
consequences of one’s folly. To do so is not an act of faith 
in human altruism: it is an act of sabotage to democracy. 
(Senior, 1969: 22, emphasis added)
A functioning democracy, in a stable and civilized society, 
is one that respects the rights of individuals, citizens and 
communities to participate on equal terms in the public and 
civic realms of society. Given the central importance of the 
economy in providing the resources necessary for a society 
to flourish, the decision making around these resources 
should be a matter for public engagement and democratic 





 1 See www.libdemvoice.org/ devo- sheffield- announced- transport- skills- business- 
support- housing- no- mayor- 43737.html
Chapter 4
 1 See www.walesonline.co.uk/ business/ appointments/ cardiff- capital- region 
reveals- board- 14299732
 2 See www.bbc.co.uk/ news/ uk- wales- 42737949
Chapter 5
 1 Anglesey, Conwy, Denbighshire, Flintshire, Gwynedd and Wrexham.
 2 In its original sense ‘metrophilia’ refers to a fetish for poetry, but is used in this 
context to refer to a fetish for narratives that valorise the metropolis.
 3 See www.bbc.co.uk/ news/ uk- wales- 46031434; www.bbc.co.uk/ news/ 
uk- wales- politics- 46482907
 4 In 2011, the percentage of people aged 3+ who can speak Welsh in Gwynedd (NW 
Wales) was 65.4 per cent, whereas in Wrexham (NE Wales) it was 12.9 per cent.
 5 See www.countytimes.co.uk/ news/ 17684963.mid- wales- g rowth-  
deal- minister- pleased- with- progress- in- powys/ 
Chapter 6
 1 See www.walesonline.co.uk/ news/ wales- news/ police- reveal- project-  
centre- swansea- 16679624
 2 www.swanseabaycitydeal.wales/ news/ regional- green- light- for- 587- million- neath- 



















Allen, M. and Ainley, P. (2013) The Great Reversal:  Young People, 
Education and Employment in a Declining Economy, Radicaled, London.
Allmendinger, P. and Haughton, G. (2012) ‘Post- political spatial 
planning in England: a crisis of consensus?’ Transactions of the Institute 
of British Geographers, 37: 89– 103.
Allmendinger, P. and Haughton, G. (2015) ‘Post- political regimes 
in English planning:  from third way to big society’ in J. Metzger, 
P.  Allmendinger and S.  Oosterlynck (eds) Planning Against the 
Political:  Democratic Deficits in European Territorial Governance, 
Routledge, London, 29– 53.
Amin, A., Cameron, A. and Hudson, R. (2002) Placing the Social 
Economy, Routledge, London.
Amin, A., Cameron, A. and Hudson, R. (2003) ‘The alterity of the 
social economy’ in A.  Leyshon, R.  Lee and C.C. Williams (eds) 
Alternative Economic Spaces, Sage, London, 27– 54.
Askew, L.E. (2009) ‘ “At home” in state institutions: the caring practices 
and potentialities of human service workers’ Geoforum, 40: 655– 63.
Atkinson, R. and Flint, J. (2001) ‘Accessing hidden and hard- to- reach 
populations:  snowball research strategies’ Social Science Update, 33, 
Department of Sociology, University of Surrey.
Axinte, L.F. (2020) ‘Regenerative City Regions? A Case Study of 
Cardiff Capital Regions and its Future Generations’ Thesis submitted 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in City and Regional 
Planning, Cardiff University.
Axinte, L.F., Mehmood, A., Marsden, T. and Roep, D. (2019) 
‘Regenerative city- regions: a new conceptual framework’ Regional 
Studies, Regional Science, 6: 117– 129.
Ayres, S., Sandford, M. and Coombes, T. (2017) ‘Policy- making 
“front” and “back” stage: assessing the implications for effectiveness 
and democracy’ The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 
19: 861– 876.
Bailey, D. and Budd, L. (ed) (2016) Devolution and the UK Economy, 
Rowman & Littlefield, London.
Bailey, D. and Wood, M. (2017) ‘The metagovernance of English 
devolution’ Local Government Studies, 43: 655– 663.
Bailey, N. and Turok, I. (2001) ‘Central Scotland as a polycentric 
















City Regions and Devolution in the UK
158
Bakker, K. (2010) Privatising Water: Governance Failure and the World’s 
Urban Water Crisis, Cornell University Press, New York.
Barber, B.R. (2014) If Mayors Ruled the World: Dysfunctional Nations, 
Rising Cities, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT.
Beardmore, E. (2015) ‘No choice over mayor in £900m historic deal’ 
The Star, 3 October, 8– 9.
Beatty, C. and Fothergill, S. (2014) ‘The local and regional impact of 
the UK’s welfare reforms’ Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and 
Society, 7: 63– 79.
Beatty, C. and Fothergill, S. (2016) The Uneven Impact of Welfare Reform, 
Sheffield Hallam University, Sheffield.
Beatty, C. and Fothergill, S. (2017) Jobs Welfare and Austerity: How the 
Destruction of Industrial Britain Casts a Shadow Over Present Day Public 
Finances, CRESR, Sheffield Hallam University, Sheffield.
Bedale, C. (2016) ‘Health and Social Care Reform in Greater 
Manchester’ Presentation to Greater Manchester Association of TUCs 
Conference, 24 September.
Beel, D., Jones, M., Jones, I.R. and Escadale, W. (2017) ‘Connected 
growth: developing a framework to drive inclusive growth across a 
city- region’ Local Economy, 32: 565– 75.
Bell, A. and Hindmoor, A. (2009) Rethinking Governance: The Centrality 
of the State in Modern Society, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Bentham, J., Bowman, A., De la Cuesta, M., Engelen, E., Ertürk, 
I., Folkman, P., Froud, J., Johal, S., Law, J., Leaver, A., Moran, M. 
and Williams, K. (2013) ‘Manifesto for the Foundational Economy’ 
CRESC Working Paper 131, Centre for Research on Socio- Cultural 
Change, Manchester.
Berry, C. (2016) ‘Industrial policy change in the post- crisis British 
economy:  policy innovation in an incomplete institutional and 
ideational environment’ The British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations, 18: 829– 47.
Berry, C. and Giovannini, A. (eds) (2018) Developing England’s 
North:  The Political Economy of the Northern Powerhouse, Palgrave 
Macmillan, London.
Berry, C., O’Donovan, N., Bailey, D., Barber, A., Beel, D., Jones, K., 
McDaniel, S. and Weicht, R. (2020) The Covidist Manifesto: Assessing 
the UK State’s Emergency Enlargement, Future Economies UCRKE, 
Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester.
Bevan Foundation and Joseph Rowntree Foundation (2017) 
Everyone Better Off:  Why Cardiff Capital Region’s Growth Must be 


















Bhattacharya, T. (2017) Social Reproduction Theory: Remapping Class, 
Recentering Oppression, Pluto, London.
BIS (2010a) ‘Understanding local growth’ BIS Economics Paper, 
Number 7, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, London.
BIS (2010b) Skills for Sustainable Growth, Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills, London.
BIS (2011) The Plan for Growth, Department for Business, Innovation 
and Skills, London.
BIS (2015) ‘Evaluation of the employer ownership of skills pilot, round 
1: initial findings’ BIS Research Paper, Number 221, Department 
for Business, Innovation and Skills, London.
Blackaby, D., Drinkwater, S., Murphy, P., Leary, N.O. and Staneva, A. 
(2018) ‘The Welsh economy and the labour market’ Welsh Economic 
Review, 26: 1– 12.
Blanco, I., Griggs, S. and Sullivan, H. (2014) ‘Situating the local in 
the neoliberalisation and transformation of urban governance’ Urban 
Studies, 51: 3129– 46.
Bock, B.B. (2016) ‘Rural marginalisation and the role of social 
innovation:  a turn towards exogenous development and rural 
reconnection’ Sociologia Ruralis, 56: 552– 73.
Bogdanor, V. (1999) Devolution in the UK, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford.
Bogdanor, V. (2019) Beyond Brexit: Towards a British Constitution, IB 
Tauris, London.
Bowman, D., Froud, J., Joha, S., Law, J., Leaver, A., Moran, M. and 
Williams, K. (2014) The End of the Experiment: From Competition to 
the Foundational Economy, Manchester University Press, Manchester.
Braudel, F. (1981) The Structure of Everyday Life, Civilization and 
Capitalism, Volume 1, Harper and Row, New York.
Breathnach, P. (2014) ‘Creating city- region governance structures in 
a dysfunctional polity: the case of Ireland’s national spatial strategy’ 
Urban Studies, 51: 2267– 84.
Brenner, N. (2004) New State Spaces: Urban Governance and Rescaling 
of Statehood, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Brenner, N. (2019) New Urban Spaces:  Urban Theory and the Scale 
Question, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Brenner, N. and Elden, S. (eds) (2009) State, Space, World: Selected 
Essays, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MT.
Brenner, N. and Schmid, C. (2011) ‘Planetary urbanisation’ in 
M. Gandy (ed) Urban Constellations, Jovis, Berlin, 10– 13.
Brenner, N., Peck, J., and Theodore, N. (2012) Afterlives of 



















City Regions and Devolution in the UK
160
Bristow, G. (2018) ‘Reflections on the Welsh economy: remanence, 
resilience and resourcefulness’ Welsh Economic Review, 26: 13– 20.
Bristow, G. and Healy,  A. (2015) ‘Crisis response, choice and 
resilience:  insights from complexity thinking’ Cambridge Journal of 
Regions, Economy and Society, 8: 241– 56.
Burn, C. (2017) ‘How station saga helped to derail devolution hopes’ 
Yorkshire Post, 22 September, 17.
Burnett, K. (2016) ‘Northern Powerhouse, northern politics’ in 
‘Powering on:  The Northern Powerhouse, two years in’ New 
Statesman, 19– 25 February, 22.
Burnham, P. (2014) ‘Depoliticisation: economic crisis and political 
management’ Policy and Politics, 42: 189– 206.
Buser, M. (2013) ‘Democratic accountability and metropolitan 
governance:  the case of South Hampshire, UK’ Urban Studies, 
51: 2336– 53.
Butler, P. and Syal, R. (2020) ‘Coronavirus crisis may leave English 
councils with £5bn funding shortfall’ The Guardian, 26 April, 6.
Callinicos, A. (2012) ‘Contradictions of austerity’ Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, 36: 65– 77.
Calzada, I. (2017) ‘Metropolitan and city- regional politics in the urban 
age: why does “(smart) devolution” matter?’ Palgrave Communications, 
3, SSRN, London.
Centre for Cities (2015) ‘Northern Powerhouse’ Factsheet, 2 June, 
Centre for Cities, London.
Centre for Cities (2020) ‘Coronavirus:  feature’ Briefing, 27 April, 
Centre for Cities, London.
CESI (2014) The Work Programme: How Is It Performing? Centre for 
Economic and Social Inclusion, London.
Chaney, P. (2016) ‘How does single party dominance influence civil 
society organisations engagement strategies? Exploratory analysis of 
participative mainstreaming in a “regional” European polity’ Public 
Policy and Administration, 31: 122– 46.
Clarke, G.R., Martin, R. and Tyler, P. (2016) ‘Divergent cities? 
Unequal urban growth and development’ Cambridge Journal of Regions, 
Economy and Society, 9: 259– 68.
Cochrane, A. and Massey, D. (1989) ‘Developing a socialist urban 
policy’ in P. Alcock, A. Gamble, P. Lee and A. Walker (eds) The Social 
Economy and the Democratic State: A New Policy Agenda for the 1990s, 
London, Lawrence and Wishart, 132– 54.



















Cox, K. (1989) ‘The politics of turf and the question of class’ in M. Dear 
and J. Wolch (eds) The Power of Geography: How Territory Shapes Social 
Life, Unwin Hyman, London, 61– 90.
Cox, K. (1998) ‘Spaces of dependence, space of engagement and the 
politics of scale, or:  looking for local politics’, Political Geography, 
17: 1– 14.
CRESC (2015) ‘What Wales could be’, Report for FSB Wales, Centre 
for Research on Socio- Cultural Change, Manchester.
Crouch, C. (2004) Post- Democracy, Polity, Cambridge.
Crouch, C. (2020) Post- Democracy After the Crisis, Polity, Cambridge.
Cumbers, A. (2012) Reclaiming Public Ownership:  Making Space for 
Economic Democracy, ZED Books, London.
Cumbers, A. (2020) The Case for Economic Democracy, Polity, Cambridge.
Cumbers, A., Helms, G. and Swanson, K. (2010) ‘Class agency and 
resistance in the older industrial city’ Antipode, 42: 46– 73.
D’Arcy, C., Gardiner, L. and Rahman, F. (2019) Low Pay in Greater 
Manchester, Resolution Foundation, London.
Danson, M., MacLeod, G. and Mooney, G. (2012) ‘Devolution and 
the shifting political economic geographies of the United Kingdom’ 
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 30: 1– 9.
Darling, J. (2016) ‘Privatising asylum: neoliberalisation, depoliticisation 
and the governance of forced migration’ Transactions of the Institute of 
British Geographers, 41: 230– 43.
Davidson, J. (2020) #Futuregen: Lessons from a Small Country, Chelsea 
Green Publishing, London.
Davidson, M. and Ward, K. (2018) Cities Under Austerity: Restructuring 
the US Metropolis, SUNY Press, New York.
Davies, J.S. and Blanco, I. (2017) ‘Austerity urbanism:  patterns of 
neoliberalisation and resistance in six cities and the UK’ Environment 
and Planning A, 49: 1517– 36.
Davies, P. (2011) The Role of Local Enterprise Partnerships in Tackling 
Skills Needs. 157 Group, London.
Davies, R. (1999) ‘Devolution: a process, not an event’ The Gregynog 
Papers, Cardiff.
Dean, J. (2009) Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies: Communicative 
Capitalism and Left Politics, Duke University Press, Durham, NC.
Dear, M. and Wolch, J. (1987) Landscapes of Despair:  From 
Deinstitutionalisation to Homelessness, Polity, Cambridge.
Deas, I. (2013) ‘Towards a post- political consensus in urban policy? 
Localism and the emerging agenda for regeneration under the 




















City Regions and Devolution in the UK
162
Deas, I. (2014) ‘The search for territorial fixes in subnational 
governance: city- regions and disputed emergence of post- political 
consensus in Manchester, England’ Urban Studies, 51: 2285– 314.
Deas, I., Haughton, G. and Ward, K. (2020) ‘Scalar postpolitics, 
inclusive growth and inclusive economies: challenging the Greater 
Manchester agglomeration model’ Cambridge Journal of Regions, 
Economy and Society, https:// doi:10.1093/ cjres/ rsaa022
DeVerteuil, G. (2016) Resilience in the Post- Welfare Inner City: Voluntary 
Sector Geographies in London, Los Angeles and Sydney, Policy 
Press, Bristol.
Devin, D., Bickerstaffe, T., Nunn, A., Mitchell, B., MacQuaid, R., 
Egdell, V. and Lindsay, C. (2011) The Role of Skills from Worklessness to 
Sustainable Employment with Progression, UKCES, Wath- upon- Dearne.
Dicks, B. (2014) ‘Participatory community regeneration: a discussion 
of risks, accountability and crisis in devolved Wales’ Urban Studies, 
51: 959– 77.
Dodds, K., Castan Broto, V., Detterbeck, K., Jones, M., Mamadouth, 
V., Ramutsindela, M., Varsanyi, M., Waschsmuth, D. and Yuan 
Woon, C. (2020) ‘Covid- 19 pandemic: territory, politics, governance 
dimensions of the crisis’ Territory, Politics, Governance, 8: 289–98.
Donald, B., Glasmeier, A., Gray, A. and Lobao, L. (2014) ‘Austerity in 
the city: economic crises and urban service decline’ Cambridge Journal 
of Regions, Economy and Society, 7: 3– 15.
Dore, J. (2020) ‘Message from the Leader of Sheffield City 
Council: Council Tax 2020– 21’ Sheffield City Council, Sheffield.
Dromey, J. and McNeil, C. (2017) Skills 2030: Why the Adult Skills 
System Is Failing to Build an Economy for Everyone, IPPR, London.
Duncan, S. and Goodwin, M. (1988) The Local State and Uneven 
Development: Behind the Local Government Crisis, Polity, Cambridge.
Economy, Infrastructure and Skills Committee (2017) City Deals and 
the Regional Economies of Wales, National Assembly for Wales, Cardiff.
Ekosgen (2012) Skills Enhancement Fund: Skills Research in the Sheffield 
City Region, Ekosgen, Sheffield.
Elliott, L. (2020) ‘The coronavirus has exposed the imbalances in 
modern Britain’ The Guardian, 3 May, 2.
Ellison, G., Glaeser, E.L. and Kerr, W. (2007) ‘What causes 
agglomeration? Evidence from coagglomeration patterns’ Working 
Paper, No. 07- 13, Centre for Economic Studies, US Census 
Bureau, Washington.



















Emmerich, M. (2017b) ‘Rejecting devo will scupper social progress’, 
Local Government Chronicle, 2 October, 6.
Emmerich, M. (2020a) ‘Important choices lie ahead’, The Municipal 
Journal, 2 March, 6.
Emmerich, M. (2020b) Levelling Up: Making Investment Appraisal Fit 
for Purpose, Metro- Dynamics, London.
Engelen, E., Froud, J., Sukhdev, J., Salento, A. and Williams, K. (2017) 
‘The grounded city: from competitivity to the foundational economy’ 
Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 10: 407– 23.
Etherington, D. (2020) Austerity, Welfare and Work: Exploring Politics, 
Geographies and Inequalities, Policy Press, Bristol.
Etherington, D. and Jones, M. (2009) ‘City- regions: new geographies 
of uneven development and inequality’ Regional Studies, 43: 247– 65.
Etherington, D. and Jones, M. (2016a) ‘The city- region chimera: the 
political economy of metagovernance failure in Britain’ Cambridge 
Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 9: 371– 89.
Etherington, D. and Jones, M. (2016b) ‘Devolution and disadvantage 
in the Sheffield City- Region: an assessment of employment, skills, 
and welfare policies’ Sheffield Solutions Policy Briefing, September, 
Faculty of Social Sciences, The University of Sheffield, Sheffield.
Etherington, D. and Jones, M. (2017) ‘Devolution, austerity and 
inclusive growth in Greater Manchester:  assessing impacts and 
developing alternatives’ Policy Brief, Staffordshire Business School, 
Staffordshire University, Stoke- on- Trent.
Ether ington, D. and Jones, M. (2018) ‘Restating the post- 
political: depoliticization, social inequalities, and city- region growth’ 
Environment and Planning A, 50: 51– 72.
EWERC (2017) Just Work in Greater Manchester, European 
Work and Employment Research Centre, Manchester Business 
School, Manchester.
Fairclough, N. (2010) Critical Discourse Analysis: The Study of Language, 
Routledge, London.
Fall, K. (2020) ‘My life in No 10’ Interview with Andrew Billen, The 
Times Magazine, 29 February, 44– 7.
Fawcett, P., Flinders, M., Hay, C. and Wood, M. (eds) (2017) 
Anti- Politics, Depoliticization, and Governance, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford.
Financial Times (2000) ‘Virus lays bare the frailty of the social contract’ 
Financial Times, 4 April, 10.
Finegold, D. and Soskice, D. (1988) ‘The failure of training in 


















City Regions and Devolution in the UK
164
Finn, D. (1987) Training Without Jobs, Macmillan, London.
Finn, D. (2015) Welfare to Work Devolution in England, Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation, York.
Florida, R. (2014) The Rise of the Creative Class, Revisited, Basic Books, 
New York.
Folkman, P., Froud, J., Johal, S., Tomaney, J. and Williams, K. (2016) 
Manchester Transformed: Why We Need a Reset of City Region Policy, 
Centre for Research on Socio- Cultural Change, The University of 
Manchester, Manchester.
Foster, E., Kerr, P. and Byrne, C. (2014) ‘Rolling back to roll 
forward:  depoliticisation and the extension of government’ Policy 
and Politics, 42: 225– 41.
Foundational Economy Collective (2018) The Foundational 
Economy: The Infrastructure of Everyday Life, Manchester University 
Press, Manchester.
Fraser, A. (2010) ‘The craft of scalar practices’ Environment and Planning 
D: Society and Space, 42: 332– 46.
Fujita, M. and Krugman, P. (1995) ‘When is the economy monocentric? 
Von Thünen and Chamberlin unified’ Regional Science and Urban 
Economics, 25: 505– 28.
Fuller, C. (2017) ‘City government in an age of austerity: discursive 
institutions and critique’ Environment and Planning A, 49: 745– 66.
Fuller, C. (2018) ‘Entrepreneurial urbanism, austerity and economic 
governance’ Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 
11: 565– 85.
Gardiner, B., Martin, R., Sunley, P. and Tyler, P. (2013) ‘Spatially 
unbalanced growth in the British economy’ Journal of Economic 
Geography, 13: 371– 89.
Glaeser, E. (2012) Triumph of the City, Macmillan, London.
GMCA (2018) Welfare Reform and Universal Credit in Greater Manchester, 
Greater Manchester Combined Authority, Manchester.
GMCDP (2018) Disabled People’s Manifesto, Greater Manchester 
Coalition for Disabled People, Manchester.
GMLC (2017) ‘ESA Claims’ A study by Paul Cosier, Great Manchester 
Law Centre, Manchester.
GMLC (2018) ‘Universal Credit roll- out: the end of social security’ 
Press Release 18 April, Greater Manchester Law Centre, Manchester.
Gooberman, L. (2017) From Depression to Devolution:  Economy and 
Government in Wales, 1934– 2006, University of Wales Press, Cardiff.
Goodwin, M., Duncan, S. and Halford, S. (1993) ‘Regulation theory, 
the local state and the transition of urban politics’ Environment and 





















Goodwin, M., Jones, M. and Jones R. (2005) ‘Devolution, constitutional 
change and the geographies of economic development: explaining 
and understanding the new institutional geographies of the British 
state’ Regional Studies, 39: 421– 36.
Goodwin, M., Jones, M. and Jones, R. (2012) Rescaling the 
State: Devolution and the Geographies of Economic Governance, Manchester 
University Press, Manchester.
Goodwin, M., Jones, M. and Jones, R. (2017) Rescaling the 
State:  Devolution and the Geographies of Economic Governance, 
Manchester University Press, Manchester. (New Preface for the 
paperback edition.)
Gough, J. (2014) ‘The difference between local and national capitalism, 
and why local capitalisms differ from one another: a Marxist approach’ 
Capital and Class, 38: 197– 210.
Gramsci, A. (1971) Prison Notebooks, Lawrence and Wishart, London.
Granqvist, K., Sarjamo, S. and Ma ̈ntysalo, R. (2019) ‘Polycentricity as 
spatial imaginary: the case of Helsinki City Plan’ European Planning 
Studies, 27: 739– 58.
Gray, M. and Barford, A. (2018) ‘The depth of the cuts: the uneven 
geography of local government austerity’ Cambridge Journal of Regions, 
Economy and Society, 11: 541– 63.
Gregory, M. and Arnold, P. (2020) ‘Understanding the potential 
economic impacts of Coronavirus’ Briefing, Ernst & Young, London.
Griggs, S., Howarth, D. and MacKillop, E. (2017) ‘The meta- 
governance of austerity, localism, and practices of depoliticization’ 
in P. Fawcett, M. Flinders, C. Hay and M. Wood (eds) Anti- Politics, 
Depoliticization, and Governance, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
195– 216.
Guinan, J., Leibowitz, J., McInroy, N. and McKinsey, S. (2020) Owning 
the Future: After Covid- 19, a New Era of Community Wealth Building, 
The Democratic Collective and the Centre for Local Economic 
Strategies, Manchester.
Hadjimichalis, C. and Hudson, R. (2014) ‘Contemporary crisis across 
Europe and the crisis of regional development theories’ Regional 
Studies, 48: 208– 18.
Hall, P. (2009) ‘Looking backward, looking forward: the city region 
in the mid- 21st century’ Regional Studies, 43: 803– 16.
Hall, P. and Tewdwr- Jones, M. (2010) Urban and Regional Planning, 
5th edition, London, Routledge.
















City Regions and Devolution in the UK
166
Harding, A. (2007) ‘Taking city regions seriously? Response to debate 
on “City- regions:  new geographies of governance, democracy 
and social reproduction” ’ International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research, 31: 443– 58.
Harris, J. (2020) ‘The pandemic has exposed the failings of Britain’s 
centralised state’ The Guardian, 25 May, 3.
Harrison, J. (2007) ‘From competitive regions to competitive city- 
regions: a new orthodoxy, but some old mistakes’ Journal of Economic 
Geography, 7: 311– 32.
Harrison, J. (2014) ‘Rethinking city regionalism as a production of 
new non- state spatial strategies: the case of Peel Holdings Atlantic 
Gateway strategy’ Urban Studies, 51: 2315– 35.
Harr ison, J. and Heley, J. (2015) ‘Governing beyond the 
metropolis:  placing the rural in city- region development’ Urban 
Studies, 52: 1113– 33.
Harvey, D. (2011) ‘Roepke lecture in economic geography – crises, 
geographic disruptions and the uneven development of political 
responses’ Economic Geography, 87: 1– 22.
Harvey, D. (2016) Abstract from the Concrete, Sternberg Press, 
Cambridge, MA.
Hastings, A., Bailey, N., Bramley, G. and Gannon, M. (2017) ‘Austerity 
urbanism in England:  the “regressive redistribution” of local 
government services and the impact on the poor and marginalised’ 
Environment and Planning A, 49: 2007– 24.
Hatcher, R. (2017) ‘The West Midlands Combined Authority has 
turned its back on inclusive economic growth to tackle inequality’ 
Mimeograph, Birmingham City University, Birmingham.
Haughton, G. (1999) ‘Community economic development: challenges 
of theory, method and practice’ in G. Haughton (ed) Community 
Economic Development, Routledge, London, 3– 22.
Haughton, G. and Allmendinger, P. (2015) ‘Fluid spatial 
imaginaries:  evolving estuarial city- regional spaces’ International 
Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 39: 857– 73.
Haughton, G., Allmendinger, P., Counsell, D. and Vigar, G. (2010) 
The New Spatial Planning: Territorial Management with Soft Spaces and 
Fuzzy Boundaries, Routledge, London.
Haughton, G., Allmendinger, P. and Oosterlynck, S. (2013) ‘Spaces of 
neoliberal experimentation: soft spaces, postpolitics, and neoliberal 
governmentality’ Environment and Planning A, 45: 217– 34.
Haughton, G., Deas, I. and Hincks, S. (2014) ‘Making an impact: when 
agglomeration boosterism meets anti- planning rhetoric’ Environment 

















Haughton, G., Deas, I., Hincks, S. and Ward, K. (2016) ‘Mythic 
Manchester: Devo Manc, the Northern Powerhouse and rebalancing 
the English economy’ Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and 
Society, 9: 355– 70.
Haughton, G., White, I. and Pinto, N. (2020) ‘Planning the post- 
pandemic era’ Town and Country Planning, April- May, 138– 40.
Healey, P. (2009) ‘City regions and place development’ Regional Studies, 
43: 831– 43.
Heinrich, V.F. (2005) ‘Studying civil society across the world: exploring 
the thorny issues of conceptualization and measurement’ Journal of 
Civil Society, 1: 211– 28.
Heley, J. (2013) ‘Soft spaces, fuzzy boundaries and spatial governance 
in post- devolution Wales’ International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research, 37: 1325– 48.
Henderson, G., Schuemaker, K. and Baker, R. (2013) Northern Skills 
for Northern Prosperity: The Rationale for Localising the Skills System in 
England, IPPR, London.
Henderson, J. and Ho, S.Y. (2014) ‘Re- forming the state’ Renewal: A 
Journal of Social Democracy, 22: 22– 41.
Hincks, S., Deas, I. and Haughton, G. (2017) ‘Real geographies, 
real economies and soft spatial imaginaries: creating a “more than 
Manchester” region’ International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 
41: 642– 57.
Hitchings, R. and Latham, A. (2020) ‘Qualitative methods I:  on 
the current conventions in interview research’ Progress in Human 
Geography, 44: 389– 98.
HM Government (2010) Local Growth: Realising Every Place’s Potential. 
Cm 7961, HM Government, London.
HM Government (2011) Localism Bill, HM Government, London.
HM Government (2013) Growth Deals, HM Government, London.
HM Government (2014) Sheffield City Region Agreement on Devolution, 
HM Government, London.
HM Government (2015a) Cities and Local Government Devolution Bill, 
HM Government, London.
HM Government (2015b) Sheffield City Region Devolution Agreement, 
HM Government, London.
HM Government (2016) Cardiff Capital Region City Deal, HM 
Government, London.
HM Government (2017) Swansea Bay City Region: A City Deal, HM 
Government, London.
HM Government (2018) Civil Society Strategy: Building a Future that 



















City Regions and Devolution in the UK
168
HM Government and Welsh Government (2019) North Wales Growth 
Deal: Heads of Terms Agreement, Welsh Government, Cardiff.
HM Treasury (2007) Review of Sub- National Economic Development and 
Regeneration, HM Treasury, London.
HM Treasury (2016) Northern Powerhouse Strategy, HM Treasury, London.
HoC Library (2018) ‘Further education: Post-16 Area Review’ Briefing 
Paper 7357, 21 May, House of Commons Library, London.
Hodson, M., McMeekin, A., Froud, J. and Moran, M. (2020) 
‘State- rescaling and re- designing the material city- region: tensions 
of disruption and continuity in articulating the future of Greater 
Manchester’ Urban Studies, 57: 198– 217.
Hoggart, K. (2005) The City’s Hinterland: Dynamism and Divergence in 
Europe’s Peri- Urban Territories, Ashgate, London.
Hoole, C. and Hincks, S. (2020) ‘Performing the city- 
region:  imagineering, devolution and the search for legitimacy’ 
Environment and Planning A, 52: 1583–601.
House of Commons Welsh Affairs Committee (2019) City Deals 
and Growth Deals in Wales: Second Report of Session 2019, House of 
Commons, London.
Hunt, T. (2015) ‘Comparing the post- crisis performance of the 
Sheffield, Brighton and Oxford city- region economies’ SPERI 
British Political Economy Brief, No. 17, The University of 
Sheffield, Sheffield.
IFS (2019) Inequalities in the Twenty- First Century: Introducing the IFS 
Deaton Review, London, IFS.
Imrie, R. and Raco, M. (2003) Urban Renaissance? Community and 
Urban Policy, Policy Press, Bristol.
Jenrick, R. (2020) ‘Communities Secretary’s statement on coronavirus 
(COVID- 19)’ Speech, 18 April, Ministry of Housing, Communities 
and Local Government, London.
Jenson, J. and Phillips, S.D. (1996) ‘Regime shift:  new citizenship 
practices in Canada’ International Journal of Canadian Studies, 
14: 111– 36.
Jenson, J. and Saint- Martin (2010) ‘New routes to social cohesion?’ 
Citizenship and the social investment state’ Canadian Journal of 
Sociology, 28: 77– 99.
Jessop, B. (1990) State Theory: Putting Capitalist States in their Place, 
Polity, Cambridge.
Jessop, B. (2000) ‘Governance failure’ in G. Stoker (ed) The New Politics 
of British Local Governance, Macmillan, London, 11– 32.




















Jessop, B. (2008) State Power:  A Strategic- Relational Approach, 
Polity, Cambridge.
Jessop, B. (2011) ‘Metagovernance’ in M. Bevir (ed) The Sage Handbook 
of Governance, Sage, London, 106– 123.
Jessop, B. (2012) ‘Economic and ecological crises: green new deals 
and no- growth economies’ Development, 55: 17– 24.
Jessop, B. (2014) ‘Repoliticising depoliticisation:  theoretical 
preliminaries on some responses to the American fiscal and eurozone 
debt crises’ Policy and Politics, 42: 207– 23.
Jessop, B. (2016a) The State: Past, Present, Future, Cambridge, Polity.
Jessop, B. (2016b) ‘Territory, politics, governance and multispatial 
metagovernance’ Territory, Politics, Governance, 4: 8– 32.
Jessop, B. (2020) Putting Civil Society in its Place:  Governance, 
Metagovernance, and Subjectivity, Policy Press, Bristol.
Jessop, B. and Sum, N.L. (2013) Towards a Cultural Political 
Economy:  Putting Culture in its Place in Political Economy, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham.
Johnson, M., Lucio, M.M., Cartwright, J., Mustchin, S. and Grimshaw, 
D. (2017) Just Work in Greater Manchester. Report 2. Manchester 
University of Manchester/ Alliance Business School, Manchester.
Jonas, A.E.G. (2012) ‘City- regionalism’ Progress in Human Geography, 
36: 822– 9.
Jonas, A.E.G. and Moisio, S. (2018) ‘City regionalism as geopolitical 
processes: a new framework for analysis’ Progress in Human Geography, 
42: 350– 70.
Jonas, A.E.G and Ward, K. (2007) ‘Introduction to a debate on “City- 
regions:  new geographies of governance, democracy and social 
reproduction” ’ International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 
31: 169– 78.
Jonas, A.E.G. and Wilson, D. (eds) (1999) The Urban Growth 
Machine:  Critical Perspectives, Two Decades Later, SUNY Press, 
Albany, NY.
Jonas, A.E.G and Wood, A. (eds) (2012) Territory, the State and Urban 
Politics, Ashgate, Farnham.
Jones, G.R., Meegan, R., Kennet, P. and Croft. J (2015) ‘The uneven 
impact of austerity on the voluntary and community sector: a tale of 
two cities’ Urban Studies, 53: 2064– 80.
Jones, L., Mann, R.  and  Heley, J.  (2013) ‘Doing space 
relationally:  exploring the meaningful geographies of local 

















City Regions and Devolution in the UK
170
Jones, M. (1997) ‘Spatial selectivity of the state? The regulationist 
enigma and local struggles over economic governance’ Environment 
and Planning A, 29: 831– 64.
Jones, M. (1999) New Institutional Spaces: Training and Enterprise Councils 
and the Remaking of Economic Governance, Routledge, London.
Jones, M. (2001) ‘The rise of the regional state in economic 
governance: “partnerships for prosperity” or new scales of state power? 
Environment and Planning A, 33: 1185– 211.
Jones, M. (2019a) Cities and Regions in Crisis: The Political Economy 
of Sub- National Economic Development, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar.
Jones, M. (2019b) ‘The march of governance and the actualities 
of failure:  the case of economic development twenty years on’ 
International Social Science Journal 227/ 228: 25– 41.
Jones, M., Orford, S. and Macfarlane, V. (eds) (2016) People, Place 
and Policy:  Knowing Contemporary Wales Through New Localities, 
Routledge, London.
Jones, R. (2012) ‘State encounters’ Environment and Planning D: Society 
and Space, 30: 805– 21.
Jones, R. (2019) ‘Governing the future and the search for spatial 
justice:  Wales’ Well- being of Future Generations Act’ Fennia, 
197: 8– 24.
Katz, B. and Bradley, J. (2014) The Metropolitan Revolution: How Cities 
and Metros Are Fixing Our Broken Politics and Fragile Economy, Brookings 
Institution Press, Washington DC.
Katz, B. and Nowak, J. (2017) The New Localism: How Cities Can Thrive 
in the Age of Populism, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC.
Katz, B. and Wagner, J. (2014) ‘The rise of innovation districts: a new 
geography of innovation in America’ Brookings, May, 1– 33.
Keating, M., Loughlin, J. and Deschouwer, K. (2013) Culture, 
Institutions and Economic Development: A Study of Eight European Regions, 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
Keep, E. (2014) What Does Skills Policy Look Like Now the Money has 
Run Out? Association of Colleges, London.
Keep, E. (2016) The Long- Term Implications of Devolution and Localism 
for FE in England, Association of Colleges, London.
Kennett, P., Jones, G., Meegan, R. and Croft, J. (2015) ‘Recession, 
austerity and the great risk shift. Local government and household 
impacts and responses in Bristol and Liverpool’ Local Government 
Studies, 41: 622– 44.
King, N. and Ives, E. (2019) A Rising Tide: Levelling up Left- behind 



















Krugman, P. (1998) ‘What’s new about the new economic geography?’ 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 14: 7– 17.
Le Galès, P. (2016) ‘Neoliberalism and urban change: stretching a good 
idea too far?’ Territory, Politics, Governance, 4: 154– 72.
Lee, N. (2017) ‘Powerhouse of cards? Understanding the “Northern 
Powerhouse” ’ Regional Studies, 51: 478– 89.
Lee, N. (2019) ‘Inclusive growth in cities:  a sympathetic critique’ 
Regional Studies, 53: 424– 34.
Lefebvre, H. (1976) The Survival of Capitalism:  Reproduction of the 
Relations of Production, Allison & Busby, London.
Leyshon, A. and Lee, R. (2003) ‘Introduction: alternative economic 
geographies’ in A. Leyson, R. Lee and C.C. Williams (eds) Alternative 
Economic Spaces, Sage, London, 1– 26.
LGA (2020) Re-thinking Local, Local Government Association, London.
Lindbolm, C.E. (1968) The Policy- Making Process, Prentice Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
Lindsay, C., Canduela, J. and Raeside, R. (2013) ‘Polarization in access 
to work- related training’ Economic and Industrial Democracy, 34: 205– 25.
Local Trust (2020) Communities at Risk: The Early Impact of Covid- 19 
on ‘Left Behind’ Neighbourhoods, Local Trust, London.
Localis (2020) Vital Signs: Building Regional Economic Resilience in the 
COVID Age, Localis, London.
Lockwood, D. (1999) ‘Civic integration and class formation’ British 
Journal of Sociology, 47: 531– 50.
Logan, J.R. and Molotch, H.L. (1987) Urban Fortunes: The Political 
Economy of Place, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA.
Lovering, J. (1983) ‘Gwynedd:  a county in crisis’ Coleg Harlech 
Occasional Papers in Welsh Studies, No. 2, Coleg Harlech, Harlech.
Lovering, J. (1999) ‘Theory led by policy: the inadequacies of the new 
regionalism (illustrated from the case of Wales)’ International Journal 
of Urban and Regional Research, 23: 379– 95.
Lovering, J. (2007) ‘The relationship between urban regeneration and 
neoliberalism:  two presumptuous theories and a research agenda’ 
International Planning Studies, 12: 343– 66.
Lyall, S., Wood, M. and Bailey, D. (2015) Democracy: The Missing Link 
in the Devolution Debate, New Economics Foundation, London.
MacKinnon, D. (2020) ‘Governing uneven development:  The 
Northern Powerhouse as a “state spatial strategy” ’ Territory, Politics, 
Governance https:// doi.org/ 10.1080/ 21622671.2020.1743202
MacLeavy, J. (2011) A ‘new politics’ of austerity, workfare and gender? 
The UK coalition government’s welfare reform proposals’ Cambridge 




















City Regions and Devolution in the UK
172
MacLeod, G. (1998) ‘In what sense a regional problem? Place hybridity, 
symbolic shape, and institutional formation in (post- )modern 
Scotland’ Political Geography, 17: 833– 63.
MacLeod, G. (2001) ‘New regionalism reconsidered:  globalization 
and the remaking of political economic space’ International Journal of 
Urban and Regional Research, 25: 804– 29.
MacLeod, G. (2013) ‘New urbanism/ smart growth in the Scottish 
Highlands: mobile policies and the post- politics in local development 
planning’ Urban Studies, 50: 2196– 21.
MacLeod, G. and Goodwin, M. (1999) ‘Reconstructing an urban 
and regional political economy:  on the state, politics, scale, and 
explanation’ Political Geography, 18: 697– 730.
MacLeod, G. and Jones, M. (1999) ‘Reregulating a regional 
rustbelt: institutional fixes, entrepreneurial discourse, and the “politics 
of representation”’ Environment and Planning D:  Society and Space, 
17: 575– 605.
MacLeod, G. and Jones, M. (2007) ‘Territorial, scalar, networked, 
connected:  In what sense a “regional world”?’ Regional Studies, 
41: 1177– 91.
Manchester City Council (2017) ‘Roll out of Universal Credit’ 
Resources and Governance Scrutiny Committee, 9 November, Manchester 
City Council, Manchester.
Manchester City Council (2019a) ‘The impact of welfare reform 
and Universal Credit on the Manchester economy’ Economy Scrutiny 
Committee, 6 March, Manchester City Council, Manchester.
Manchester City Council (2019b) ‘The Council’s 2019/ 2020 budget 
paper pack’ Documentation to be considered at the Resources and 
Governance Scrutiny Committee on 25 February and Budget Council 
on 8 March, Manchester City Council, Manchester.
Mann, R. and Plows, A. (2016) ‘East, west and the bit in the 
middle:  localities in North Wales’ in M.  Jones, S.  Orford, and 
V. Macfarlane (eds) People, Place and Policy: Knowing Contemporary 
Wales Through New Localities, Routledge, London, 95– 117.
Martin, R. (2015) ‘Rebalancing the spatial economy: the challenge 
for regional theory’ Territory, Politics, Governance, 3: 235– 72.
Martin, R., Sunley, P., Tyler, P. and Gardiner, B. (2016) ‘Divergent 
cities in post- industrial Britain’ Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy 
and Society, 9: 269– 99.

















Massey, D. (2015) ‘Vocabularies of the economy’ in S. Hall, D. Massey 
and M.  Rustin (eds) After Neoliberalism? The Kilburn Manifesto, 
Lawrence & Wishart, London, 3– 18.
McCann, P. (2016) The UK Regional- National Problem:  Geography, 
Globalisation and Governance, Routledge, London.
McKinsey & Company (2020) ‘Covid- 19 in the United 
Kingdom: assessing jobs at risk and the impact on people and places’ 
11 May, McKinsey & Company, London.
McNeil, C. (ed) (2010) Now It’s Personal: The New Landscape of Welfare- 
to- Work, Institute of Public Policy Research, London.
Meegan, R., Kennett, P., Jones, G. and Croft, J. (2014) ‘Global 
economic crisis, austerity and neoliberal urban governance in England’ 
Cambridge Journal of Regions Economy and Society, 7: 137– 53.
Melia, S. (2018) Does transport investment really boost economic 
growth? World Transport Policy and Practice, 23: 118– 28.
Midlands Engine (2020) ‘Economic impact of COVID- 19’ Editorial 
1, 28 April, Midlands Engine, Nottingham.
Midmore, P. (2018) ‘Rural development in Wales: looking backwards, 
looking forwards’ Welsh Economic Review, 26: 21– 8.
Mohan, G. and Mohan, J. (2002) ‘Placing social capital’ Progress in 
Human Geography, 26: 191– 210.
Monbiot, G. (2020) ‘Privatisation to blame for our tragic Covid- 19 
response’ The Guardian, 27 May, 3.
Morgan, K. (2018) ‘Experimental governance and territorial 
development’ Paper delivered at the OECD Seminar on Experimental 
Governance, 14 December. Cardiff University, Cardiff.
Muldoon- Smith, K. and Greenhalgh, P. (2015) ‘Passing the buck 
without bucks:  some reflections on fiscal decentralisation and the 
business rate retention scheme in England’ Local Economy, 30: 609– 26.
Nathan, M. and Overman, H. (2013) ‘Agglomeration, clusters, and 
industrial policy’ Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 29: 383– 404.
National Audit Office (2013) Funding and Structures of Local Economic 
Growth, Stationery Office, London.
National Audit Office (2016) English Devolution Deals. HC 948, 
Stationery Office, London.
Nelles, J. (2012) Competitive Metropolitan Policy: Governing Beyond Local 
Boundaries in the Imagined Metropolis, Routledge, London.
Nelson, K. (2017) Devolution in Greater Manchester:  Explanations, 



















City Regions and Devolution in the UK
174
New Economy Manchester (2015) Welfare Reform in Greater 
Manchester Impact on People, Services, Housing, and the Economy, New 
Economy, Manchester.
Newman, J. (2014) Landscapes of antagonism:  local governance, 
neoliberalism and austerity, Urban Studies, 51: 3290– 305.
Newman, J. and Clarke, J. (2009) Publics, Politics and Power: Remaking 
the Public in Public Services, Sage, London.
NIACE (2012) The Work Programme:  What is the Role of Skills? 
Leicester, NIACE.
Normington, D. and Hennessy, P. (2018) The Power of Civil Servants, 
Haus Publishing, London.
Norris, E. and Adam, R. (2017) All Change: Why Britain is Prone 
to Policy Reinvention and What Can Be Done About It, Institute for 
Government, London.
North Wales Economic Ambition Board (NWEAB) (2016) Growth 
Vision for the Economy of North Wales, NWEAB, Conwy.
North Wales Economic Ambition Board (NWEAB) (2018) A Growth 
Deal for North Wales: Smart, Resilient and Connected, NWEAB, Conwy.
North West TUC (2018) A City Region Employment Charter, North 
West TUC, Liverpool.
O’Brien, P. and Pike, A. (2015) ‘City deals, decentralisation and the 
governance of local infrastructure funding and financing in the UK’ 
National Institute Economic Review, 233: R14– R26.
O’Brien, P. and Pike, A. (2019) ‘ “Deal or no deal?” Governing urban 
infrastructure funding and financing in the UK City Deals’ Urban 
Studies, 56: 1448– 76.
Offe, C. (1984) Contradictions of the Welfare State, Hutchinson, London.
Offe, C. (1985) Disorganized Capitalism: Contemporary Transformations 
in Work and Politics, Polity, Cambridge.
Omstedt, M. (2016) ‘Reinforcing unevenness: post- crisis geography 
and the spatial selectivity of the state’ Regional Studies, Regional Science, 
3: 99– 113.
ONS (2020) ‘Deaths involving COVID- 19 by local area and 
socioeconomic deprivation:  deaths occurring between 1 March 
and 17 April 2020’ Statistical Bulletin, 1 May, Office for National 
Statistics, Newport.
Orford, S. and Webb, B. (2018) ‘Mapping the interview 
transcript: identifying spatial policy areas from daily working practices’ 
Area, 50: 529– 41.
Otten, J. (2014) ‘Devo Sheffield announced: transport, skills, business 




















Overman, H. (2012) ‘Investing in the UK’s most successful cities 
is the surest recipe for national growth’ Politics and Policy Blog, 
LSE, London.
Overman , H. (2014) ‘Making an impact: misreading, misunderstanding, 
and misrepresenting research does nothing to improve the quality 
of public debate and policy making’ Environment and Planning A, 
46: 2276– 82.
Overman, H., Rice, P. and Venables, A.J. (2007) Economic Linkages 
Across Space, Centre for Economic Performance, London.
Pain, K. (2008) ‘Examining “core- periphery” relationships in a global 
city- region:  the case of London and South East’ Regional Studies, 
42: 1161– 72.
Painter, J. (2005) ‘Governmentality and regional economic strategies’ 
in J. Hillier and E. Rooksby (eds) Habitus: A Sense of Place, Aldershot, 
Ashgate, 131– 57.
Painter, J. and Goodwin, M. (2000) ‘Local governance after Fordism: a 
regulationist perspective’ in G. Stoker (ed) The New Politics of British 
Local Governance, London, Macmillan, 33– 53.
Payne, J. and Keep, E. (2011) One Step Toward, Two Steps Back? Skills 
Policy in England Under the Coalition Government, SKOPE, Cardiff.
Peck, J. (1995) ‘Moving and shaking: business élites, state localism and 
urban privatism’ Progress in Human Geography, 19: 16– 46.
Peck, J. (2012) ‘Austerity urbanism’ City, 16: 626– 55.
Peck, J. (2014) ‘Pushing austerity: State failure, municipal bankruptcy 
and the crises of fiscal federalism in the USA’ Cambridge Journal of 
Regions, Economy and Society, 7: 17– 44.
Peck, J. and Theodore, N. (2000) ‘Work first: welfare- to- work and 
the regulation of contingent labour markets’ Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, 24: 119– 38.
Peck, J. and Theodore, N. (2015) Fast Policy: Experimental Statecraft 
at the Thresholds of Neoliberalism, University of Minnesota Press, 
Minneapolis, MN.
Peck, J. and Tickell, A. (1994) ‘Jungle law breaks out: neoliberalism 
and global- local disorder’ Area, 26: 317– 26.
Peck, J. and Tickell, A. (2012) ‘Apparitions of neoliberalism: revising 
“Jungle law breaks out” ’ Area, 44: 245– 9.
Pemberton, S. (2016) ‘Statecraft, scalecraft and local government 
reorganisation in Wales’ Environment and Planning C: Government and 
Policy, 34: 1306– 23.

















City Regions and Devolution in the UK
176
Pemberton, S. and Shaw, D. (2012) ‘New forms of sub- regional 
governance and implications for rural areas: evidence from England’ 
Planning Practice & Research, 27: 441– 58.
Penny, J. (2016) ‘Between coercion and consent:  the politics of 
“cooperative governance” at a time of ‘austerity localism’ in London’ 
Urban Geography, 38: 1– 22.
Perraudin, F. (2016) ‘Sheffield region’s bid to absorb Chesterfield faces 
legal setback after ruling’ The Guardian, 22 December, 16.
Pidd, H. (2020) ‘Go big or go home to heal UK divide, report tells 
No 10’ The Guardian, 27 February, 15.
Pike, A., Rodriguez- Pose, A., Tomaney, J., Torrisi, G. and Tselios, V. 
(2012) ‘In search of the “economic dividend” of devolution: spatial 
disparities, spatial economic policy, and decentralisation in the UK’ 
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 30: 10– 28.
Pike, A., Marlow, D., McCarthy, A., O’Brien, P. and Tomaney, J. 
(2015) ‘Local institutions and local economic development: the local 
enterprise partnerships in England, 2010- ’ Cambridge Journal of Regions, 
Economy and Society, 8: 185– 204.
Pike, A., MacKinnon, D., Coombes, M., Champion, T., Bradley, 
D., Cumbers, A., Robinson, L. and Wymer, C. (2016) Uneven 
Growth: Tackling City Decline, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, York.
Pike, A., Coombes, A., O’Brien, P. and Tomaney, J. (2018) ‘Austerity 
states, institutional dismantling and the governance of sub- national 
economic development:  the demise of the regional development 
agencies in England’ Territory, Politics, Governance, 6: 118– 44.
Pitt, T. (2020) Beyond Levelling Up: The Conservative Case for Tackling 
Inequalities of Income and Wealth, Social Market Foundation, London.
Polanyi, K. (1957) The Great Transformation:  The Political Economic 
Origins of Our Time, Beacon Press, Boston, MA.
Pugalis, L. and Townsend, A.R. (2012) ‘Rebalancing England: Sub- 
national development (once again) at the crossroads’ Urban Research 
& Practice, 5: 157– 74.
Raffas, T. (2017) ‘Demanding activation’ Journal of Social Policy, 
46: 349– 65.
Rafferty, A. and Jelley, R. (2018) ‘Ways to promote a responsible 
business agenda in UK cities: Greater Manchester’ Inclusive Growth 
Analysis Unit Report, University of Manchester, Manchester.
Rallings, C. and Thrasher, M. (2006) ‘“Just another expensive talking 
shop”: public attitudes and the 2004 regional assembly referendum 
in the North East of England’ Regional Studies, 40: 927– 36.


















Redcliffe- Maud, L. and Wood, B. (1974) English Local Government 
Reformed, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Rhodes, R. (2007) ‘Understanding governance: ten years on’ British 
Politics, 4: 1243– 64.
Rigby, D.L. and Brown, W.M. (2013) ‘Who benefits from 
agglomeration’ Regional Studies, 49: 28– 43.
Roberts, C. (2017) The Inbetweeners: The New Role of Internships in the 
Graduate Labour Market, IPPR, London.
Royal Society of Arts (RSA) (2014) Unleashing Metro Growth: Final 
Recommendations of the City- Growth Commission, Royal Society of 
Arts, London.
RSA (2016) Inclusive Growth Commission:  Emerging Findings, Royal 
Society of Arts, London.
RSA (2017) Inclusive Growth Commission: Making the Economy Work for 
Everyone, Royal Society of Arts, London.
Rubery, J., Grimshaw, D., Keizer, A. and Johnson, M. (2018) 
‘Challenges and contradictions in the “normalising” of precarious 
work’ Work, Employment and Society, 32: 509– 27.
Rutherford, T. (2006) ‘Local representations in crisis:  governance, 
citizenship regimes, and UK TECs and Ontario local boards’ 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 24: 409– 26.
Sandford, M. (2018) ‘Devolution to local government in England’ 
Briefing Paper, Number 07029, 4 May, House of Commons 
Library, London.
Sandford, M. (2019) ‘Money talks: the finances of combined authorities’ 
Local Economy, 34: 106– 22.
Sandford, M (2020) ‘Conceptualising “generative power”: evidence 
from the city- regions of England’ Urban Studies, 57: 2098– 114.
Schneider, C. and Cottineau, C. (2019) ‘Decentralisation versus 
territorial inequality: a comparative review of English region policy 
discourse’ Urban Science, 3: 1– 22.
Scott, A. (ed) (2001) Global City- Regions: Trends, Theory, Policy, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford.
Scott, A. (2019) ‘City- regions reconsidered’ Environment and Planning 
A, 51: 554– 80.
Scott, A. and Storper, M. (2003) ‘Regions, globalization, development’ 
Regional Studies, 37: 579– 93.
Senior, D. (1969) Royal Commission on Local Government in England 



















City Regions and Devolution in the UK
178
Shaw, K. and Tewdwr- Jones, M. (2017) “‘Disorganised 
devolution”:  reshaping metropolitan governance in England in a 
period of austerity’ Raumforschung und Raumordnung/ Spatial Research 
and Planning, 75: 211– 24.
Sheffield City Council (2011) Unemployment and Worklessness in 
Sheffield, Children and Young People’s Services Lifelong Learning 
and Skills, Sheffield.
Sheffield City Council (2013) Sheffield Economic Strategy, Sheffield City 
Council, Sheffield.
Sheffield City Region Local Enterprise Partnership (2013) Made in 
Sheffield: A Deal for Growth, Sheffield LEP, Sheffield.
Sheffield City Region Local Enterprise Partnership (2014) A Strategic 
Economic Plan: A Focused 10 Year Plan for Private Sector Growth 2015– 
2025, Sheffield LEP, Sheffield.
Sheffield Fairness Commission (2012) Making Sheffield Fairer, Sheffield 
Fairness Commission, Sheffield.
Sheffield First Partnership (2010) Sheffield Economic Masterplan, Sheffield 
First Partnership, Sheffield.
Sheffield First Partnership (2012) The Sheffield Employment Strategy, 
Sheffield First Partnership, Sheffield.
Sheffield First Partnership (2013) Sheffield Economic Masterplan, Sheffield 
First Partnership, Sheffield.
Sheffield First Partnership (2014) State of Sheffield 2014, Sheffield First 
Partnership, Sheffield.
Sheffield First Partnership (2016a) State of Sheffield 2016, Sheffield First 
Partnership, Sheffield.
Sheffield First Partnership (2016b) ‘Devolution: the future for Sheffield. 
Understanding the challenges and opportunities for our city’ Seminar 
Report, Sheffield First Partnership, Sheffield.
Shildrick, T. (2018) Poverty Propaganda: Exploring the Myths, Policy 
Press, Bristol.
Shucksmith, M. (2008) ‘New Labour’s countryside in international 
perspective’ in M. Woods (ed) New Labour’s Countryside: Rural Policy 
Since 1997, Policy Press, Bristol, 57– 76.
Shukaitis, S. (2013) ‘Recomposing precarity: notes on the laboured 
politics of class composition’ Ephemera, 13: 641– 58.
Smith, N. (1990) Uneven Development: Nature, Capital and the Production 
of Space, Blackwell, Oxford.
Smith Institute (2017) Devo– Work:  Trade Unions, Metro Mayors and 
Combined Authorities, Smith Institute, London.
SSAC (2018) Universal Credit: Addressing the Risks of Managed Migration, 





















Storper, M. (2013) Keys to the City: How Economics, Institutions, Social 
Interaction, and Politics Shape Development, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, NJ.
Swansea Bay City Region (2016) Swansea Bay City Region: A City 
Deal 2016– 2035, Swansea Bay City Region, Swansea.
Swyngedouw, E. (2009) ‘The antinomies of the postpolitical city: in 
search of a democratic politics of environmental production’ 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 33: 601– 20.
Swyngedouw, E. (2010) ‘Post- democratic cities. For whom and for 
what?’ Paper presented to the Regional Studies Association Annual 
Conference, 26 May, Pecs, Budapest.
Swyngedouw, E. (2018) Promises of the Political:  Insurgent Cities in a 
Post- Political Environment, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Thomas, P., Etherington, D., Jeffery, B., Beresford, R., Beel, D. 
and Jones, M. (2020) Tackling Labour Market Injustice and Organising 
Workers:  The View from a Northern Heartland, Sheffield Hallam 
University, Sheffield.
Thompson, M. (2020) ‘What’s so new about New Municipalism?’ Progress 
in Human Geography https:// doi.org/ 10.1177/ 0309132520909480
Thompson, M., Nowak, V., Southern, A., Davies, J. and Furmedge, 
P. (2020) ‘Regrounding the city with Polanyi:  from urban 
entrepreneurialism to entrepreneurial municipalism’ Environment and 
Planning A, 52: 1171– 94.
Tomaney, J. (2016) ‘Limits of devolution:  localism, economics and 
post- democracy’ The Political Quarterly, 87: 546– 52.
Tomaney, J. and Pike, A. (2020) ‘Levelling up?’ The Political Quarterly, 
91: 43– 8.
Torrance, D. (2020) ‘ “A process, not an event”: devolution in Wales, 
1998– 2020’ Briefing Paper, Number CBP- 8318, House of Commons 
Library, House of Commons, London.
Toynbee, P. and Walker, D. (2017) Dismembered: How the Attack on the 
State Harms Us All, Guardian Books, London.
TUC (2014) TUC Submission to the City Growth Commission, 
TUC, London.
UK Parliament (2016) Select Committee on the Constitution, The Union 
and Devolution. 10th Report of Session 2015– 16, HL Paper 149, UK 
Parliament, London.
UK2070 Commission (2020a) Make No Little Plans – Acting At Scale 
For a Fairer and Stronger Future, UK2070 Commission, Sheffield.
UK2070 Commission (2020b) Civil Society Perspectives on Inequality: Focus 

















City Regions and Devolution in the UK
180
UKCES and Centre for Cities (2015) City Deals and Skills, Centre 
for Cities, London.
Umney, C. (2018) Class Matters: Inequality and Exploitation in Twenty- 
First Century Britain, Pluto, London.
UNISON (2016) ‘Public Consultation on the devolved powers 
in Greater Manchester’ UNISON North West response, May, 
UNISON, Manchester.
Vainikka, J. (2015) ‘Identities and regions: exploring spatial narratives, 
legacies and practices with civic organizations in England and 
Finland’, Nordia Geographical Publications, 44: 1– 72.
VCSE (2016) ‘Greater Manchester Voluntary, Community and Social 
Enterprise, Devolution Reference Group’, GMCVO Information 
Sheet, Manchester.
Vickers, I., Spear, R., Brennan, G. and Syrett, S. (2017) Cities, the Social 
Economy and Inclusive Growth: A Practice Review, Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation, York.
Waite, D. (2015) ‘City profile: Cardiff and the shift to city- regionalism’ 
Cities, 48: 21– 30.
Waite, D. and Bristow, G. (2019) ‘Spaces of city- regionalism: 
conceptualising pluralism in policymaking’ Environment and Planning 
C: Government and Policy, 37: 689– 706.
Waite, D. and Morgan, K. (2019) ‘City deals in the polycentric 
state: the spaces and politics of Metrophilia in the UK’ European Urban 
and Regional Studies, 26: 382– 99.
Waite, D., MacLennan, D. and O’Sullivan, T. (2013) ‘Emerging city 
policies: devolution, deals and disorder’ Local Economy, 28: 770– 85.
Wales Rural Observatory (2009) Deep Rural Localities, Wales Rural 
Observatory, Aberystwyth.
Ward, K. and Jonas, A.E.G. (2004) ‘Competitive city- regionalism as 
a politics of space: a critical reinterpretation of the new regionalism’ 
Environment and Planning A, 36: 2119– 39.
Ward, K., Newman, J., John, P., Theodore, N., Macleavy, J. and 
Cochrane, A. (2015) Whatever happened to local government? 
A review symposium, Regional Studies, Regional Science, 2: 435– 57.
Ward, N. (2006) ‘Rural development and the economies of rural areas’ 
in J. Midgley (ed) A New Rural Agenda, IPPR, London, 46– 67.
Ward, S.V. (1988) The Geography of Interwar Britain, Routledge, London.
Webber, D., Healy, A. and Bristow, G. (2018) ‘Regional growth paths 
and resilience: a European analysis’ Economic Geography, 94: 355– 75.
Welsh Government (2008) People, Places, Futures: The Wales Spatial 




















Welsh Government (2011) City Regions Task and Finish Group: ‘City 
Regions’ Definition and Criteria, Welsh Government, Cardiff.
Welsh Government (2012) City Regions:  Final Report, Welsh 
Government, Cardiff.
Welsh Government (2015a) Well- Being of Future Generations Act: The 
Essentials, Welsh Government, Cardiff.
Welsh Government (2015b) White Paper, Reforming Local 
Government: Power to Local People, Welsh Government, Cardiff.
Welsh Government (2017a) Reforming Local Government: Resilient and 
Renewed, Welsh Government, Cardiff.
Welsh Government (2017b) Securing Wales’ Future:  Transition from 
the European Union to a New Relationship with Europe, Welsh 
Government, Cardiff.
Welsh Government (2017c) Moving North Wales Forward: Our Vision for 
North Wales and North East Wales Metro, Welsh Government, Cardiff.
Welsh Government (2018) ‘Regional economic and labour market 
profile, North Wales’ Statistical Bulletin, SB 44/ 2018.
Welsh Government (2019) ‘City region analysis’ StatsWales, 27 
November, Welsh Government, Cardiff.
Wharton, J. (2016) ‘The story so far’ in ‘Powering on: The Northern 
Powerhouse, two years on’ Supplement to the New Statesman, 19– 25 
February, 8– 9.
While, A., Gibbs, D. and Jonas, A.E.G. (2013) ‘The competitive 
state, city- regions, and the territorial politics of growth facilitation’ 
Environment and Planning A, 45: 2379– 98.
Whitehead, M. (2003) ‘In the shadow of hierarchy: metagovernance, 
policy reform and urban regeneration in the West Midlands’ Area, 
35: 6– 14.
Whitehead, M. (2005) ‘Between the marvellous and the 
mundane:  everyday life in the socialist city and the politics of 
the environment’ Environment and Planning D:  Society and Space, 
23: 273– 94.
Whitham, G. (2018) The Decline in Crisis Support in England, Greater 
Manchester Poverty Action, Manchester.
Wiggan, J. (2012) ‘Telling stories of 21st century welfare:  the UK 
coalition government and the neoliberal discourse of worklessness 
and dependency’ Critical Social Policy, 32: 383– 405.
Williams, J. (2020a) ‘ “We’ve seen nothing like this since the 1930s” – 
how will Greater Manchester’s economy bounce back from 

















City Regions and Devolution in the UK
182
Williams, J. (2020b) ‘Government refuses to promise councils will be 
paid back for “catastrophic” financial toll of coronavirus’ Manchester 
Evening News, 26 April, 3.
Williams, J. (2020c) ‘ “No way to run a country”: why Covid- 19 has 
exposed a key weakness in the British state’ Manchester Evening News, 
24 May, 7.
Wills, J. (2016) Locating Localism: Statecraft, Citizenship and Democracy, 
Policy Press, Bristol.
Winter, M. (2006) ‘Rescaling rurality: multilevel governance of the 
agro- food sector’ Political Geography, 25: 735– 51.
WLGA (2017) ‘Consultation on local approaches to poverty 
reduction:  The Well- Being of Future Generations Act and 
public service boards’ Response by the Welsh Local Government 
Association, Cardiff.
Wood, M. and Flinders, M. (2014) ‘Rethinking depoliticisation: beyond 
the governmental’ Policy and Politics, 42: 151– 70.
Woods, M. and Heley, J. (2017) ‘Conceptualisation of rural- urban 
relations and synergies’ ROBUST Deliverable 1.1., Department of 
Geography and Earth Sciences, Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth.
World Bank (2009) World Development Report:  Reshaping Economic 
Geography. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Yates, E. (2017) ‘Reproducing low- wage labour: capital accumulation, 
labour markets and young workers’ Industrial Relations Journal, 
48: 463– 81.
Zuege, A. (1999) ‘The chimera of the third way’ in L. Panitch and 
C. Leys (eds) Necessary and Unnecessary Utopias: Socialist Register 2000, 













ABRs (area- based reviews) 68
accelerators 145
accountability, impact of austerity 
on 65
Adam, R. 3
Adult Skills Budget 46, 60, 68




civil society as 36
agglomeration 4, 24, 81, 102, 120, 
121, 146
All Change; Why Britain Is So Prone 
to Policy Reinvention, and What 
Can Be Done about It, Institute 
of Government 3
‘anchor institutions’ 66, 73, 76, 144
Andrews, Leyton 85
Anglesey (Ynys Môn) 100, 111
Apprenticeship Grant for Employers 46
apprenticeships 46– 7, 54, 60, 70
area- based reviews (ABRs) 68
austerity 21, 23, 64, 81
‘austerity localism’ 150
austerity resistance/ mitigation by civil 
society actors 63, 64, 66– 7,  
69– 70, 71, 73, 74, 75– 7, 78
‘austerity urbanism’ 21, 63– 4
political economy in city 
regions 64– 7
‘downloading’ of to regions 65
GMCR (Greater Manchester City 
Region) 67– 71
LA (local authority) unions 32– 3
Northern Powerhouse 25
SBCR (Swansea Bay City Region 
and City Deal) 132– 3
SCR (Sheffield City Region) 50– 1
Wales 95– 7, 106
B
Bakker, K. 56






Belfast, City Deal 9
Bell, A. 43
Benefit Cap Extension, Greater 
Manchester 72
benefit cuts 71
Benefit Freeze, Greater Manchester 72
benefit sanctions 71, 76


















CAs (combined authorities) 8, 14, 23, 
24, 25, 26, 37, 46, 57, 64, 80, 81, 
82, 105
CCR (Cardiff Capital Region) 5, 9, 
21, 79– 80, 97– 8, 99, 105, 140
austerity geographies 95– 7
CCR Business Council 87– 99, 88
CCR Business Organisation 87
CCR Cabinet 87
CCR Economic Growth 
Partnership 87
City Deal 83, 86– 9, 87, 88, 88, 90, 
91, 97, 125
civil society 80, 91– 2, 96
creation of 82– 91, 87, 88, 88, 90
economic growth model 92– 3
GVA (gross value added) 89
scale and accountability 93– 5
Transition Board 86, 88, 91
central- local relations, Wales 83– 6
Ceridigion 106
Index












































































City Regions and Devolution in the UK
184
charities 29; see also civil society
Cheshire 106, 114
Cheshire and Warrington Local 
Enterprise Partnership 111
Chesterfield 41, 59
chimera 41, 43, 62
Cities and Local Government 
Devolution Act 2016 2, 8
City Deals 8, 9, 45– 6, 104– 5, 109
City Region Taskforce, Wales 84
city regions 5, 6
competition between 27
critiques of and missing links 13– 17
futures of 139– 42
growth, neoliberalism and civil society 
contexts 12– 13
limits of 119– 21
solutions 6– 9, 10, 11, 12
City Strategy Pathfinder (CSP) 45, 
50, 54
city- first approach 15, 25, 99, 105, 
120, 121, 129
city- region building 
Northern Powerhouse 25– 8, 26, 28
as a process 19– 20, 79
civic repair 140, 144– 7, 153– 4
civil society 5, 21, 28, 139, 140, 146
CCR (Cardiff Capital Region) 80, 
91– 2, 96
depoliticisation of 142– 4
GMCR (Greater Manchester City 
Region) 29– 30, 32– 3, 34– 8, 35, 
39, 73, 74, 75– 7
Northern Powerhouse 24– 5, 27, 
28– 38, 35
SCR (Sheffield City Region) 29,  
30– 1, 33– 4, 38– 9, 43
civil society actors 16, 18, 21, 141
austerity resistance/ mitigation 63, 64, 
66– 7, 69– 70, 71, 73, 74, 75– 7, 78
Civil Society Strategy: Building a Future 
that Works for Everyone, HM 
Government 1, 2– 3
Clegg, Nick 41
Coalition government (Conservative/ 
Liberal Democrat), 2010– 15 5, 8, 
23, 25, 99, 105
skills policy 45
combined authorities (CAs) 8, 14, 23, 
24, 25, 26, 37, 46, 57, 64, 80, 81, 
82, 105
Communist Party, Sheffield 44
Communities First 96
Community Care Grants 72
community groups 29
austerity resistance/ mitigation 73
see also civil society
‘competitive city’ 145
‘Connected North Wales’ 110
Conservative governments 1979– 90 
(Thatcher Governments) 44– 5
Conservative governments 2015– 6,  
23– 4, 25, 65, 129 
Conservative Party 5– 6
construal 18, 19, 131
Corbyn, Jeremy 135
Core Cities 8, 105
Coronavirus Act 2020 148
COVID- 19, FE (foundational 
economy) in post- COVID- 19 
period 147– 54
Cox, K. 19, 94
Crisis Loan awards 72
Crouch, C. 5
CSP (City Strategy Pathfinder) 45, 
50, 54
Cumbers, A. 66, 154
D
Darling, J. 14– 15
Davidson, M. 63
Davies, Ron 79
DBIS (Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills) 51
Dean, J. 61
Dear, M. 33
Deas, I. 4, 16, 146, 153
Deeside 111
de- industrialisation 7, 68, 75
Wales 111
Democracy: The Missing Link in the 
Devolution Debate (Lyall) 3
democratic deficit 43, 78, 82
Department for Business, Innovation 
and Skills (DBIS) 51
Department for Work and Pensions 
(DWP) 47, 67
depoliticisation 82, 141
of civil society 142– 4
Derbyshire 59
Derbyshire County Council 59
Derbyshire Dales 41
Derbyshire Employment and Skills 
Board 59
de- unionisation 69
‘Devo Manc’ see GMCR (Greater 
Manchester City Region)
‘Devo Sheffield’ see SCR (Sheffield 
City Region) (‘Devo Sheffield’)
devolution 1– 2, 21
regional 26
Devolution Agreements 21, 61








































































disability benefits, GMCR (Greater 
Manchester City Region) 71
disabled people, SCR (Sheffield City 
Region) 53, 59










city region scale 26– 7
FE (foundational economy) school 
of 22, 141– 2, 144– 54
economic governance, SCR (Sheffield 
City Region) 44– 8, 48
elite city deals see CCR (Cardiff 
Capital Region)
embeddedness 145
Emmerich, M. 23, 141
employment crisis, SCR (Sheffield City 
Region) 51– 4, 59
employment regulation 64
Employment Support Allowance, 




RDAs (Regional Development 
Agencies) 8
Enterprise Zones, North Wales 111
entrepreneurship, grassroots 145




FE (foundational economy) 22, 
141– 2, 144– 7
post- COVID- 19 147– 54
research agendas on FE city 
regions 152– 4
financial crisis, 2008 25, 65, 150
financialisation 141
SBCR (Swansea Bay City Region 
and City Deal) 132– 3
Finn, D. 78
Flinders, M. 142
Flintshire 100, 106, 114
Folkman, P. 145– 6
food banks, Greater Manchester 71
Fothergill, S. 72








‘Funding and Structures for Local 
Economic Growth,’ National 
Audit Office 3
Further Education 51, 60, 68
G
geographies of governance 21
‘geographies of representation’ 19
globalisation 14
GMCA (Greater Manchester 
Combined Authority) 34, 35– 6, 
71, 75
GMCR (Greater Manchester City 
Region) 81, 140, 141
austerity and uneven 
development 67– 71
austerity urbanism 63– 4
civil society 29– 30, 32– 3, 34– 8, 
35, 39
austerity resistance/ mitigation 73, 
74, 75– 7
GVA (gross value added) 69
health and social care devolution 35, 
67, 68
trade councils 75
welfare reform and social 
protection 64, 71– 3, 76– 7
see also Northern Powerhouse
Goodwin, M. 79
governance 65, 82
governance failure 21, 55– 6, 58
governance geography 6
SCR (Sheffield City Region) 21,  
42– 3, 55– 8, 61– 2
governmental depoliticisation 142; see 
also depoliticisation





Gray, M. 72– 3
Greater London Authority 1
Greater Manchester 106
COVID- 19 impact 149
health and social care devolution 37, 
67, 68

























































City Regions and Devolution in the UK
186
see also GMCA (Greater Manchester 
Combined Authority); GMCR 
(Greater Manchester City Region)
Greater Manchester Centre for 
Voluntary Organisation 76– 7
Greater Manchester City Region see 
GMCR (Greater Manchester 
City Region)
Greater Manchester Coalition of 
Disabled People 77
Greater Manchester Combined 
Authority (GMCA) 34, 35– 6, 
71, 75
Greater Manchester Devolution 
Deal 8– 9
Greater Manchester Health and Social 
Care Plan 75
Greater Manchester Law Centre 76– 7
Greater Manchester Strategic 
Workforce Engagement Board 76
Greater Manchester Voluntary, 
Community and Social Enterprise 
(VCSE) Devolution Reference 
Group 34– 7, 35, 38, 39, 77
gross value added (GVA) see GVA 
(gross value added)
‘grounded city’ 145
Growth Deals 8, 104– 5, 109
growth machines 12– 13, 31, 80, 120
Guinan, J. 151
GVA (gross value added) 31, 99, 151
CCR (Cardiff Capital Region) 89
GMCR (Greater Manchester City 
Region) 69
NWGD (North Wales Growth 
Deal) 107
SBCR (Swansea Bay City 
Region) 125, 128
SCR (Sheffield City Region) 59
Gwynedd (Meirionnydd) 106
H
Harrison, J. 14, 102– 3
Harvey, D. 18
Haughton, G. 13, 83, 121
Haywood, Elizabeth 84
Healey, P. 7
health and social care, devolution of in 
Greater Manchester 37, 67, 68
Health and Work Programme, 
GMCR 67
Heinrich, V.F. 5
Heley, J. 83, 84, 102– 3
Hindmoor, A. 43
HM Government 89
Civil Society Strategy: Building a Future 
That Works for Everyone 1, 2– 3
Local Growth: Realising Every Place’s 
Potential Cm 7961 1, 2
HM Treasury 8
housing associations 29; see also 
civil society




incapacity benefit claimants, SCR 
(Sheffield City Region) 53
inclusion 28, 61
‘inclusive growth’ approach 25
Inclusive Growth Commission, Royal 
Society of Arts 28, 61, 117
industrial relations 64
Industrial Strategy for the UK 39
innovation, grassroots 145
Institute of Government 
All Change; Why Britain Is So Prone to 
Policy Reinvention, and What Can 
Be Done about It 3
Institute for Public Policy Research 68
Internet Coast 126
interstitial places 22, 103, 104– 5
J
Jarvis, Dan 59
Jenson, J. 27, 91
Jessop, B. 5, 17– 18, 19, 23– 4, 25, 55, 
57, 58, 59, 91, 142, 143
Job Retention Scheme 148– 9
Job Seeker Allowance claimants 
Greater Manchester 71
SCR (Sheffield City Region) 52– 3
Johnson, Boris 147
Johnson, M. 66
Jonas, A.E.G. 16, 113
Jones, G.R. 29
Jones, M. 16, 19
Jones- Evans, Dylan 135, 137
Joseph Rowntree Foundation 72









Greater Manchester 69– 71









































































NE Wales 100, 107– 8, 114
NW Wales 100, 107– 8, 114
Labour Party 
Sheffield 44
Sheffield Labour Party, Fairness 
Commission 47, 55
see also New Labour governments, 
1997– 2010
LAs (local authorities) 8, 14, 63, 80, 81
COVID- 19 response and support 149
Derbyshire 59
impact of UC on 72– 3
Wales 83, 85– 6, 87, 88, 88, 100, 106
Lee, R. 140
Leeds City Region 81
Lefebvre, H. 144, 145, 149
LEPs (Local Enterprise Partnerships) 8, 




Lindblom, C.E. 18, 41
Liverpool 29, 106
Llanelli 121
Llanelli Wellness and Life Science 
Village project 128
local authorities (LAs) see LAs 
(local authorities)
Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) 8, 
14, 15, 23, 27, 31, 37, 45, 49, 
76, 80
local government reorganisation 21
Wales 85– 6, 87, 88, 88, 100, 106
Local Growth: Realising Every Place’s 
Potential Cm 7961, HM 
Government 1, 2
Local Resilience Forums 149
Local Skills Councils 45
localism 2, 21, 49, 58, 61, 140
‘austerity localism’ 150
London, centralisation of government 
and finance in 7






MacLeod, G. 16, 19, 102
Make No Little Plans – Acting at Scale 
for a Fairer and Stronger Justice, 
UK2070 Commission 3– 4
Manchester 64;
see also GMCR (Greater Manchester 
City Region); Greater Manchester
Manchester City Council 72, 73, 76
COVID- 19 impact 149
Massey, D. 7
Matthews, Terry 125
Mayoral authorities 8, 14
mayors, directly- elected 2, 41
MDA (Mersey Dee Alliance) 106, 
111, 114
metagovernance 151
CCR (Cardiff Capital Region) 79
SCR (Sheffield City Region) 21, 43, 
57– 8, 61– 2
‘Metro’ areas, North America 12
Metro- Dynamics 141
metrophilia 101– 2, 120– 1
SBCR (Swansea Bay City Region 
and City Deal) 130– 2
‘Metropolitics’ 41
Mid Ulster City Deal 9
Midmore, P. 104
Mid- Wales Growth Deal 9, 117
‘more jobs gap’ 69
Morgan, K. 101– 2, 121
N
National Assembly of Wales 1, 
9, 85; see also Welsh Assembly; 
Welsh Parliament
National Audit Office 60
‘Funding and Structures for Local 
Economic Growth’ 3
National Institute of Adult Continuing 
Education (NIACE) 54
National Union of Mineworkers 48
NE Wales 114
labour market 100, 107– 8, 114
see also North Wales; NWGD (North 
Wales Growth Deal)
Neath 121
Neath Port Talbot 123, 125, 137
neoliberalism 13, 61, 62, 64, 143
Thatcher Governments (Conservative 
governments, 1979– 90) 44– 5
US welfare provision 33
new citizenship regimes 25, 27, 37, 
39, 151
‘new civic offer’ 145– 6
New Economics Foundation 3
New Economy Manchester 69
New Labour governments, 1997– 2010 
23, 26, 45, 50
governance policy 7– 8
‘New Municipalism,’ North 
America 12

































































City Regions and Devolution in the UK
188
NIACE (National Institute of Adult 
Continuing Education) 54
Norris, E. 3
North America, ‘Metro’ areas and ‘New 
Municipalism’ approaches 12
North East Derbyshire 41
North East Metro 112
North of England 39;
see also NW England
North of UK 9, 26
North Wales 5, 100, 104
LAs (local authorities) 100, 105
as a region 105– 8, 107, 108
‘spatial imaginary’ 102, 109, 114
transport infrastructure 110, 111, 
113– 14, 115
Welsh language speakers 107
see also NE Wales; NW Wales; 
NWGD (North Wales 
Growth Deal)
North Wales Economic Ambition 
Board (NWEAB) 109, 110
North Wales Growth Deal 
(NWGD) see NWGD (North 
Wales Growth Deal)
North West TUC 75
Northern Ireland 1, 2, 9
Northern Ireland Assembly 1
Northern Powerhouse 9, 14, 19, 20, 
21, 23– 5, 38– 40, 67, 109, 116
building of city regions 25– 8,  
26, 28
civil society 24– 5, 27, 28– 38, 35
‘spatial imaginary’ 111
see also GMCR (Greater Manchester 
City Region); SCR (Sheffield 
City Region)




labour market 100, 107– 8, 114
see also North Wales; NWGD (North 
Wales Growth Deal)
NWEAB (North Wales Economic 
Ambition Board) 109, 110
NWGD (North Wales Growth 
Deal) 5, 9, 22, 100– 1, 108,  
109– 12, 116– 17, 140
agglomeration and spatial 
displacement 114– 15
critiques of 113– 15
evidence base for 112– 13
GVA (gross value added) 107





civil society as 36– 7
Offe, C. 17, 19
Oldham 64







Parc Adfer, Deeside 111
Peck, J. 24, 63, 83
Pemberton, S. 85, 94
Pembrokeshire 123, 131
People Plus 47, 49, 54
Phillips, S.D. 27, 91
Pike, A. 60, 69
Polanyi, K. 145
‘policy transfer’ 83
Port Talbot 121; see also Neath 
Port Talbot
‘post- democratic’ frameworks 62
post- political city regions 141, 142– 4
‘post- political’ frameworks 62
Powys 106
PricewaterhouseCoopers 46
private investment, SBCR (Swansea 
Bay City Region and City 
Deal) 133– 4




RDAs (Regional Development 
Agencies) 1, 7– 8, 23, 26, 45, 60





impact of austerity on 65
‘representational regimes’ 27– 8, 31




Royal Commission on Local 
Government in England 154
Royal Society of Arts, Inclusive Growth 



















































































rural regions 99– 101, 102– 3, 116, 131; 
see also North Wales; NWGD 
(North Wales Growth Deal); 




Salford Borough Council 76
SBCR (Swansea Bay City Region and 
City Deal) 5, 9, 22, 99, 105,  
119– 20, 121, 122, 122– 3, 123, 
124, 125, 125– 6, 127, 128, 
136, 140
austerity and financialisation 132– 3
conflicting aspirations in 129– 30
critiques of 128– 35
GVA (gross value added) 125, 128
metrophilia 130– 2
trickle- out 133– 5




devolution 1, 2, 7
Scott, A. 1, 4– 5, 6
Scottish Parliament 1
SCR (Sheffield City Region) (‘Devo 
Sheffield’) 5, 20– 1, 24– 5, 27, 28, 
41– 3, 58– 62, 81, 140
austerity, uneven development and 
employment crisis 50– 4, 59– 61
civil society 29, 30– 1, 33– 4, 38– 9, 43
economic governance and skills 44– 8, 
48, 59
governance and metagovernance 21, 
42– 3, 55– 8, 61– 2
GVA (gross value added) 59
LEP (Local Enterprise 
Partnership) 45, 46, 47, 49, 51
political geography 48
representation, accountability and 
democratic deficits 49– 50
Skills and Employment 
Partnership 46
see also Northern Powerhouse
Sector Skills Councils 45
Select Committee on the Constitution, The 
Union and Devolution. 10th Report 
of Session 2015– 2016, HL Paper 
149, UK Parliament 4 




Serco 47, 49, 54
service industries 44, 53, 68– 9
Shared Prosperity Fund 118
Sheffield 41
Manufacturing Innovation District 48
see also SCR (Sheffield City Region) 
(‘Devo Sheffield’)
Sheffield City Council 45
austerity cuts 51, 59
political control of 47, 55
Sheffield City Region see SCR 
(Sheffield City Region) 
(‘Devo Sheffield’)
‘Sheffield City Region Agreement on 
Devolution,’ HM Government 46
‘Sheffield City Region Combined 
Authority Devolution Deal,’ HM 
Government 46
Sheffield College 51
Sheffield First Partnership 45
Sheffield Labour Party, Fairness 
Commission 47, 55
Siencyn, Dyfrig 14– 15
skills, SCR (Sheffield City 
Region) 44– 8, 48, 51– 4, 58– 9, 60
Skills Funding Agency 46
‘Smart North Wales’ 110
SMEs (small and medium- sized 
enterprises) 145
SCR (Sheffield City Region) 52
skills development 46– 7
Snowdonia 111
social enterprises 29, 145;
see also civil society
Social Reproduction 149– 50
societal depoliticisation 143;
see also depoliticisation
South of UK 26
South West Wales 122– 3;
see also SBCR (Swansea Bay City 
Region and City Deal)
South Yorkshire 41, 47
Southeast of UK 7
‘spaces of dependency’ 19
‘spaces of engagement’ 19
‘spatial fixes’ 18
‘spatial imaginaries’ 19, 23– 4, 25, 29, 
38, 111
North Wales 102, 109, 112
spatio- temporal fixes 18, 24
Special Interest Group of Municipal 
Authorities 149
stabilisers 145
‘state spatial selectivity’ 19
state, the 17– 19
centralisation of 26
Stockport 64















































































City Regions and Devolution in the UK
190
Sustainability Transformation 
Partnerships, GMCR (Greater 
Manchester City Region) 68
Swansea 106, 120, 122, 123, 125
metrophilia 130– 2
see also SBCR (Swansea Bay 
City Region)
Swansea Bay City Region and City 
Deal (SBCR) see SBCR (Swansea 
Bay City Region and City Deal)





Tameside Poverty pledge 76
tax credit claimants, Greater 
Manchester 71, 72
‘Team North Wales’ 110
Thatcher Governments (Conservative 
governments, 1979– 90) 44– 5
Theodore, N. 24, 83
third sector 29; see also civil society
Thompson, M. 145
trade councils 75
trade unions 21, 66– 7
austerity resistance/ mitigation 63, 73, 
75– 6, 78
CCR (Cardiff Capital Region) 88
Greater Manchester 69– 70, 71
Trafford 64
Training and Enterprise Councils 45
Transition Boards 82
CCR (Cardiff Capital 
Region) 86, 91
Swansea Bay Transition Board 125– 6
transport infrastructure, North 
Wales 110, 111, 113– 14, 115
Travel to Work Areas, Swansea 123, 
123, 124
trickle- down effects 12, 27, 30, 31, 39, 
81, 93, 113, 114, 130– 1, 141




UC (Universal Credit) 65, 72– 3
and COVID- 19 148
GMCR (Greater Manchester City 
Region) 67, 71, 72, 77
UK Parliament 
Select Committee on the Constitution, 
The Union and Devolution. 10th 
Report of Session 2015– 2016, HL 
Paper 149 4
UK2070 Commission 139, 140
Make No Little Plans – Acting at Scale 
for a Fairer and Stronger Justice 3– 4
uneven development 4, 7, 12– 13, 14, 
15, 24, 65, 79, 80– 2, 137
CCR (Cardiff Capital Region) 92– 3
GMCR (Greater Manchester City 
Region) 67– 71
Northern Powerhouse 38– 9
NWGD (North Wales Growth 
Deal) 99, 100, 102– 3, 104
SCR (Sheffield City 
Region) 41, 50– 4
UNISON trade union 75
Universal Credit (UC) see UC 
(Universal Credit)
University of Manchester, Inclusive 
Growth Analysis Unit 75
US (United States) 
‘Metropolitics’ 41
neoliberalism and welfare 
provision 33
V
VCSE (Greater Manchester Voluntary, 
Community and Social Enterprise) 
Devolution Reference Group 34– 7, 
35, 38, 39, 77
voluntary groups 29
austerity resistance/ mitigation 73
see also civil society
W
Waite, D. 101– 2, 121
Wales 21
austerity 95– 7, 106
central- local relations 83– 6
city regions 9
de- industrialisation 110
devolution 1, 2, 7, 79– 80, 118
FE (foundational economy) 146– 7
independence 118
LA (local authority) restructuring  
85– 6, 87, 88, 88, 100, 106
see also CCR (Cardiff Capital 
Region); North Wales; NWGD 
(North Wales Growth Deal); 
SBCR (Swansea Bay City Region)
Wales Spatial Plan (WSP) 9, 83– 4, 106




welfare reform 21, 65
GMCR (Greater Manchester City 
Region) 71– 3
































































SCR (Sheffield City Region) 45, 47, 
49– 50, 60
Wellbeing of Future Generations Act 
2015 (Welsh Government) 95, 
129, 146– 7
Welsh Assembly 106
Economy, Infrastructure and Skills 
Committee 105, 129
see also National Assembly of Wales
Welsh Government 9, 79, 82, 84– 5, 
86, 87, 89, 129, 146– 7
and the NWGD 109, 112
Wellbeing of Future Generations Act 
2015 95, 129, 146– 7
Welsh Index of Multiple 
Deprivation 109
Welsh language speakers 107
Welsh Parliament 9;








women and employment 
SCR (Sheffield City Region) 53, 59
Wood, B. 6
Wood, M. 142
Work Choice, GMCR (Greater 
Manchester City Region) 67
Work and Health Programme, 
GMCR 67
Work and Pensions Select 
Committee 76
Work Programme (WP) see WP 
(Work Programme)
Workforce Engagement Protocol 76
Working Tax Credit 73
WP (Work Programme) 
GMCR (Greater Manchester City 
Region) 67
SCR (Sheffield City Region) 45, 47, 
49– 50, 53– 4, 60
Wrexham 100, 106, 114
WSP (Wales Spatial Plan) 9, 83– 4, 106
Y
Yates, E. 70– 1
Yorkshire Devolution Deal 59








































   D
avid Beel, M
artin Jones and Ian Rees Jones
The Civil Society and Social Change series provides interdisciplinary and comparative 
perspectives on the rapidly changing nature of civil society at local, regional, national 
and global scales. The series comprises a core set of edited volumes reporting on 
research findings from across the Wales Institute of Social and Economic Research 
and Data. 
Series editors: Ian Rees Jones, Cardiff University,  
Mike Woods, Aberystwyth University and Paul Chaney, Cardiff University
“Conceptually and empirically rich, this book provides an essential 
contribution to understand the evolution of the city-regions and 
devolution agenda, exposing the governance, socio-economic and 
democratic challenges that underpin it.” 
Arianna Giovannini, De Montfort University
ePDF and ePUB available Open Access under CC-BY-NC licence.
In recent years, the ‘city region’ has seen a renaissance as the de facto spatial centre 
of governance for economic and social development. 
Rich in case study insights, this book provides a critique of city-region building  
and considers how governance restructuring shapes the political, economic, social 
and cultural geographies of devolution. Reviewing the Greater Manchester, Sheffield, 
Swansea Bay City Regions, Cardiff Capital Region and the North Wales Growth  
Deal, the authors address the tensions and opportunities for local elites and civil 
society actors.
Based on original empirical material, situated within cutting-edge academic and 
policy debates, this book is a timely and lively engagement with the shifting 
geographies of economic and social development in Britain.
David Beel is Senior Lecturer in Political Economy at Manchester Metropolitan University.
Martin Jones is Professor of Human Geography and Deputy Vice-Chancellor at  
Staffordshire University.
Ian Rees Jones is Professor of Sociological Research at Cardiff University and Director of  
the WISERD ESRC Civil Society Research Centre.
9 781447 355014
ISBN 978-1-4473-5501-4
City Regions and 
Devolution in the UK
The Politics of Representation
David Beel, Martin Jones and Ian Rees Jones
policy.bristoluniversitypress.co.uk
PolicyPress@policypress@policypress
